中国地产业失业潮暗涌 人才市场“一位难求”
9/28/2021
今年以来，鉴于大多数房地产企业采取主动缩表收紧战线的紧缩性战略，致使房地产行业的人才需求量大幅下降，地产相关人员在职场上找工作的难度亦较过去几年显著提升。
据第一财经报道，多位猎头提供的信息显示，过去几年地产快速扩张，各家公司都大肆进人，甚至不惜高新挖人，使得地产从业者薪酬逐年攀升，但今年人力市场的风向彻底掉头，多数跳槽人员都是都是平级或降薪跳槽，行业整体降薪趋势明显。
猎聘网统计数据显示，上半年房地产相关行业求职者数量居各行业之首，人员占比高达14.73%，这意味着，约每七个求职者中，就有一个地产人；反观新增职位数量，地产相关行业新增职位量排第二，占比10%，较2020年显著下降。
一位行业人士说，下半年比上半年的数据更差，因为不少公司是在七八月之后才启动了裁员计划的。据悉，目前市场上仅有少数几家稳健型房企开放着招聘通道，其余大部分公司的需求为零。
据悉，房企新一轮裁员降薪，主要源于企业缩减行政开支等管理费用的诉求，在行业景气周期时，管理成本往往是被忽视的小钱，但当景气不再，“小钱”在老板心里就变成了“大钱”。
中秋节前夕，香港股市经历了血雨腥风的一天暴跌，其中跌幅最大的一家公司是国内的房地产行业里有着“黑马”之称的新力控股。20日当天，该公司股价盘中闪崩，收盘跌幅近九成，此后一直停牌等到原因公告，但截至28日，自查公告迟迟未见披露。
新力股价暴跌有市场因素，亦有公司自身综合因素。综合多方消息来看，市场的悲观情绪与该公司此前不久推出的全员降薪计划不无关系。据悉，新力控股人力资源在18日前后口头传达了降薪计划，没有正式文件下发，具体执行标准为，总部管理层普降50%以上，副总裁级别降薪70%，基层降薪10%至20%。
内部降薪，一直是房企缩减开支的手段之一。疫情期间，房企现金紧缩，许多企业都采取了类似方式，暂时度过难关。但2021年以来，房企降薪裁员的消息依然层出不穷，背后传达出的信号，已悄然不同。
比如一家正处于资金债务旋涡中的大型房企，已于8月推出了中高层的降薪计划，具体执行标准为，中层减薪10%，高层降薪一半。
综合多位猎头人士的信息显示，为了控制管理成本，今年大部分公司都减少了升职的数量，薪酬调整幅度开始降低，例如华东一家相对稳健型公司，以前每年可以保证员工10%薪酬增长，但今年的平均薪酬调整仅在5%至8%。
据了解，不少地产企业都采取了基本工资+绩效奖励相结合的薪酬结构，且绩效奖励占比极高。过去几年，房企销售增长绩效连连提升，不少中高层管理人员可在年底获得不菲的奖励，这样的奖金从数十万到数千万不等。但在今年行情急转直下之后，绩效奖励能否在年终继续发放，就成了最大悬疑。
与降薪一并发生的是裁员。自去年下半年以来，多数房企通过优化组织结构从而实现减员增效的内部调整就一直在持续。
根据市场消息统计，今年来传出裁员的房企高达十余家，涉及绿地、恒大、雅居乐、金科、苏宁置业、花样年、阳光城等，而这些企业的减员行为，大多与内部组织合并及调整相关。
从中报数据看，多家房企及物业公司在上半年减员。据东方财富Choice数据，已披露员工数量的54家港股上市房企及物企中，有15家员工较2020年末减少，24家人员数量未变，13家人员数量增多。
业内人士透露，这些缩减的人员，不一定均是裁员的结果，但反映出房地产行业人力资源流向的一些变化，过去是净增长，而今年却出现了流出。
猎聘网统计数据显示，上半年房地产相关行业求职者数量居各行业之首，人员占比高达14.73%，但新增职位数不增反降，人才需求度明显下降，这意味着相当比例的地产失业人员只能转行就业。
不过，想要想彻底转型也并非易事。猎聘网统计数据显示，地产行业80%的人跳槽后，还是继续在业内发展，仅有少部分能够转行，如2.3%去了互联网，2.9%的人去乙方，1%的人去金融行业。
中国打房引发转职潮 龙头房企员工年减3成
中央社
9/01/2021
中国持续对房地产业政策调控，以遏止房价上升，已引发“逃亡潮”，不少人担心在强监管下，房地产前途堪忧，纷纷转职。多个龙头房企近一年员工人数减少3成。
