特朗普想惩罚中国, 付出代价的却是美国人
文章来源: 纽约时报
11/27/2021
在威斯康星州埃文斯维尔，因为对中国进口商品加征关税的缘故，斯托顿拖车公司的员工停车场现在又停满了车。这家公司生产把集装箱运到美国各地所需的带轮子的钢框全挂车。由于中国生产的全挂车现在价格高得令人难以承受，斯托顿正在招聘数百名工人，而美国的其他人正在为这些新工作岗位掏钱。
关税导致了全挂车短缺，短缺又发生在进口需求激增之际，这是美国港口出现大堵塞的原因之一。关税也推高了价格。美国生产的全挂车已开始下线，但它们的价格高于加征关税前的中国全挂车，这提高了用全挂车运输的东西价格。
特朗普总统2018年对全挂车和一系列其他商品加征关税时，曾大声坚称，中国补贴出口行业是不遵守规则的做法。特朗普承诺，关税会保护美国制造商免受不公平竞争。拜登总统保留了这些关税。联邦政府今年征收到的关税将超过以往任何一年。
支持制造业是一个值得的目标。全挂车制造商要求联邦政府采取各种行动，包括移民法改革以扩大劳动力，为工人提供技术培训，以及为投资自动化提供税收优惠。
然而，政府却采取了限制竞争的做法，而不是通过进行长期投资来帮助企业竞争，这种懒惰的做法既代价高昂又适得其反。对来自中国的商品征收关税看起来像是在惩罚中国，但关税成本是由美国人支付的。
包括美国全挂车制造商在内的关税支持者认为，小幅提价对保住工作岗位来说是值得的。实际上，他们提出理由说，消费者几乎不会注意到这点儿价格上的差异。对全挂车的情况算算值不值还为时过早，但过去类似政策的例子表明，支持者的逻辑有问题。例如，奥巴马政府为了保护国内制造商，曾在2009年对中国轮胎征收关税。一项分析发现，关税保住了逾1200个轮胎制造岗位，成本是每个轮胎的价格提高了约25美元。
如果这乍看起来像是个公平交易，那么请考虑一下，把这个成本加起来等于美国消费者每年在轮胎上多花逾10亿美元，或者说他们为保住每个岗位花了100万美元，而这种工作岗位的年均工资约为4万美元。如果政府每年给这些工人发工资，让他们不要生产轮胎，这种做法省下的钱要多得多。
据芝加哥大学和联邦储备银行的经济学家做的一项研究，特朗普政府2018年对进口洗衣机征收关税，同样也在美国创造了1800个工作岗位，每个岗位给消费者带来的成本约为81.7万美元。
此外，虽然创造了一些工作岗位，但也流失了一些工作岗位。美联储的一项分析发现，特朗普的关税甚至没有增加政策意在支持的制造业工作岗位，因为减少竞争带来的好处，被某些零部件更高的成本和报复性关税所抵消。
斯托顿的埃文斯维尔工厂于1993年投产，制造多式联运集装箱和全挂车，这些是全球贸易基础设施的基础。这家工厂一直挺成功，直到21世纪初，中国国际海运集装箱（简称“中集集团”）开始以比斯托顿购买原材料的费用还低的价格向美国提供全挂车。到2006年时，这家威斯康星州的公司基本上停止了全挂车生产。美国近年来销售的新全挂车中，80%以上由中集集团生产。
2018年，特朗普决定对一系列中国商品加征25%的关税时，全挂车并不在清单上，它是在一场游说活动后加上去的。游说活动是宾夕法尼亚州的制造商猎豹全挂车发起的，这家制造商曾靠聚焦缝隙市场存活，它将中国全挂车描述为特朗普试图惩罚的不公平贸易做法的典型例子。猎豹董事长弗兰克·卡茨驳斥了货运公司所谓关税会导致价格上涨的抱怨。“他们真正的意思是，他们希望继续以不公平的低价购买全挂车，”卡茨说。
猎豹还敲响了国家安全的警钟，它聘请的一家游说事务所向贸易官员提出理由说，“受到威胁的恰是美国国内贸易的自由流动。”当然，这个说法对许多其他商品也正确，但一个试图一切靠自己生产的国家最终不会更安全。这种国家会变得更穷、更弱、更孤立。
美国全托车制造商们对25%的关税仍不满足，它们寻求得到对中国不公平地补贴中集集团的裁定，这种裁定会引发更高的关税。它们的理由是，中集集团应该受到更多惩罚，因为该企业抢在特朗普关税生效之前，在2018年把更多全挂车运到美国。斯托顿的首席执行官鲍勃·瓦林曾在2015年试图说服监管部门对来自中国的集装箱征收关税，但未成功。这次不同。今年5月，政府对全挂车加征了额外的关税，将总进口税提高到惊人的246%。几年前售价一万美元的中集集团全挂车，现在售价3.5万美元。
一个可预见的影响是，自2017年以来，从墨西哥进口的全挂车增加了两倍多。另一个影响是港口和卡车运输公司找不到足够多的全挂车。美国企业预计今年将生产约1.5万辆全挂车，仅能满足不到一半的年需求量。今年早些时候宣布打算购买1.3万辆全挂车的南卡罗来纳州港务局现在表示，估计在2023年前收不到货。
但猎豹和斯托顿得到了他们想要的。瓦林说，他的公司预计明年1月达到每周生产200辆全挂车的产量，公司还计划在美国南部开一家新厂，帮助将产量提高到每周500辆。他希望总共增加约500名工人，最低工资是每小时18美元。
但这个胜利是脆弱的。对中国全挂车征收的惩罚性关税将持续五年，这是为了让美国公司在市场上找到立足点。这种做法对太阳能等新兴行业也许可行。但如果成熟行业的公司今天无力竞争的话，它们怎么能够在未来竞争呢？
美国一些国内行业，比如钢铁，已经得到过几轮不成功的政府保护。其他行业，比如皮卡制造商和蔗糖种植者，已经处于联邦的工业保护计划下几十年。如果有临时关税保护措施导致产业回升的例子，我一直都没找到。
拜登应该与特朗普的破坏性关税政策彻底决裂。正确的解决办法很简单，但并不容易：支持创新，维护一个让企业能够蓬勃发展的环境，确保工人从中受益，并停止过多地担忧中国。
华尔街大佬警告美国: 企图控制中国只会适得其反
来源：今日西澳网
11/24/2021
澳大利亚“今日西澳网”11月23日文章，原题：华尔街亿万富翁警告美国：企图控制中国只会适得其反 瑞·达利欧因成功预测2008年的金融危机而一举成名。他创立了世界上规模最大的对冲基金——桥水基金，管理的资产达2230亿美元。两周后，他5年内的第3本书《正在变化的世界秩序》即将出版发行，该书通过深入研究几个世纪以来的经济起伏，尝试更好地理解当前的经济环境和挑战。
Jun 30, 2021
When China opened up to foreign investment four decades ago, many predicted capitalism would bring democratic change. But they were wrong. Emboldened by the 2008 financial crisis and now America’s catastrophic handling of the pandemic, Beijing is offering up its authoritarian model as a thriving alternative to the liberal values of the West.
