中国禁播“美容贷”广告
9/27/2021
中国国家广播电视总局昨天（27日）发布通知，要求所有平台即日起一律停止播出“美容贷”及类似广告。
据中国国家广播电视总局官网消息，这份名称为《关于停止播出“美容贷”及类似广告》的通知指出，近期发现，一些“美容贷”广告以低息甚至无息吸引青年，诱导超前消费、超高消费，涉嫌虚假宣传、欺骗和误导消费者，造成不良影响。
通知称：“为此，广电总局决定，自即日起，各广播电视和网络视听机构、平台一律停止播出‘美容贷’及类似广告。“
中国市场监管总局曾在8月底发布《医疗美容广告执法指南（征求意见稿）》，称将对各类医疗美容广告乱象予以重点打击，包括将容貌不佳与“低能”“懒惰”“贫穷”等负面评价因素做不当关联，制造“容貌焦虑”、使用患者名义或者形象进行诊疗前后效果对比或者作证明等。
中国广电总局：坚决抵制含不良情节和画面的动画片
9/24/2021
中国国家广播电视总局称，坚决抵制含有暴力血腥、低俗色情等不良情节和画面的动画片上网播出。
据广电总局官网昨晚（23日）发布的公告，广电总局网络视听节目管理负责表示，支持符合条件的互联网视听节目服务机构依法依规制作、引进、播出内容健康向上、弘扬真善美的优秀动画片，坚决抵制含有暴力血腥、低俗色情等不良情节和画面的动画片上网播出。
公告称，儿童和青少年是动画片的主要受众群体，各互联网视听节目服务机构应办好“儿童频道”、“青少专区”，进一步规范节目内容、优化节目编排，为青少年健康成长营造良好的网络视听空间。
Sep 22, 2021
中国监管风暴 学者称与美中博弈有关
中央社
9/05/2021
中国大力度整治娱乐圈和网络科技业等，引各方猜测。中国学者曹辛说，当前是用国家政权的力量，以公众的名义，导引中国经济、文化和社会生活的发展方向，与美中博弈的大背景密不可分。
英媒金融时报（FT）中文网3日刊发察哈尔学会国际舆情研究中心秘书长、半岛和平研究中心研究员曹辛的文章，指当前的整顿既是中国在相关领域的自由和野蛮发展使然，也与美中关系相关。
他引述外媒分析加上自身见解说，中国决策层认为，中国经济和文化发展在部分领域的导向已经出现了问题，必须调整方向；而且在当前面临美中博弈的大背景下，中国的时间已经不多，必须快速转向。
在对于中国网络平台和网络游戏行业的整顿方面，他引述外媒分析指出，北京认为科技产业分成「锦上添花型」和「不可或缺型」，后者的「硬科技」才是决定一国是否强大的因素。而美中之间的科技战，让中国更加确信需要在半导体等关键领域上更加自主，限制社群媒体和网游有助于将资源引导到「硬科技」企业。
俄罗斯媒体「地缘政治网」则分析，对私人补教行业的重组、对大型科技公司的限制、对饭圈（粉丝圈）文化的整顿、以及监管年轻人过度沉迷的电子游戏，「这是使中国社会与国家优先事项保持一致的另一努力，再次表明大企业的利益并不总代表整个社会利益」。曹辛认为，这很符合中国高层的想法。
文章指出，当前对不同行业的整顿，背后逻辑并不相同。
文章认为，中国官方对网络行业的整顿是为了让国内的资金转向、投到实体经济中去，让中国拥有世界上最强大的高科技和制造业，与美国竞争。这首先是经济和金融发展导向问题。
至于官方整治「饭圈」和娱乐圈资本无序扩张，「则是彻头彻尾的中国特色政治问题」。
曹辛以中纪委官网文章「斩断娱乐圈乱象背后的资本链条」为例，文中就明确表示：文艺绝不是单纯的唱歌跳舞，而是思想文化和意识形态工作的重要阵地，「是党的一项极端重要的工作」。
文章认为，当前对网络和娱乐圈的整顿「方向是对的，因为它符合当今中国的产业和社会发展的实际需要」，一旦开始向正确方向行进时，中国会继续发展。
尽管如此，曹辛说，中国政府在整顿过程中应当高度关注两点，一是应该把国企和民企置于同样的法律位置，只处理民企而对国企网开一面，会引发政治和社会问题。
二是应尽量在较小损失的前提下进行经济和社会的调整和转向，「要有能力调转自如，不能失去控制」，更不能因政治考虑无法控制，「这是中国上世纪60年代的教训」，暗指不能让类似文革的悲剧重演。