据第一财经报导，虽然中国持续对产业进行监管，但暂时未改变房地产、金融、网路科技业是中国3大高薪行业的格局。只不过有一些现象正悄悄在产业内部发生，其中之一，是房地产业出现一波转职潮。
报导引述中国多家龙头房企近日发布的半年报显示，万科集团的员工人数从13万大幅下跌，近一年员工减少20%；合景泰富、富力、泰禾等房企的员工人数，在过去一年更减少超过30%。
另一方面，报导引述统计资料指出，80家中国的上市房企，薪资总量的增速已经连续3年收窄，2020年人均年薪首次出现下降，中位数为人民币18.3万元（约2.8万美元），高层干部薪资年减5%。
报导形容，过去5年，房地产业不断膨胀，创造了不少致富的励志故事，然而随著产业规模见顶、市场走弱、融资收紧，巨大的人才泡沫终将被戳破。不少人不愿意成为最后一个逃走的人，因此纷纷转职，甚至有人为了转职，降薪数十万元也在所不惜。
报导引述一名房地产业界人士的观察，不少人转职的目标都是网路科技大厂，而且不只基层员工或储备干部，甚至有地区经理近期跳槽至阿里巴巴。
报导分析，虽然现在网路科技业风波不断，阿里巴巴、腾讯、字节跳动等大厂深陷舆论质疑、监管风波中，但在房地产业人士眼中，网路科技业仍在上升期，相比已经步入夕阳期的房地产业，有更多可能性。
不过也并非所有的人都能顺利转职，报导提到，对于人力、财务相关工作的人而言，要转职进入网路科技大厂相对容易，因为很多东西相通。但就房地产业的专门工作职务，例如土地投资，很难将这些经验带到业外。
报导指出，房地产业目前仍是高薪产业，然而疲累、动盪、被一个又一个的时程追著跑，加上近年中央对房市的调控越来越严厉，使得房地产业在政策之下走的困难。希望找一份稳定的工作成了不少房地产业人士的盼望，薪资反而已不是首要考量。
中国小学一二年级将不进行纸笔考试
8/30/2021
中国小学一二年级将不进行纸笔考试，其他年级由学校每学期组织一次期末考试。
中国教育部今天（30日）在新闻发布会上公布以上信息。
中国教育部今天印发了《关于加强义务教育学校考试管理的通知》，提出了准确把握考试功能、大幅压减考试次数、合理运用考试结果、完善学习过程评价等要求。
《通知》明确小学一二年级不进行纸笔考试，其他年级由学校每学期组织一次期末考试；初中年级从不同学科实际出发，可适当安排一次期中考试。
《通知》还要求，要合理控制考试难度，严禁超课标超教学进度命题。要合理运用考试结果，学校期中期末考试实行等级评价。要统筹处理好考试、作业、日常评价、质量监测等方面的关系，注重学生的综合素质、学习习惯与学习表现、学习能力与创新精神等方面的综合评价。
中国教育部认为，义务教育阶段的考试主要发挥诊断学情教情、改进加强教学、评价教学质量等方面功能，除初中学业水平考试外，其他考试不具有甄别选拔功能。
中国「双减」政策 北京关63家补习班 补教业恐现倒闭潮
来源：联合报
8/25/2021
中国近期力推教育“双减”（减少作业和校外补习）政策，北京今年以来已对补教机构罚款逾1500万元人民币，并关停63家无证补教机构。港媒引述业界预测，9月上旬，中国将有大量补习班倒闭。
北京市场监管综合执法总队副总队长贺捷昨指出，今年以来，北京已检查补教机构万余次，处罚172件，罚款共计1534.54万元人民币，责令63家无证补教机构停止办学。
在资本加持下，近年中国补教业兴盛，家长和孩子被迫“内卷”（恶性竞争导致虚耗），教育行业乱象频发。7月24日，中共官方发出通知，要求各地减轻义务教育阶段学生作业和校外培训负担。“双减”政策落地，引发行业地震。
中国补教业在今年暑期迎来“寒冬”。双减政策发布后，中国教育类上市公司年内市值蒸发超过千亿元人民币。新东方─S、新东方在线在港股重挫逾三成，思考乐教育、天立教育等也超跌。
连中国著名连锁补教机构“华尔街英语”也陷破产危机。香港01引述业界预测，9月1日到10日，会有一大批补习班倒闭，先前还抱一丝希望的业者会发现，虽然开学了，补习班却收不到钱。
业者和家长表示，九月确实是新季度收费，政策出炉后，对已交补习费但未完结的课程，会协调退费或是另作安排。此外，已有补习班在倒闭或讨论转型中，从业人员也在讨论转换跑道。