瑞·达利欧指出，美国人误解了中国人和他们自己在历史上的地位。他写道：“对于美国人来说，300年好像是很久以前的事了，然而对于中国人来说，300年一点都不长。尽管发生革命或者战争推翻美国制度的前景对于大多数美国人来说是不可想像的，但是对于中国人来说，这两种前景看来是必然会发生的，因为他们（在漫长的历史中）一次又一次地经历这些事情。当大多数美国人专注于特定的事件时，尤其是那些正在发生的事情，大多数中国领导人则从更宏观、更具进化性的模式这一角度来观察事情。”
他认为，美国任何控制或者改变中国的企图都只会适得其反。他说：“鉴于中国了不起的过往表现以及背后的文化有多么深入人心，正如美国人不会放弃他们的价值观和制度一样，中国人也绝不会放弃他们的价值观和制度。企图迫使中国人和他们的制度变得更加美国化，对于他们来说，这意味着对他们最基本信仰的征服，他们将誓死保护他们的基本信仰。要想和平共处，美国人必须得明白：中国人认为他们的价值观以及他们实现这些价值观的方法是最好的，正如美国人认为他们的美国价值观和实现这些价值观的方式是最好的一样。”
他得出结论：“如果美国继续衰退、中国继续崛起的话，最重要的是每一方是否都能表现得优雅一点。”（作者安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，陈康译）
Wall Street billionaire warns US that trying to control China will backfire
By Andrew Ross Sorkin
11/24/2021
Ray Dalio made his name by predicting the financial crisis of 2008. He has built the world’s largest hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates, with some $US223 billion ($308 billion) under management. He has also become something of a public intellectual and life coach, advocating a particular style of management he describes as “radical transparency.”
In two weeks, his third book in five years, The Changing World Order, will be published. It is an attempt to better understand the current economic environment and the challenges that it presents by delving into centuries of economic ups and downs.
The book is a provocative read for those of us questioning where in the arc of history the American empire resides and what may happen to the economy next. There are few tomes that coherently map such broad economic histories as well as Dalio’s. Perhaps more unusually, Dalio has managed to identify metrics from that history that can be applied to understand today. He examined four empires: the Dutch, British, American and Chinese.
He writes that each followed almost the exact same path:
“Rising education leads to increased innovation and technology, which leads to an increased share of world trade and military strength, stronger economic output, the building of the world’s leading financial centre, and, with a lag, the establishment of the currency as a reserve currency. And you can see how for an extended period most of these factors stayed strong together and then declined in a similar order. The common reserve currency, just like the world’s common language, tends to stick around after an empire has begun its decline because the habit of usage lasts longer than the strengths that made it so commonly used.”
Today, Dalio is most concerned about the end of the American empire and the beginning of another Chinese empire, a transition he believes could lead to war. He writes that Americans misunderstand the Chinese and their own place in history:
“300 years seems like a very long time ago to Americans, but for the Chinese, it isn’t long at all. While the prospect of a revolution or a war that will overturn the US system is unimaginable to most Americans, both seem inevitable to the Chinese because they have seen those things happen again and again and have studied the patterns that inevitably precede them. While most Americans focus on particular events, especially those that are happening now, most Chinese leaders view current events in the context of larger, more evolutionary patterns.”
He believes any attempt by the United States to control or change China will only backfire:
“Given China’s impressive track record and how deeply imbued the culture behind it is, there is no more chance of the Chinese giving up their values and their system than there is of Americans giving up theirs. Trying to force the Chinese and their systems to be more American would, to them, mean subjugation of their most fundamental beliefs, which they would fight to the death to protect. To have peaceful coexistence Americans must understand that the Chinese believe that their values and their approaches to living out these values are best, as much as Americans believe their American values and their ways of living them out are best.”
Ultimately, he concludes that “If the US continues to decline and China continues to rise, what matters most is whether or not each can do so gracefully.”
I spoke to Dalio by video call, and he acknowledged that before doing the research, he “really didn’t have much of an understanding of the connection with internal conflicts, external conflicts, the cost of war — financial and non-financial — and the impact of nature.”
He was particularly shocked by the role of natural disasters on economies. “Nature, meaning climate, it was surprising to me — that it caused more revolutions and more deaths and wars and depressions,” he said.
Dalio said he’s not a pessimist. “I’m not trying to be fatalistic,” he said. “I am trying to give that arc. I’m trying to get measurements that are objective.”
Asked to name a comparable period in history that ended well, Dalio pointed to the late 1960s, during the Vietnam War and the War on Poverty, when the value of the dollar was decreasing and inflation was increasing rapidly. “We got through that with adjustments,” he said, “though we didn’t have an external power that was as strong as China.”
Another point of optimism, he said, is that “the worst case doesn’t affect most people as badly as it sounds when you read it.” He cited the Great Depression as an example. “Most people remained employed, and going through the wars, most people remained alive.”
Still, he is not convinced that central bankers can solve current challenges such as supply chain shortages and inflation, which is one of the reasons that he has become intrigued by cryptocurrencies, especially bitcoin.
He said one of the superpowers of the central bank is that most people don’t understand the relationship between monetary policy and the value of their money.
“It’ll be hidden,” he said. “People will look at how much they’re worth in nominal dollars, not in inflation-adjusted dollars. So they’ll say, ‘I’m safe,’ as they will lose 4, 5, 7 per cent per year.”
Dalio is convinced that if people better understood this and understood the various cycles of economies, their outcomes would be better, and crises would be easier to avert.
“I have a principle: If you worry, you don’t have to worry. And if you don’t worry, you have to worry.”
美国前国务卿：我不认为中国未来10年会打台湾
文章来源: 联合新闻网
11/20/2021
美国前国务卿季辛吉在预定周日（21日）播出的CNN专访中表示，他不认为中国在未来10年会以武力入侵台湾，但”绝对可能”寻求削弱台湾的地位。
季辛吉在接受CNN节目主持人扎卡利亚（Fareed Zakaria）访问时表示：”我不预期会全面攻击台湾，这么说吧，在10年的期间内，我只能看到这么远。”
高龄98岁的季辛吉也曾任国家安全顾问，促成1972年尼克松访问大陆。他说，”人人都想当对中国的鹰派，大家都认为中国决心称霸世界，这是中国的最大目标”。
但他说，美中之间不应该有想当然尔的敌对和竞争，他认为美国总统拜登在与习近平的视讯峰会上，”开始朝不同的方向移动”。
季辛吉说：”我们的最大目标应该是避免冲突，可以预见，中国将采取削弱台湾看起来已实质自治的能力。”
Kissinger Doesn’t See China Invasion of Taiwan in Next Decade
11/20/2021
(Bloomberg) — Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said he doesn’t foresee a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan in the next decade, though it’s “perfectly possible” that China will seek to weaken the island’s status.
“I don’t expect an all-out attack on Taiwan in, say, a 10-year period, which is as far as I can see,” Kissinger said in an interview on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS” to air Sunday.
Oct 9, 2021
Kissinger, 98, who also served as national security adviser and helped pave the way for President Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China, offered that “everyone wants to be a China hawk” and “everyone assumes that China is determined to dominate the world and that that is its primary objective.”
But he said there shouldn’t be an automatic rivalry and competition with the U.S., and that he thinks President Joe Biden during the virtual summit this week with Chinese leader Xi Jinping “began to move in a direction of a different road.”
China’s claim that Taiwan is a breakaway province to be retaken by force if necessary was a contentious part the Biden-Xi talks. A Chinese Communist Party resolution reflecting Xi’s agenda advocated pushing for union with Taiwan, though it stopped short of listing unification as a near-term goal.
“We should have a principal goal of avoiding confrontation,” Kissinger told CNN. Still, he said it’s “foreseeable” that China “will take measures that will weaken the Taiwanese ability to appear substantially autonomous.”