中国官媒纷转评论 称官方整治动作是“深刻变革”
8/30/2021
中国多家官媒昨天（29日）集中转发一篇自媒体评论文章，文中指中国官方近期在各个领域的一系列整治动作是一场“深刻变革”，并称阻挡这场变革的“将被抛弃”。
这篇题为《每个人都能感受到，一场深刻的变革正在进行！》的文章最初由微信公众号“李光满冰点时评”发表，但过后被人民网、新华网、央视网、中国军网、光明网、中青在线、中新网、环球网等众多官媒转发。
文章说，从蚂蚁上市被叫停，到中央整顿经济秩序、反垄断，到阿里被罚182亿元（人民币，下同，约37.88亿新元）和滴滴被查，到隆重纪念建党100周年，提出走共同富裕道路，以及最近对娱乐圈乱象的一系列整治动作，“都在告诉我们，中国从经济领域、金融领域、文化领域到政治领域都在发生一场“深刻的变革”，或者也可以说是一场‘深刻的革命’”。
文章写道，“这是一次从资本集团向人民群众的回归，这是一次以资本为中心向以人民为中心的变革”，“这是一场政治变革，人民正在重新成为这场变革的主体，所有阻挡这场以人民为中心变革的都将被抛弃”，这场深刻的变革也是一次回归，“向着中国共产党的初心回归，向着以人民为中心回归，向着社会主义本质回归”。
文章还说，变革将荡涤一切尘埃，资本市场不再成为资本家一夜暴富的天堂，文化市场不再成为娘炮明星的天堂，新闻舆论不再成为崇拜西方文化的阵地，“红色回归，英雄回归，血性回归”。
文章指出，当前正在进行的从治理培训机构、学区房开始的治理教育乱象，让教育真正回归平民化、公平性，使普通人有向上流动的空间，未来还要治理高房价、高医疗费，彻底铲平教育、医疗、住房三座大山。
对于中共高层目前聚焦的“共同富裕”，文章说，虽然不搞杀富济贫，但需切实解决收入差距越来越大的问题。
文章指出，中国面临着越来越严峻复杂的国际环境，美国正对中国实施越来越严厉的军事威胁、经济及科技封锁、金融打击、政治及外交围剿，“通过中国内部的第五纵队对中国发动颜色革命”，这场深刻变革正是为了应对美国已经开始对中国发动的“野蛮而凶猛的攻击”，如果此时还要依靠大资本家作为反帝国主义、反霸权主义的主力，那么就会像当年苏联一样。
文章最后强调，每个人都能感受到，“一场深刻的社会变革已经开始”，不仅要摧枯拉朽，而且要刮骨疗伤，还要清扫屋子，清新空气，让社会更加健康，让社会主体感到身心愉悦。
每个人都能感受到 一场深刻的变革正在进行！
来源：光明网
8/30/2021
中国娱乐圈一直都不缺臭气熏天的猛料，前不久相继爆出吴亦凡、霍尊的乱象以及张哲瀚到日本靖国神社拜鬼之事，近日又爆出湖南卫视主持人钱枫涉嫌强奸她人一事，总让人感觉中国娱乐圈已经烂透了。如果再不整治，不仅娱乐圈烂透了，整个文化圈、文艺圈、演艺圈、影视圈也都烂透了。
这两天，风暴再起，直击娱乐圈乱象，中央网信办重拳整治“饭圈”，国家税务总局处罚郑爽偷逃税2.99亿元，各大平台下架赵薇、高晓松，这次对娱乐圈的重击意味着什么？
8月25日，中央网信办发布加强“饭圈”乱象治理的通知，提出了治理“饭圈乱象”的十点要求：一是取消明星艺人榜单，二是优化调整排行规则，三是严管明星经纪公司，四是规范粉丝群体账号，五是严禁呈现互撕信息，六是清理违规群组版块，七是不得诱导粉丝消费，八是强化节目设置管理，九是严控未成年人参与，十是规范应援集资行为。通知特别提到要提高政治站位，从维护网上政治安全和意识形态安全、营造清朗网络空间的高度认识和推进“饭圈”乱象治理工作。显然这是一次政治行动，各地都必须从政治高度来认识这一整治行动。