据观察者网报导，对补教机构来说，转型几乎已成必然，素质教育、成人职业教育、与学校合作成为主要选项。
中国线上英语机构阿卡索裁员九成 老板疑似失联
8/18/2021
消息指，中国一对一在线少儿英语机构阿卡索已完成最后一批裁员，接近3000人的总部团队已裁撤90%。一名阿卡索运营员工透露，自上月29日起，裁员已持续半个月之久。
根据腾讯新闻《一线》报道，成立于2013年的阿卡索是一家专注于为低幼儿童提供线上外教的培训机构。据了解，公司已在上周日（15日）完成最后一批裁员，但这些员工多数只拿到了60%的赔偿。当天，阿卡索深圳总部被警方、员工以及街道办的人员围堵，其创始人兼CEO王志彬已经失联。
资料显示，今年39岁的王志彬生于中国大陆，6岁移居香港。曾留学英国，获得电子工程学学士学位与通讯与信号处理学硕士学位。
阿卡索的外教资源来自菲律宾，总数达上万名。由于菲教成本较低，阿卡索的课时单价一般在20块（人民币，约4新元）左右，发展迅猛。从2016年首次对外公布融资消息以来，阿卡索迄今已完成九轮融资。
阿卡索去年还宣布签约中国影视明星夫妇佟大为、关悦为代言人。同年年底，阿卡索获得了由环球网颁布的 “2020年度影响力少儿英语品牌”及“2020年度影响力在线教育品牌”。
在“双减”政策落地一周后，王志彬曾在员工群里发布公开信，表示公司过去经历多次磨难，这次也不会有问题。但没过两天就开始裁员。被裁的首先是销售人员及在试用期的人员，后来是运营人员。
一位阿卡索员工表示，“完全没有任何征兆。”直到今年5月，阿卡索还在正常招人，每天都有新员工入职。
阿卡索今天在官方微信公众平台上还发布了王志彬署名的《致阿卡索全体用户的一封信》，称为响应“双减意见”，公司不得不调整发展战略，进行人员优化，但不存在网传的“跑路”“倒闭”等情况。
上月颁布的中国“双减”政策严禁培训机构聘请在境外的外籍人员开展活动，也不得开展面向学龄前儿童的线上学科类培训。受此影响，包括VIPKID、51talk、久趣英语、阿卡索等多家青少年英语外教直播课机构宣布，不再提供境外外教课服务。目前来看，阿卡索是受震荡最大的公司。
Biden’s China Doctrine?
By Raihan Ronodipuro
7/19/2021
The current issue of “The Economist,” published recently, features a cover story on Biden’s China Doctrine. According to the report, “Bidenism” has converted the rhetoric of the “Trumpism” era into a policy prescription of Sino-US clashes (particularly institutional confrontation), with only one winner.
Biden and his team think that China is not interested in coexisting with the US, and they anticipate an early domination. Because of this, the goal of US policy toward China is to undermine China’s objectives. The US can collaborate with China on topics of mutual interest, such as climate change, but on problems such as the economics, technology, diplomacy, military, and values, the US focuses opposing China’s aspirations by strengthening itself and expanding cooperation with allies.