李显龙总理谈中美关系与台海局势
文 / 黎康
11/19/2021
李显龙总理星期三（17日）在彭博创新经济论坛（Bloomberg New Economy Forum）的晚宴上，接受了彭博社总编辑米思伟（John Micklethwait）的访问。
在长达45分钟的对谈中，李总理回答了关于国际形势、冠病疫情和新加坡相关的多个问题，尤其是就中美关系和台海局势问题展开了20分钟的交流。
中美思维方式的根本区别是什么？如何看待“东方崛起西方衰落”论？台海局势又是否一触即发？点击视频，听李显龙总理回答。
以下是文字实录：
米思伟：总理，如同迈克所说的，非常感谢你让我们来到这里，也感谢你再次与我对话。
李显龙：感谢你来，也感谢你再次组织这次对话。这是我们的第四次或第五次了。
米思伟：我想我们从国际形势开始，然后再具体谈冠病疫情以及新加坡。首先，中国和美国，今年早些时候或去年年底，你曾呼吁休战。我想知道，过去一周我们在联合国气候变化大会（COP）上看到了关于气候变化的协议，现在看到了习近平和拜登的谈话，这算得上是你呼吁的休战吗？
李显龙：我认为这是个必要的开始，两国之间的分歧多且深。分歧并不局限于个别课题，而是涉及到基本的思维方式。这不是一场会议或一份协议就能解决或缓解的。但美国和中国能在联合国气候变化大会（COP）达成一些共识是好事。两位领导人能够举行这次视讯会议并坦率交谈，也至关重要。
米思伟：你如何描述这两种不同的思维方式？你看到的根本区别是什么？
李显龙：这两个国家看待世界的方式非常不一样，看待彼此的方式也非常不同。对美国人来说，中国不仅是一个潜在的威胁，而是一个挑战者以及一个严重的问题，几乎是一个对手，这已成为两党非常强烈的共识。我不是说行政部门都是这样想的，但我认为这是美国社会的普遍看法，至少智库是这样想的。
与此同时，与中国的关系不仅是对抗性的战略平衡问题，它还涉及道德层面——对与错，我维护民主，你不是，我是人权，你不是。如果你以这样的方式定义问题，要过渡到谈共存，谈大家都生活在同一个地球上，就变得很困难。
在中国方面，我认为他们的许多记者和民众都有一个已经固定的观点，我想象一些领导也是一样，就是美国要拖慢中国并阻止中国崛起，以及美国后曾经帮助中国，给予他们永久最惠国待遇（MFN），允许他们加入世贸组织，促进了投资增长，让他们变成今天的样子。
第二点，他们有一种感觉，中国的时代已经到来，将在世界上占据应有的位置，这是可以理解的。但是，你以何种方式在世界上占据你应有的位置，作为一个非常大的玩家为许多不太大的玩家留出空间，这是一种敏感度和艺术，而它不是与生俱来的。
米思伟：你描述的这种有问题的思维方式，是否也涉及中国的时代已经到来，而美国的时代即将逝去？
李显龙：是的，也有那方面。有一种强烈的感觉，认为东方正在崛起，西方正在衰落，美国尤其是一个衰落的大国。我认为这是错误的。我可以了解什么让他们这样想。其他人有时也会这样想。但如果你从长远来看，你真的必须押注美国会从它对自己做的事情中恢复过来。
米思伟：我们可以看看它现在对自己做的其中一件事情吗？我们早些时候在会议上听到了雷蒙多的谈话。她在这里，非常卖力地推销美国印太经济框架。这是没有贸易协议的贸易协议，背后没有贸易协议。我猜想像新加坡这样的国家会更希望现在称为《跨太平洋伙伴全面进展协定》（CPTPP）的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP）能重启。美国在推销一个你们很难自然就倾向的概念。
李显龙：这些都是政治现实。《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP）原本是理想的作法。美国花了一些时间才认识到这一点，去决定这就是它希望与这个区域接触的方式，并推动这个旗舰性的实质性项目，它将不仅展示而且实际上深化美国与亚洲的接触和关系。
奥巴马亲自采纳了它。他花了很多时间推动领导人并使谈判取得进展。但我认为他没有做到的，也许就是不可能做到的，是在国内和国会中给予足够的推力。最后，他的时间不够了，不可能透过国会跛脚鸭会期将它夹带通过。反正，希拉里（克林顿）也不认同，当特朗普获胜时，事情也就到此为止了。而现在处于它已死的位置。我不是说它不能复活，但复活不会在三天或三年后发生。
所以，如果不能这样做，美国还能做什么？好，你仍需要以实质性的议程参与，而如果我不能，我可以谈数码化合作、绿色合作、人力资源合作。虽然缺了一块，但至少我不会在互动中缺席。
米思伟：你从一个卖家的角度非常热衷地谈论发言，但你其实是买家。你是必须决定它是好是坏的那个人。你是否还觉得它有用？
李显龙：它可以是有用的。我们正向美国以及亚太经合组织（APEC）一些成员国提出数码经济协议的想法。我们希望美国能参与其中。要民主党政府这么做并不容易，因为该政府上任时答应要照顾美国的中产阶级，所有事情都需要与此有联系。其实，所有事情最终都会与此有联系，但如果你坚持要立即和直接联系，那你或许会错失很多间接但有价值的计划。
米思伟：中国正申请加入《跨太平洋伙伴全面进展协定》（CPTPP）。台湾也是。你如何评估其中一方或是双方加入的机会？
李显龙：《跨太平洋伙伴全面进展协定》（CPTPP）的构建方式，欢迎任何愿意、且达到该协定相当高门槛与符合其精神的国家加入。在《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP）的构想下，我们就设想有一天中国会感兴趣，而中美同处一个TPP框架，将比两国签订双边自由贸易协定（FTA）来得更可能。我认为双方都逐渐想通，连最初不以为然、认定这个协定就是要针对自己的中国，后来也决定研究它。他们考虑了很久，终于说或许我们应该感兴趣。令人遗憾的是，美国人如今已不在里头了。
从经济角度来说，我认为这是理性的。从程序角度来说，CPTPP所有成员国达成共识后才能做出决定。当他们在考虑时，考虑的就不只是经济层面，也会有政治考量，战略和安全因素，以及其它任何他们或许正在讨论的双边关系问题和关注。
米思伟：而南中国海也是其中一部分……
李显龙：南中国海不是贸易议题，但亚太经合组织经济体或CPTPP成员国与中国之间也有贸易议题。我希望他们能解决所面对的问题。从长远来看，更多贸易要比少贸易来得好。我仍相信这点，尽管现在已不太流行。我希望这些事情获得解决的方法，能促进稳定和各国的整合。
米思伟：新加坡一直是多边主义的重要施惠者或受惠者。今早有趣的是，我们看到王岐山（中国国家副主席）的致辞，他提到多边和多边主义大概有20次。这个新的中国，带着礼物向你走来，承诺他是多边主义者。你相信吗？
李显龙：我认为他们说了正确的话，也尝试在做正确的事。我的意思是，如果中国说出我是一个单边主义者，你会觉得不对劲。他们声称是多边主义者，也想加入所有这些组织。事实上，他们希望投选一些自己人领导这些组织，一些联合国的组织就出现了激烈的竞争。他们（中国）想影响这些组织的条规，这都是合理的，因为他们已是一股可观的力量，他们要在世界上有相应的影响力。问题是，当一个非常主要的势力加入一个组织时，你要如何让该组织真正饯行多边主义。原则上，根据各国无论大小和平共存的五项原则，我们都是平等的，但在联合国的实际操作中，大家都知道有些国家比其他国家更平等。
米思伟：这就是说，房间里出现了一头大象。它可能比其他所有伙伴要大得多。
李显龙：是的，而且你必须与这个力量互动，它也需要对自己的运作方式有些自我意识，确保获得大家的接受，从而可以在不动用赤裸裸武力的情况下延续影响力。
米思伟：中国是否已达到这么考虑问题的境界，让你能想象他们坐在你身边，并差不多平等地对待所有人？
李显龙：没有强权平等对待所有人，但有些会做得比其它好些。
米思伟：他们做得更有礼一些。
李显龙：不，我不会说更有礼些。看看美国人，他们从二战结束后就待在亚太地区，在那之前已在菲律宾。七八十年后，依然受到这个地区的欢迎，而不是被视为丑陋的美国人，这说明了一些什么。
米思伟：如果中国加入CPTPP或没加入，会怎么反映出美国在这一区域的角色？
李显龙：如果中国加入CPTPP，美国在这一地区仍有角色可扮演。你在这里有投资、贸易、利益、朋友和盟友。我们希望在（美国）遍布全世界的关注事务时，你有时间经营世界这一部分，吱声不大，却有价值和有经济回报的关系。
米思伟：如果你是乔拜登，你会做什么来改变这个平衡？你说的一切，听起来你认为美国需要为这个区域投入的比现在稍多些。
李显龙：首先，我会尝试推动贸易。你不能签订自贸协议，但你会想推进贸易，尽管民主党的规则不允许。其次是发展与中国的关系，因为如果这个关系搞僵了，这个地区每个国家的处境都会变得更难。第三，不要止步于与中国发展关系，而也要经营你在这个地区的其他朋友和盟友。第二部分拜登正尝试在做。这是一段漫长旅程，但他已开始。朋友和盟友，他采取的方式相当明确，我认为人们都相信这点。他可以做的最后一件事，是确保2024年之后的（美国）总统，无论是哪个政党，也有和他相同想法。
米思伟：这非他力所能及……
李显龙：可惜的是，这非他力所能及，但这是非常重要的事。你必须能放远目光，因为美国的利益远远持续到2024年之后。
米思伟：关于这方面的最后一个问题，涉及到台湾。对于台湾将发生的事情，我们应该多担心？
李显龙：我认为我们应该关注。我不认为战争会在一夜之间发生，但这是一个可能出现意外或误判、需要细致处理的处境。有关国家都说对的话。上午的视频峰会上，拜登说，美国将坚持它的一个中国政策，他也提到了存在很久的台湾关系法。习近平则说，我们并不急于解决两岸问题。这是一个暗号，但我们都知道它的意思。在台湾，蔡英文博士说，我们呼吁各方维持现状。所以，每个人都说对的话，但如果你观察正在发生的事事态的发展，会发现情况并非静态。美国已显著提高与台湾的外交、甚至军事接触的能见度、级别和强度。
中国大陆一直在测试台湾的防空能力。大陆几乎每天都派遣飞机飞到台湾的防空识别区。这些飞机没有进入台湾的直接空域，但大陆是在测试台湾的防御能力，并压缩台湾的国际空间，在五年前或好几年前，大陆在这个问题上可以对台湾有些让步。在台湾方面，本届民进党政府不接受两岸各自表述的九二共识，并说，不，这不是一个可接受的构想，并采取了其他行动，例如，在他们的护照上，用英文印上“台湾护照”的字眼。
这些行动都引起了猜疑、紧张和焦虑，导致误判或意外更有可能发生。而且真的，你需要后退一步，“降温”这个词太强烈—冷静一点，想想如果你尝试了另一个选项后，你将有多后悔失去这个选项。
米思伟：你真的认为大陆是这么想的吗？你认为大陆会不会，当然、如果另一个选择是大陆控制台湾？
李显龙：不，我认为如果大陆相当清楚局势是稳定的，如果事态不会逐渐朝着不利于他们的方向发展，他们也许会更放松、慢慢观察事态演变。难点是，如果他们担心情况是往渐渐远离他们的方向发展，不是在经济层面上的离开，因为在经济层面上，我认为大陆将成为台湾经济越来越重要的因素，而是就台湾人民的态度以及国际环境而言。那么他们可能会判断，如果迟些，事态会变得更加复杂。因此，我认为这并不是大陆想马上解决的问题。不过我应该如何处理一个非常困难的问题？我的意思是，他们已经有香港这一个棘手的问题了。
米思伟：你提到了香港，我们就很快地谈一下。你认为香港是一个大陆增加管线权的地方吗？哪里的限制已经收紧了。
李显龙：我认为，根据香港在去年之前所发生的事情，很难想象这种情况能持续到2047年，到50年。这是不可能的。你不能这样治理这样一个地方。法律无法通过；政府的令状无法执行，而且有蔓延到越过一国两制边境的风险。所以，他们现在的情况是，问题被很坚决地压制了。我认为国际上，甚至是香港内部，都为此付出了代价；我也认为他们（中国）将从这里观察事态的演变。我不认为他们希望或寻求让香港变得与其他大陆城市一样。这将使得香港对大陆而言没有价值，因为大陆已经有许多繁荣的城市。香港是不同的，所以有价值。不过，在不给一国两制的另一端构成不可容忍的问题的前提下，香港能够有多不同，这是难点所在。
米思伟：香港损失了多少，新加坡得到了多少？
李显龙：我想有些人可能会决定他们更喜欢待在一个地方而不是另一边，但是总的来说，我毫不怀疑，如果香港繁荣，新加坡和香港做生意、竞争，新加坡得到的会更多。
新加坡防长：台湾问题是“深红线” 美国应远离
来源：瞰天下
11/05/2021
新加坡国防部长黄永宏在第12届阿斯彭安全论坛上说，台湾问题是一条深红线。他事后接受本地媒体访问时重申，各国应该远离这条深红线，因为靠得太近就会有误判形势的可能。
Nov 3, 2021
到美国华盛顿参加第12届阿斯彭安全论坛（Aspen Security Forum）的新加坡国防部长黄永宏，当地时间11月3日（本地时间4日凌晨）发表他此行的主旨演说。他过后回答主持人阿斯彭战略集团联合主席约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye）的提问时，提出他对台海局势的看法。
约瑟夫·奈问黄永宏是否担心美国目前处理台湾问题的方式，以及过程中是否可能出现形势误判的情况。
黄永宏回答说，误判的情况可能发生，这是一条深红线。“若为了台湾动武，我想到时无论是什么局面都不会有赢家，所以我的劝告是应该避而远之。”
他事后接受本地媒体访问时重申，各国应该远离这条深红线，因为靠得太近就会有误判形势的可能。而一旦动武将各方皆输，不仅是美国和中国，东南亚甚至是全球都会陷入混乱。
Nov 3, 2021
马凯硕： 西方不应错误地认为中国需要照搬其模式
10/19/2021
新加坡前资深外交官马凯硕（Kishore Mahbubani）昨天（18日）说，西方认为中国应该照搬其模式，这是错误的假设，因为中国是一个更加强韧和更加自信的文明，而西方亟需明白这一点。
根据中新社报道，也是新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院创始院长的马凯硕在接受德国“中国平台”网站专访时说，一个崛起的中国并不会步美国的后尘寻求称霸，因为中国专注于改善本国14亿人的生活，而不是卷入毫无必要的战争。
Jul 1, 2021
Kishore Mahbubani of the Asia Research Institute and former diplomat says U.S.-China tension regarding China’s “reunification” with Taiwan “may lead to a war.” He says pushing China into a corner would be unwise.