The report calls Biden’s China Doctrine into doubt. Internally, although Biden wishes to utilize China to unify the two parties and push his own agenda, the Republican Party is clearly not foolish enough to readily embrace Biden’s proposals as long as Biden includes a “China” chapter on the bill’s cover.
Diplomatically, Biden not only misjudged the United States’ present global power, but also miscalculated the losses that American allies would suffer if they faced China. In reality, instead of promoting cohabitation, the US administration has turned the relationship between major powers into a “zero sum” game.
The article provides an illustration of how China is on the verge of dominating the economic sphere. Aside from becoming the world’s largest economy, the number of nations with China as their primary trade partner has nearly doubled that of countries with the United States as their primary trading partner.
When it comes to the Sino-US competition, Germany’s perspective is clearly influenced by economic reasons. Southeast Asian countries turn to the United States only for security, and they look to China for economic growth. As a result, if forced to choose between China and the United States, many countries will go with China.
Biden has continued to utilize China’s difficulties to push the domestic agenda, despite the US’s capacity to re-defend norms. His policy proposals include industrial strategies, government involvement, planning, and control. According to rumors, the Biden administration may employ further subsidies and oversight to ensure that jobs and manufacturing remain in the United States.
So, in effect, Biden’s policy proposals have followed a moderate kind of trade protectionism. If the Biden administration withdraws its friends from China, if the goal is to allow the US to leave more employment possibilities, the allies who have not benefitted will understandably wonder, “Why on earth should I join the US in doing this?”
The cover story of The Economist may be considered to have struck the high points of Bi’s China policy since taking office. The Biden administration appears to have clear stances and propositions on China policy, but both its logic and the actions of relevant officials send a strong signal that it serves only the internal affairs of the United States – as if the United States is unconcerned about the affairs of other countries.
Benefits and emotions For example, Southeast Asia was originally given significant weight in the United States’ Asia-Pacific policy, but when the ASEAN foreign ministers met at the end of May, Anthony Blinken, who had been invited, not only did not attend, but instead decided to travel from Ireland to Israel. Connected to join, however because to technical difficulties, other individuals waited on the scene for over an hour before connecting successfully. Despite the fact that it is only a technical problem, the impression provided to ASEAN nations is that the Biden administration does not value Southeast Asia.
A few weeks later, the same group of ASEAN foreign ministers traveled to Chongqing for the meeting. China not only laid out the red carpet for them, but Foreign Minister Wang Yi also had constructive face-to-face talks with them. When ASEAN nations compare their sentiments to those of China and the United States, they realize how frigid they are.
Aside from technical problems, Blinken opted to visit the Middle East rather than Southeast Asia, which rendered the Biden administration’s “return to Asia-Pacific” rhetoric unconvincing to many countries. The US Department of Defense relocated its lone aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific to facilitate military departure from Afghanistan, sending an incredible signal to US allies.
Similar events took place several times in the six months after Biden entered the stage. For example, when the Indonesian foreign minister visited New York last month for a UN meeting, he requested a foreign minister-level meeting with Blinken, but Blinken wasn’t sure if he couldn’t spare the time or didn’t want to see each other at all.
Other nations’ bewilderment, as well as the United States’ skepticism of the Biden administration, has inevitably been felt. Biden and his staff are now pushing for a solution. Blinken, for example, stated last Sunday that the Biden administration maintained the Trump administration’s policy of rejecting China’s South China Sea sovereignty claims, and that the US and the Philippines have signed a mutual defense treaty, and that any attacks on the Philippines will result in a response from the US.
Trying to win the approval of the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, studying Pompeo will not help the US diplomatic position. If Biden’s China policy proposal continues to follow the thinking and operations of the Trump era, it may face significant domestic and foreign problems.
US must outcompete China for a stable relationship: Daniel Russel
Beijing’s aggression comes from perception that America is declining, former official says
TSUYOSHI NAGASAWA, Nikkei staff writer
7/10/2021
WASHINGTON — The secret visit of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, kicked off an American policy of engagement with China. Fifty years later, with China on track to overtake the U.S. economy as early as 2028, bilateral relations are at a crossroad.