谈及西方国家习惯于将美国视作“民主伙伴”，而将中国视作“挑战和威胁”，马凯硕直言，这种观念并不正确。他指出，中国是世界上最古老的文明之一，在其历史上有超过4000年的时间是领先世界的，只有近代以来才有200年左右的时间落后于西方，但后者只是很短的时期。他说，西方认为中国应该照搬其模式，这是错误的假设，因为中国是一个更加强韧和更加自信的文明，“西方亟需明白这一点”。
马凯硕认为，关于“新冷战”的表述是错误的。在美苏冷战期间，东西方两大阵营相互隔绝，而今天的中美两国在经济领域已经紧密地联系在一起。在他看来，当前的确存在大量的地缘政治博弈，但今天的世界已是相互依存的状态，需要共同应对越来越多的全球性挑战，例如冠病疫情和气候变化。
马凯硕强调，一个崛起的中国不会步美国后尘。他认为，中国不希望以一种“传教士”的方式去改变世界，更不会让自身陷入类似伊拉克或者叙利亚那样毫无必要的战争当中，“这是因为中国要专注于改善本国14亿人的生活，这已经够忙了。”
Sep 23, 2021
谈及对下届德国政府对华政策的期许，马凯硕表示，情绪化是处理地缘政治时最大的误区，德国应该避开这一误区，“过去十年间，中国市场增长了三倍，你不应忘记你的汽车正在销往何处。”
马凯硕曾作为新加坡常驻联合国代表担任安理会轮值主席，他的最新著作《中国的选择：中美博弈与战略抉择》近日被翻译成德文出版发行。
新加坡外交部长维文：维系新中关系窍门 是要保持有用但不被利用
来自 / 联合早报
文 / 杨浚鑫
10/12/2021
外交部长维文医生日前上澳洲访谈节目时，被问及是否对澳中关系出现波折感到惊讶，他以分享新加坡的经验做出回应。“维系与中国的关系在于保持相关性，有用处却不被利用。这是我们所有人都须要找到的微妙平衡，新加坡找到了。”
新中关系的维系，在于我国通过政府间合作项目等方式，对中国保持相关性，有用处却不被利用。外交部长维文医生说，这是各国须找到的微妙平衡。
由澳大利亚前国防部长派恩（Christopher Pyne）主持的访谈节目《环球焦点》，前天（10月10日）在澳洲天空新闻台（Sky News Australia）播出第一集，邀请到维文担任嘉宾。
根据外交部提供的访谈文本，派恩就澳中目前的紧张关系询问维文，是否对这两个国家的关系出现波折感到惊讶。维文回应时强调，他没有资格告诉澳洲如何施展外交，他能做的只是分享新加坡的经验。
维文说，中国是新加坡最大的贸易伙伴，新加坡自2013年起也是中国最大的外资来源国。“因此，从新加坡的角度，我们有着切身利益，而我们对中国的态度向来是展示我国的相关性。”
他举出三个新中政府间合作项目，即苏州工业园、天津生态城，以及重庆战略性互联互通示范项目。其中，重庆项目下的“国际陆海贸易新通道”，将通过新加坡连接中国西部和东南亚。
维文说：“维系与中国的关系在于保持相关性，有用处却不被利用。这是我们所有人都须要找到的微妙平衡，新加坡找到了。”
他强调，新中关系极佳，中国国务委员兼外长王毅不仅上个月访新，两人过去12个月也面对面会见了约四次。“双方互动水平和节奏向来很高。或许较鲜为人知的是，即使在冠病疫情期间，双方仍在关键时刻彼此低调相助。”
长期关系必生分歧 维文：出现时须解决
维文说，新中关系并不对称，因为新加坡太小了，也不是基于完全一致的立场，因为这不可能，但两国找到合作方式，并在出现分歧时共同解决。
他认为，分歧是任何长期关系不可避免的一部分，必须去处理。“这如同一场每周都有同样玩家围坐一桌的游戏。即使你有分歧也要去解决它，并理解这其中有大的格局和更长远的角度。”
派恩进一步追问，新加坡的做法是不是亚细安国家普遍采取的做法。对此，维文说，亚细安已超越欧盟和美国，成为中国最大的贸易伙伴。
“这种贸易相互依存关系是真实的，并仍在增长。”
就中国的“一带一路”项目而言，东南亚对此的主要兴趣在于投资，尤其是基础设施和连通性方面的投资。可见，双方的中长期利益有明显交集。
因此，尽管中国在南中国海问题上与东南亚声索国存在分歧和争端，但这只是双方广泛关系中的一个面向。维文说：“没有人希望情况失控或破坏关系的长期轨迹。”
他坦言，领土声索可能需要数年乃至数十年才能解决，任何国家都不会轻易放弃，但它不是各国继续往来和建立关系的绝对障碍。这正是东南亚目前的情况。
维文也重申，亚细安坚持维护包容开放的区域架构。这当然牵涉美国。事实上，美国在东南亚的投资额，超过它在印度、中国和韩国的投资总额，因此在本区域拥有切身利益。
“我曾对美国历届政府说：‘你们已经占得先机。美国仍是东南亚最大的外资来源国。美国在本区域的存在受到欢迎且具建设性。不要失去这个领先优势。’”
派恩也问维文，是否认为北京正在制定一个能允许澳中有尊严地走出目前混乱局面的方式。对此，维文说，中国在地缘战略上有长远和开阔的眼光，他相信有这方面的计划，虽不清楚何时发生，但希望两国关系能早日改善。
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Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Interview on Sky News Australia’s “Global Focus with Christopher Pyne” on 15 September 2021
10/12/2021
Christopher Pyne (Sky News Australia): Hello, I am Christopher Pyne, and this is “Global Focus” on Sky News Australia. Today, my guest is Vivian Balakrishnan, who is Singapore’s Foreign Minister and a good friend to Australia over a long period of time. Vivian, welcome to the show, and thank you very much for being with us.
Minister: Thank you. Always great to see you. A blast from the past, and we have been up to a lot together.
Pyne: That is definitely true. I am sorry we cannot be together in person. But you know, it would not be too long before we can be again.
Minister: Hope so, hope so.
Pyne: The relationship between Australia and China is clearly strained at the moment, economically and politically. Does it surprise you that the relationship has taken this turn?
Minister: Well, first I would say, I am not really in a position to advise Australia. But what I would say, shared as a perspective from Singapore – this tiny city-state in the heart of Southeast Asia. The biggest success story in the last 40 years really has been China after the reform started by Deng Xiaoping. As a result of that, and especially the last 20 years since they joined the WTO (World Trade Organization), China has become our largest trading partner. But the other surprising fact, perhaps, may be that Singapore is also the largest foreign investor in China, has been since 2013. So, the point is that from a Singapore perspective, we have got skin in the game. And our attitude to China has been to demonstrate relevance. For instance, we have got three Government-to-Government projects. The first one was in Suzhou. It was an industrial park – bring in foreign companies, build manufacturing plants. Second was in Tianjin – that was an eco-city, when this whole thing of sustainable development came about. Our most recent project was in Chongqing – in a sense, part of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) but really an attempt to connect Western China and through this new corridor which we call the “Chongqing Connectivity Initiative-New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor”. This corridor links Western China through into Southeast Asia via Singapore. So, it has been about relevance, about being useful, but not being made use of. This is a delicate balance which all of us need to find, and we have been able to find that. Right now, if you were to ask me, I would have to say our relations are excellent. (Chinese) Foreign Minister Wang Yi was just in town. I have seen him personally face-to-face about four times in the last 12 months. The level of interaction, (and) the tempo has been high. Perhaps the lesser-known fact is that even during this COVID pandemic, at critical moments, quietly, both sides have helped each other at critical points in time. So, there is a relationship not based on symmetry – you cannot, because we are so small – not based on complete congruence – it is not possible – but we find ways to work together and where there are differences, we work through them. The point is that you have to treat the issues as they come up – the differences as part and parcel of a longer-term relationship that has to be managed. It is like a game in which the same players are going to be at the table week after week. Even if you have differences, work it out and understand that there is a much larger account and a much longer-term horizon. That is just my take from Singapore. I am in no position to tell Australia how to conduct foreign policy. Julie Bishop and Marise Payne are more than capable of doing this.
Pyne: Yes, indeed. My former House mate in Canberra for 20 years, Marise Payne, would not be appreciative at all of you giving her advice about how to manage our relationships. But she likes you very much.
Minister: She does not need my advice.
Pyne: I know how well you get along.
Minister: We get along perfectly.
Pyne: I have been in some of those meetings of ministers for trade, defence, and foreign affairs, and I know how close you and Marise are. This is a great relationship that we have got.
Minister: Chris, you have been there. You have seen it up close.