In an interview with Nikkei, Daniel Russel, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration, said the nature of the relationship is changing, and it would be wrong to assume that Washington would return to the “good old days,” supporting China’s growth while making an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
But Russel, now vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute, also stressed that aiming for regime change in Beijing is unrealistic and unwise, and would be in line with the “catastrophic” failures of attempted regime changes in the Middle East.
Edited excerpts from the interview follow:
Q: Since Kissinger began an engagement policy with China in the 1970s, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively stable. The U.S. has invited China into the international system. Looking back, how do you evaluate the pros and cons of this policy?
A: If we took a step back and looked broadly at the historical record, we see that the United States deliberately chose a policy of engaging China and supporting its development, first back in 1972 under President Richard Nixon, where this was part of the strategy for containment of the Soviet Union, but then again in the ’90s, when Bill Clinton was president, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a second policy of engaging China that led up to the entry of China into the WTO.
From the Clinton era on, America’s policy toward China was based on the view that a stable China, a prospering China, would serve the best interests of the United States, in part because a weak China, or an insecure China, would likely pose a lot of risks to U.S. interests and to our allies.
I’ve never heard a persuasive argument that it would have been better to do something different than engagement, at those junctures. The United States made a common-sense decision, to try to engage China and to shape its behavior, to integrate China and to give it a stake in the international system, that the United States had largely designed.
And, while people hoped for political liberalization, I don’t think that political liberalization was the reason that the U.S. government and other governments took this approach, because what was the alternative?
Who is going to argue that an effort to isolate China and to contain China, or to destabilize China would have been a better strategy? It would have been a recipe for disaster.
Today, there is a kind of new conventional wisdom that is based on the view that cooperation with China is impossible, that engagement with China is a failure.
If you look at the historical record, that’s just not defensible, that’s not true.
But that doesn’t mean that we can go back to the “good old days” where we tried to support China’s growth, where we made an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
There are two reasons for this.
In the past, as long as there was a large disparity, a gap, in military power and economic power between the two countries, the relationship was reasonably stable. But China has become much more economically successful and much more militarily and technologically capable. China is now close to being a peer power to the United States, which it never was.
Secondly, in the Xi Jinping era — which now is about almost nine years — China’s leadership has become more assertive, more ideological, and more brazen, more overt, in challenging global norms and challenging U.S. leadership. We’ve seen bullying behavior intensify by China.
Q: What were negotiations with China like in the years of President Barack Obama?
A: We had two very different experiences with the Chinese. On the South China Sea, Obama had very direct, very blunt, discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping repeatedly, from 2013 and the Sunnylands meeting on, each time more forcefully warned Xi that China’s island building, its reclamation, its activities, were creating risk, and that the United States had a responsibility to the defense of the Philippines and more broadly had a strong commitment to freedom of navigation, and could not accept efforts by China to claim the so-called nine-dashed line, or to develop outposts in international waters, and that this was damaging the U.S.-China relationship.
Finally, in the meeting in 2015, Xi made an assurance, and he made a public assurance as well, that China would not militarize the outposts that it built.
But, in that case, China did not ultimately honor that commitment, and the problematic behavior continued. And it had a very damaging effect on U.S. relations with China.
The issue of cyber theft, and particularly the Chinese government’s sponsorship of cyber-enabled theft of American intellectual property from companies, that was a different experience, because for years Obama raised this issue with Xi and warned of consequences, and told Xi that, although China was denying it, the United States knew that China was conducting these attacks, and that they couldn’t hide from us.
And finally, the Chinese saw evidence that the United States was preparing to take very severe action in retaliation for this, and the Chinese leadership recognized that they were reaching a dangerous, critical point, and so they sent to Washington the top security official in China, Meng Jianzhu, who came with instructions: don’t come home without an agreement.
And he stayed in Washington for several days. He met with the U.S. government team. And you may remember that the U.S. and China issued a four-point agreement. In that agreement, China essentially acknowledged that this cyber theft had occurred, committed to end it, and made some public commitments that they did implement, they did honor.
For several years after that, the U.S. agencies that were monitoring cyberattacks formed a judgment that China had, in fact, scaled back significantly the attacks that at least the government, the state, was supporting.