Pyne: I had, and (I) enjoyed it too. The approach that you have just outlined that Singapore is taking with China, is that generally the approach of the ASEAN nations? That they all see similarly that they can have a relationship with China, which does not have to exclude others?
Minister: Well, I would characterise the relationship with ASEAN and China along the following dimensions. First, China is now the largest trading partner for virtually all of us. But a more recent development which may not be fully appreciated yet, is that if you ask China who their largest trading partner is, in fact, ASEAN has now overtaken the EU (European Union) and the US (United States). This trade interdependence is real, and it is growing. So that is the first point. The next point is that even if you look in terms of China’s Belt and Road signature project, the key interest of Southeast Asia is investments, and particularly investments in infrastructure, in connectivity, and still there again you see that there is an obvious confluence of interests – medium and long term interests. Are there problems or differences? You know fully well that there are. For instance, in the South China Sea, where there are differences over claims, for each of the Southeast Asian countries with claims – and I would exclude Singapore because we have no claims in the South China Sea – but for each of the claimant states, their differences, their disputes – even if you want to call it that – with China are just one dimension of a much broader relationship, and therefore would be looked at strategically. No one wants them to get out of hand or to disrupt the long-term trajectory of relationships. Now, one final point I would make about ASEAN, is that ASEAN is very insistent on maintaining an inclusive and open regional architecture. This is something which Australia would be familiar with because you know that we have always been advocates, champions for Australia’s economic and political engagement with our part of the world. (The) same thing applies to China. Even as China is our biggest trading partner, even as China is a significant source of investment, and we are key investors into China, we want to keep our region open, inclusive, and that of course relates to the elephant in the room – America, which has in fact, invested more in Southeast Asia than America has invested in India, China, and (Republic of) Korea combined. That is another fact which is not fully appreciated – the amount of skin that America has in Southeast Asia. I used to tell successive administrations: “You have got a head start. You still remain – when I say “you” (I mean) America – the biggest foreign investor in Southeast Asia. You are a welcome, constructive presence. Do not lose the head start. You are welcome.” So, the key word there is inclusivity. We want Southeast Asia to continue to engage with China, with America, with Australia, New Zealand and of course, you have got Japan, (Republic of) Korea, and India, and that in a sense, creates the larger outer arc. Another example of that is the RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The only one that could not get onto and sign was India. But for 15 countries – and the combined economy is a huge big chunk – to get on this platform, and to get on at a time when there is a pushback globally against free trade and economy integration, makes it all the more significant. So I would say it is a big, deep, and evolving account. But Australia is part of this account too, and that is important to emphasise, especially back home for you.
Pyne: Yes. Well, it is interesting because here in Australia, the media commentary is very much the only issue that people talk about is the tension between China and the rest of the nations in the Indo Pacific, and the South China Sea is, as you know, often used as the primary example of tension. But what you are saying, if I could paraphrase, is that the countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, (and) others that have claims over the South China Sea, see that as just one part of a multi-faceted relationship with, what is clearly the largest economy in the region, and 1.3 billion people who are not suddenly going to go away. So, managing that relationship and that South China Sea tension is just another thing to discuss, as opposed to becoming the most important part of the relationship.
Minister: It is a long-term game. You are not dealing with an adversary, (and) you do not want to make them (an) adversary. But it is a stakeholder. You will have differences, and there will be divergence. The question is, can you resolve it? Even if you cannot (right) now – frankly territorial claims are very difficult to resolve; it may take years, decades even, and no country is going to walk away from claims lightly. But it does not have to be an absolute block to ongoing engagement and (the) building (of) those relationships. So that is really what is happening in Southeast Asia.
Pyne: Do you think that there is a party, and you cannot also comment on foreign policy out of Beijing, but would it surprise you if there was not a group in Beijing formulating, now, a dignified exit for both Australia and China out of the current imbroglio that we find ourselves in?
Minister: China thinks long term and takes a wide view in geo-strategy. I am sure there would be a paper somewhere in a drawer on what happens when we press the green button and say, the sun is out and it is (a) good day mate. When that will happen? I do not know. But I hope it happens soon.
Pyne: Yeah, me too. Well, Vivian that has been great. We have to go to a break now, but Sky News Australia will come back after the break and continue our conversation. It might switch to the role of the US in the Indo Pacific. So, thank you very much so far, and we look forward to talking to you again in a couple of minutes.
Christopher Pyne (Sky News Australia): Welcome back to Global Focus here on Sky News Australia. My guest today is Vivian Balakrishnan, Singaporean Foreign Minister. We have been talking about ASEAN, Singapore, Australia, the role of China in our region, and now we will shift to the other great superpower in the Indo Pacific, which is the US. Vivian, the Afghanistan war has effectively come to an end, Taliban is back in power in Kabul after 20 years. I know you cannot speak for all of ASEAN, but you can speak for the Singaporean Government. Is it your view and Singapore’s that this is the combination of the US completing its mission and now extricating itself from a very difficult conflict or is it being seen as a significant defeat for the US, which is going to take many years to recover from in terms of their prestige in the Indo Pacific region?
Minister: That is a profound question. Actually, both Australia and Singapore, and you would be familiar with this, were part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Why did America go in? And why was Australia and even Singapore part of the ISAF? It was because of terrorism. In fact, more specifically because of 9/11. In Singapore’s case, we even discovered a local terrorist cell. Fortunately, we discovered it before they could actually take any action. But even this local homegrown cell had links with Al-Qaeda. So we fully understand why in the aftermath of 9/11, America had to go in (to Afghanistan). The question then is, is this threat from terrorism resolved? The answer is that it is certainly acute. (The) immediate threat 20 years ago was settled, but the nature of terrorism has now metastasised and (is) turbocharged with internet technologies. In fact, the risk has gone up, not gone down. But really, if you think, and here we put ourselves in the Biden Administration’s shoes, the truth is they inherited a very difficult situation. Actually, they are not the first Administration to want to come out of Afghanistan. So, they were in a difficult pickle and I think you, as a former Defence Minister will know as well as I do, there is no easy, neat, tidy way to get out of a sticky situation like that. So, we understand why they had to get out. Of course, everyone wishes it was done more elegantly, but that is more easily said than done. We hope Afghanistan will not become another haven for terrorists again. But we have no illusions; I think both in Australia and in Southeast Asia, we have got homegrown terrorists. We have got terrorists in our own region. The question is whether they will be activated or at least enthused by current events in Afghanistan to try their luck. So, we will have to be vigilant. That is what confronts us. As far as the people in Afghanistan is concerned, I think there is an emerging humanitarian disaster. We hope that the Taliban leaders – you know, 20 years is a new generation – we hope that they will take good care of their own people. We hope that they will also build functional relationships with their neighbours and the rest of the world, but time will tell. In the end, I think the other point is that Afghanistan has always been the graveyard of empires. The British discovered it, the Russians re-learnt it. It looks like America’s nation building effort there has been another footnote in history of this recurring pattern. So, there we have it – a difficult situation. We have great sympathy for the Biden Administration.
Pyne: It will be very interesting to see if the new model for combating terrorism is similar to what happened in the Philippines a few years ago when the Australian government, the defence forces provided intelligence (and) surveillance support for the Philippines military in addressing the ISIS conflicts that occurred in the Philippines, and you would be familiar with that. ASEAN nations gave their support to the Philippine government, which was a much more clinical and specific engagement, as opposed to what happened in Afghanistan which was something like 25 different nations joining the coalition and whether we learned our lesson from that particular conflict. And of course, your point you made previously is a good one – the Biden Administration came to the Afghanistan conflict at the end. The Obama Administration announced the drawing down on forces almost 10 years ago. Of course, the Trump Administration announced that they were leaving and allowed 5,000 Afghan, Taliban fighters to be free. So, nobody comes to this, what appears to have been something of a fiasco, with entirely clean hands.
Minister: It is a messy situation. You mentioned the Southern Philippines, Marawi. There are no neat surgical operations. When there is a terrorist attack, it is not just a military operation. You also have to deal with the hearts and minds of the people. The solution, ultimately, lies locally. That is where the battlefront really is. It shows the limit of external intervention. To assume that we can do this remotely without leadership and resolve on the ground, locally – that is just a bridge too far. At least within Southeast Asia, I think all the governments are focused on this. We have got good counterintelligence operation information sharing. Australia has also been a critical part of this. You would know from your previous life. Like I said, we are just going to have to deal with it and to get on with it, and to know that this is a clear and present danger.
Pyne: Definitely. The Biden Administration, I think will be quite different to the Trump Administration in managing of the Indo-Pacific (and) China, and its superpower status. How do you see the Biden Administration in its early days, certainly being just over half a year? Here in Australia, we see it very much as a return to a more consistent and probably predictable response to issues. How has Singapore and the ASEAN nations in general, seen the Biden approach to the Indo-Pacific and particularly, he has made the Quad quite preeminent in his and his Secretary of State’s views about American foreign policy. How do you see that all playing out in the next three years?
Minister: Well, I share your view that at least in terms of style, in terms of the personalities involved, this is a return to a more conventional establishment, a more conventional way of operating the State Department. (US Secretary of State) Antony Blinken and the others, including (US National Security Advisor) Jake Sullivan, are not strangers to Australia and Asia. So that is familiar. You are on familiar ground. But I would say that the real question for us in Southeast Asia is that trade and investment is strategy. The fact that the US, having been a key locomotive for the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), at the end of the day had to walk away from it – and mind you this is not because of the Biden Administration, – it is not just President Trump, but even candidate Hillary Clinton, the former Secretary of State, in her campaign also had to back away from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). Now, I know this is because of domestic pressures, the polarisation and the division in the American body politic. Frankly, America cannot come to the table until it resolves its internal situation, achieves unity of purpose, (and) achieves confidence to engage in this. But herein lies the apparent contradiction, because if you look at the past seven decades, the spectacular growth in Southeast Asia and the equally spectacular, uninterrupted growth of Australia, a key reason for that has been the US presence here, (and) its investments in our economy – and I already told you, America is more invested here (Southeast Asia) than it is in India, China, and (Republic of) Korea combined. I am sorry I do not have the figure for Australia, but I am sure it is a very big number. And not just money – access to technology, access to markets, becoming part of global supply chains with multinational corporations, this belief that free trade, properly negotiated free trade agreements, norms, rules and regulations, create a fertile environment for peace and prosperity. So I think we are all missing a key architect of that architecture and we have left the door open, certainly in terms of the CPTPP, for America to come back. I think both Australia and Singapore certainly hope America comes back. But in the meantime, while America is out, what has happened? The RCEP was signed last year. In fact, China and Singapore were the first two countries to ratify the RCEP. Now, China has also told us that they are interested in exploring and becoming part of the CPTPP. Of course, so has the UK (United Kingdom). And again, coming from a city-state that believes in free trade because, after all, trade is more than three times (Singapore’s) GDP, we have to welcome such overtures. The point is that all these big things are happening, and America does need to work out its strategy, and understand that the game in Southeast Asia is trade and investments. So that is what we are waiting for. I would not lose hope. I will continue to make that point, and to also remind America that the door remains open, and that you (America) have a head start. Do not miss out. Because after all, the real growth is in the Pacific, and America is a Pacific power. That is my elevator pitch to them.