Q: Based on those lessons, how should the U.S. approach China?
A: My judgment is that Chinese behavior has become much more troubling and dangerous as Chinese leaders have begun to believe that they are as strong as the United States, that they are getting stronger and the U.S. is getting weaker.
I don’t think that it is wise or feasible to pursue a strategy of weakening China. Instead, it is necessary and wise to pursue a strategy of strengthening the United States and its allies because, as I pointed out before, when the power differential between the United States and China was wider, the relationship was very stable.
As long as the Chinese perception is that the United States is weak, is on the decline, is withdrawing from its traditional role in shaping and often leading international affairs, in rules-setting and so on, and has abandoned the sort of moral high ground that gave the United States so much soft power over the decades, China is incentivized to challenge more directly.
If and when the Chinese leaders see more evidence that the United States is demonstrating resilience, is renewing and reinventing itself, that the overall strength of the democratic communities is growing, not shrinking, the Chinese leaders will be much more open to compromise. They will be much more flexible, much more careful, in their behavior.
Chinese leaders are Leninists and Leninists respect strength and have contempt for weakness.
If the United States, over the course of this year, shows, for example, extraordinary ability to stop the spread of COVID-19, an extraordinary ability to develop vaccines that have 96% to 97% effective rates, demonstrates the ability to manufacture billions of doses and make them available to countries around the world, whereas China, despite its very strict and draconian controls, now continues to battle emerging cases of the delta variant, and the Chinese vaccine, Sinovac, which they have distributed around the world, is now revealed to be far less effective in preventing COVID than advertised, that’s a way in which the United States is already demonstrating its strength.
It is already outcompeting. We’re not hurting China. We’re not blocking China. But we are outperforming China.
Q: You talked about the leadership of Xi Jinping himself. How is he different from former presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin before him?
A: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not democrats; they had no interest in sharing power. But they were also pragmatists, and they were continuing the tradition of Deng Xiaoping, the tradition of “hiding and biding,” the tradition of opening and reform.
Xi Jinping represents a more nationalist and a more ideological strain of Leninism. In the Chinese communist system, he is clearly representing those who believe that more control is the right answer, and that political liberalization is a recipe for disaster that China cannot afford.
Q: China hawks in the U.S. have argued that the biggest problem is the Chinese Communist Party and thus the U.S. should seek regime change.
A: Number one, the people who are advocating regime change are the very people that have experimented with regime change in Iraq, in Libya, and other parts of the world. And, in every case, it has been a catastrophic failure. It’s not only that it didn’t succeed; it’s that it created immense problems in the country and immense problems in the United States.
The United States does not have the power to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party, and we know from experience that, even if we were successful, the consequences are unpredictable and immensely dangerous.
We can certainly hope for a change and an improvement. There’s much that we can do to bolster civil society within China, and much we can do to help strengthen institutions other than the Chinese Communist Party, in China.
There is a lot of pressure that can be applied externally on the Chinese leadership to limit their behavior. But the notion of the United States reaching in and changing the government in China is unrealistic and unwise.
Q: Is there a similarity between the current situation and the 1970s, in the sense that the Biden administration is now seeking a stable and predictable relationship with Russia so as to focus more on China and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia?
A: The big difference in the 1970s was that Moscow and Beijing were in an intense rivalry and were virtual enemies. Another difference was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in a very significant Cold War, in which we had very little economic or other mutual dependencies and were largely separated into independent blocs, and we were competing around the world for influence, in a very direct way.
Today, Russia is a relatively weak power that is largely focused on making problems, making mischief for the U.S. and for the West.
And the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is very cooperative, very collaborative. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is well integrated into the global system, the multilateral system, and the degree of economic and technological integration between China, the United States, and the rest of the West, is unimaginably large.
So, I think, in those respects, we’re in a very, very different world. And, while it is problematic for the United States when China and Russia cooperate in causing problems for us and our friends, and while there would be some virtue and value in trying to provide incentives for Moscow to moderate its behavior and to refrain from that kind of mischief-making, I don’t think there is any prospect for a kind of fundamental alteration of the triangular relationship, the way that Kissinger and Nixon changed it in 1972.
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020