Pyne: I think it is a good point you make. It is a good point you make, and the truth is Australia, Japan, and Singapore – when the Trump Administration withdrew from the TPP – we made it clear that we believe strongly in it, and that we would keep going with it, which I think was very important. Well Vivian, we could talk all evening and we have got lots more questions I could ask you, but we have run out of time. So, can I thank you very much for coming on Global Focus. It is great to see you again and I look forward to seeing you in person. And I send also Julie Bishop’s best wishes, who I was speaking with today.
Minister: Please tell her I miss her too. Great seeing you, thank you.
李光耀谈阿富汗问题讲了什么？
文 / 联合早报网
8/20/2021
美国从阿富汗撤军没多久，扶植的政权迅速崩塌，以伊斯兰原教旨主义运动与恐怖主义活动起家的塔利班重新上台，山姆大叔投入了20年的资源和心血一夜间付诸东流……
这几天，一些网站上载了新加坡已故建国总理李光耀2009年10月接受美国著名电视记者、谈话节目主持人查理·罗斯（Charlie Rose）专访时谈及阿富汗问题的视频片段，有的中国网站的标题更称其为“神预言”。
首先要交代一下背景。美国是在2001年九一一事件后进军阿富汗，两个月间就推翻了被指为九一一事件主谋基地组织提供庇护的塔利班政权。2002至2008年，美国一方面继续与塔利班在军事上缠斗，另一方面则致力重建阿富汗国家核心机构。到了2009年，美国总统奥巴马增加在阿富汗的驻军，以实施一项保护民众免受塔利班袭击并支持叛乱分子重新融入社会的战略，同时也定下从2011年起逐步将安全责任移交给阿富汗军警并撤军的计划。但上述战略和计划都不甚成功，美国与北约的作战任务直至2014年12月才算正式结束。
李光耀2009年接受查理·罗斯专访时，正是美军加大投入阿富汗战争之际。
至于是怎么“神”呢，就来看看整理自视频的问答录：
查理·罗斯：当您审视美国与其对外关系，还有它对石油和中东政治的关注时，您是否认为这是一种分心？你认为……
李光耀：不，我不是说中东会让人分心。我认为试图在阿富汗打造出一个国家来是一种分心。在过去三四十年来，那里根本没有国家可言，末代国王被赶出去后就内战不止。
查理·罗斯：对。
李光耀：你们到底要怎么把这些小碎片拼在一起？这是不可能的。
查理·罗斯：所以，要怎么做？
李光耀：我不是专家，但我觉得你们在阿富汗获胜不是因为跟塔利班作战，而是因为你们让北方联盟与塔利班作战，并为北方联盟提供了情报和轰炸、瞄准塔利班的能力，以致他们成功取下南方。
查理·罗斯：是的，但他们在那里也面对治理问题。
李光耀：没错，但那是他们的问题，你们为什么要把它变成你们的问题？
查理·罗斯：那怎么办？你会撤出所有的军队，任由阿富汗发生的事情发生吗？反正他们对美国没有那么大的威胁，是这个论点吗？
李光耀：我不知道，因为我认为再怎么难，也难不过美国让他们的军队被困在那里了。苏联军队冷酷无情，他们中有12万人在那里，但也不得不离开。
查理·罗斯：我们帮了一点忙，因为我们支持了圣战者组织。他们得到了来自世界各地的很多支持，因为后者希望看到苏联挨打。
李光耀：但不管苏联人是否帮助他们把美国人赶出去，我认为……北约成员国对结果非常怀疑。
查理·罗斯：甚至到了不想将军队派往某些战区的地步。
李光耀：没错。是的，当然，因为那样你就会白白被枪杀。
查理·罗斯：但那些争论阿富汗是否被离弃的人首先会说，你看，苏联撤军后你曾经离弃过一次阿富汗，现在你又要离开了。美国必须坚持某些事情，并且必须对外展示它已准备好留下来。你完全不认同吗？
李光耀：不。
查理·罗斯：那你一定和你的朋友基辛格聊得很开心吧？
李光耀：不，不。
Aug 18, 2021
查理·罗斯：对于美国在世界上的角色，你和基辛格的看法有何不同？
李光耀：我不觉得我们有任何区别。
查理·罗斯：是吗？那你怎么定义呢？
李光耀：我认为美国可以成为世界秩序的良性稳定器，没有美国，东亚当初就不会增长，你们带来了和平与技术、贸易和投资，东亚因此繁荣昌盛。
查理·罗斯：很明显，东亚发生了这种情况，你说的是新加坡和韩国。我们如何在中东做到这一点？当我们发生这样的冲突时，你要怎么做到这点？
李光耀：（笑）你不能解决世界上所有的问题。
据新加坡时政网站慈母舰（Mothership）报道，除了上述专访，李光耀2008年2月2日接受合众国际社采访时，也曾谈及阿富汗问题，他在这次访问中的谈话比较坦率，并提出部分解决方案。
李光耀说，如果美国给困在阿富汗，不应尝试做太多事情，而是让军阀之间去解决，条件是他们不会去建立一个新的塔利班国家。
他认为，要改造一个社会，是超出了任何国家的能力，以美国当年攻打伊拉克为例，应该快进快出，进去了只要委任继任者就完事了，并警告说“如果你表现得像（倒台的伊拉克前总统）萨达姆，我就会回来”，那就够了。
美前高官傅立民：美正与中国打着注定会输的比赛
5/10/2021
美国前资深外交官、前助理国防部长傅立民（Chas W Freeman Jr）批评美国政府的对华政策“自欺欺人”（self-defeating），指华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛。
傅立民周日发表在澳洲亚太事务研究网站东亚论坛（ East Asia Forum）上发发表题为《华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛（Washington is playing a losing game with China）的文章，指美国应在全球性问题上加强与中国的合作，如果继续选择与中国对抗，只会在国际社会上失道寡助。
他认为目前的美中关系，凸显了弗里曼的战略动力学第三定律（Freeman’s third law of strategic dynamics），即每一次敌对行为都会引来更加敌对的反应。
文章指华盛顿发起贸易战，只是因为对中国超越美国的潜力感到担忧，并试图通过不断升级的“极限施压”来削弱、遏制中国。
他说，在国际象棋中，美国就是一个很容易被识别的选手：除了激进的开局外，没有其他的战略。
傅立民在文中以数据证明，美国老百姓深受政府发起贸易战的伤害。他指出，美国农民失去了价值240亿美元（318亿新元）的大部分中国市场；美国公司利润降低，转而削减员工工资和工作岗位、推迟加薪，并提高美国消费品的价格；据估计，美国损失了24.5万个就业岗位，同时减少了约3200亿美元的国内生产总值（GDP），美国家庭平均每年要多花1277美元购买消费品；预计到2025年，美国将失去32万个工作岗位，GDP将比预期的低1.6万亿美元。
文章指出，在另一边，中国正稳步前进。2020年，中国总体贸易顺差达到5350亿美元，再创新高；与此同时，中国正通过降低贸易壁垒、与美国以外的国家达成自由贸易协议、发起贸易争端解决机制等方法，提高了自己的地位。
此外，傅立民还称，中国给美国带来的挑战主要是经济和技术上的，并不是军事上的。但现实是，“美国的飞机和战舰总在中国边界周围活动，中国的飞机和战舰并没有在美国的海岸外巡逻；中国周围到处是美军基地，而美国附近却没有中国的基地”。
傅立民强调：“如果美国继续选择对抗，只会发现自己越来越孤立。如果美国对华政策被定义为一种道德努力，大多数其他国家将选择远离，而不是被吸引”。他指出，各国想要的是获得多边支持来应对挑战，而不是美国的单边对抗；希望在主权最大化的条件下容纳中国，而不是让中国成为敌人。
傅立民认为，除对抗无益外，中美两国合作还有许多必然性。首先，在美国国内，没有中国的参与，市场投资、供应链等很多问题都无法解决；其次，在国际上，两国应合作改革全球治理，解决共同关心的全球性问题，如环境恶化、流行病、核武器扩散、全球经济和金融不稳定、全球贫困等等，并为新技术制定标准。
在文章最后，傅立民强调，“为了在与中国（竞争中）保持优势，美国必须提升竞争力，建设一个治理更好、教育更好、更平等、更开放、更创新、更健康和更自由的社会”。他断言，显然对抗不是通往这一美好愿景的方式，合作才是。
傅立民目前是美国布朗大学沃森国际与公共事务研究所访问学者，曾作为美国前总统尼克逊的首席中文翻译陪同访华，之后他先后在国务院主管中国事务、担任美国驻华公使和负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长。
陆克文斥莫里森草率介入台海议题幼稚
5/10/2021
在中澳关系持续恶化的背景下，澳大利亚前总理陆克文撰文批评，莫里森政府最近声称若台海爆发战争，澳洲将支援美国等盟友的有关言论，“在政治上是幼稚的”（politically juvenile），可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
莫里森上周接受澳洲3AW电台的访问时说，澳洲政府对台政策将坚定不变，若中国大陆武力进攻台湾，澳洲将会履行支援美国及盟友的承诺。
对此，陆克文前天（8日）在《悉尼先驱晨报》发表署名文章称，莫里森政府最近对澳洲军事介入未来美中对台湾战争的可能性所发表的草率评论，在政治上是幼稚的，可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
文章说，50年来，澳洲历届政府都没有在台海冲突的课题上，公开猜测澳洲会怎么做，但在过去两周，总理莫里森、国防部长达顿，以及内政部秘书长佩祖洛，都严重违反了这一澳洲两党共识。
陆克文在文章中指出，澳洲政府此前有充分理由对潜在的台湾军事方案保持沉默（tight-lipped），因为该冲突将涉及中美两个世界上最大的军事力量，并有可能成为自1945年以来亚洲最暴力和最具破坏性的战争。因此，澳洲现阶段不应该损害国家决策的独立性和灵活性。
文章也说，澳洲官员一直周旋在华盛顿、北京和台北之间，竭尽全力防止此类战争发生。面对美国，澳洲官员要同美国一道，确保美国在亚太地区的军事威慑力，以此对中国大陆产生遏制效果；面对中国大陆，澳洲官员则进行游说，试图让北京相信美国会武装介入台海冲突；而面对台湾，澳洲官员要试图阻止台湾单方面宣布“台独”（或采取走向“台独”的步骤），因为这将越过北京最基本的红线。
文章接着称，莫里森政府在台湾问题上像不成熟地捶胸示强（adolescent chest-thumping），不仅让美国人感到困惑，让大陆民众感到愤怒，让台湾百姓不解，也让亚太地区其他国家感到迷惑。
陆克文随后在文章中质问，为什么莫里森、达顿等要在台湾问题上，公开发出“红色警报”信号？难以想象（inconceivable）澳洲的国家安全机构会建议他们这样做，因为这不符合国家利益。“事实上，这在战略上将适得其反。”
陆克文在文中指出，目前澳洲疫苗和检疫程序一团糟、债务和赤字居高不下、执政党自由党内歧视女性问题严重，莫里森政府此时发表草率涉台言论唯一可能的动机是想转移国内视线，以获得多数支持赢得选举。对自由党来说，把工党打成“亲共”是最好的伪装。
文章称，坎培拉还有一个最广为人知的秘密：达顿和莫里森之间存在未公开的领导权之争。达顿认为，在自由党内部，中国议题是击败莫里森的最佳工具。这是可耻的，纯粹为了政治私利，用澳洲核心国家经济和安全利益做赌注。
陆克文最后在文中说，中国日益增长的实力以及特朗普政府的失败，让莫里森政府难以处理澳中关系。面对复杂的挑战，澳洲领导者需要有明智、冷静和慎重的判断，国家安全不是政治游戏。然而，莫里森和达顿过去两周的表现无疑表明，面对复杂的国家安全性势，这届澳洲政府缺乏应对挑战的勇气。
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020