无独有偶。8月27日，国家税务总局公布对艺人郑爽偷逃税案的处罚决定。经查，郑爽于2019年主演电视剧《倩女幽魂》，与制片人约定片酬为1.6亿元，实际取得1.56亿元，分为两个部分收取。其中，第一部分4800万元，将个人片酬收入改变为企业收入进行虚假申报、偷逃税款；第二部分1.08亿元，制片人与郑爽实际控制公司签订虚假合同，以“增资”的形式支付，规避行业监管获取“天价片酬”，隐瞒收入进行虚假申报、偷逃税款。在《倩女幽魂》项目中，根据郑爽违法事实认定为偷税4302.7万元，其他少缴税款1617.78万元。同时查明，2018年规范影视行业税收秩序后，郑爽另有其他演艺收入3507万元，同样存在以企业收入名义改变个人收入性质、进行虚假申报的问题，根据郑爽违法事实认定为偷税224.26万元，其他少缴税款1034.29万元。以上合计，郑爽2019年至2020年未依法申报个人收入1.91亿元，偷税4526.96万元，其他少缴税款2652.07万元。
根据相关法律规定，对郑爽追缴税款、加收滞纳金并处罚款共计2.99亿元。其中，依法追缴税款7179.03万元，加收滞纳金888.98万元；对改变收入性质偷税部分处以4倍罚款，计3069.57万元；对收取所谓“增资款”完全隐瞒收入偷税部分处以5倍“顶格”罚款，计1.88亿元。根据《中华人民共和国刑法》规定，若其在规定期限内未缴清罚款，税务机关将依法移送公安机关处理。广电总局发出通知，要求各级广播电视播出机构、广播电视视频点播业务开办机构和网络视听节目服务机构不得邀请郑爽参与制作节目，停止播出郑爽已参与制作的节目。最近，经常出现在各类新闻榜头条的赵薇又出事了。8月26日，赵薇的超话在微博消失，《还珠格格》、《情深深雨濛濛》等多部剧集，在腾讯、爱奇艺网站显示的演职员表中，赵薇被删去名字。
按说，赵薇早在二十多年前就应该从中国公众视野中消失，可她却越来越发达。二十年前，她身穿侵华日军的旭日旗出现在公众视野，受到全网讨伐，她竟然没有遭到封杀，反而在中国的资本市场上呼云唤雨，被誉为中国女版巴菲特，那个时候她跟马云、王林等大师打的火热，她能够掌控舆论，有关她的负面新闻经常遭到清理。后来在她导演的影片《没有别的爱》中，男主角戴立忍是死硬的台独分子，女主角水原希子是支持参拜靖国神社的日本反华分子，由此引起公众愤怒，令人奇怪的是这件事也很快被平息下去。最近赵薇旗下演员张哲瀚多次出现在靖国神社，做纳粹手势、结交日本右翼，引起全国人民公愤。问题仍然是，无论有多少负面新闻，赵薇始终不倒，这始终是一个迷样的问题，现在看来，不是不报，是时候未到。
与赵薇同时下架的还有另一个美国人高晓松，我国网上、电视台长期都有他的节目《晓说》、《晓松奇谈》等，他胡扯乱谈历史，崇美跪美，忽悠了一批中国人成为他的粉丝。
从整治饭圈到处罚郑爽，再到下架封杀赵薇和高晓松，仅仅两天内发生的事，我们有什么感觉？如果我们从更高的政治层面来看这一系列事件，就会从一些细节中发现一个国家的历史走向和发展趋势。
从蚂蚁上市被叫停，到中央整顿经济秩序、反垄断，到阿里被罚182亿元和滴滴被查，到中央隆重纪念建党100周年，提出走共同富裕道路，以及最近对娱乐圈乱象的一系列整治动作，都在告诉我们，中国正在发生重大变化，从经济领域、金融领域、文化领域到政治领域都在发生一场深刻的变革，或者也可以说是一场深刻的革命。这是一次从资本集团向人民群众的回归，这是一次以资本为中心向以人民为中心的变革。因此，这是一场政治变革，人民正在重新成为这场变革的主体，所有阻挡这场以人民为中心变革的都将被抛弃。这场深刻的变革也是一次回归，向着中国共产党的初心回归，向着以人民为中心回归，向着社会主义本质回归。
这次变革将荡涤一切尘埃，资本市场不再成为资本家一夜暴富的天堂，文化市场不再成为娘炮明星的天堂，新闻舆论不再成为崇拜西方文化的阵地，红色回归，英雄回归，血性回归。因此我们需要治理一切文化乱象，建设鲜活、健康、阳刚、强悍、以人民为本的文化，我们需要打击资本市场上大资本操纵、平台垄断通吃、劣币驱逐良币的乱象，引导资金流向实体企业、流向高科技企业、流向制造业，当前正在进行的从治理培训机构、学区房开始的治理教育乱象，让教育真正回归平民化、公平性，使普通人有向上流动的空间，未来还要治理高房价、高医疗费，彻底铲平教育、医疗、住房三座大山。虽然我们不搞杀富济贫，但需要切实解决富者愈富、贫者愈贫的收入差距越来越大的问题，共同富裕是要让普通劳动者在社会财富分配中能够获得更多收入。这次变革将给我们社会带来一系列新的气象，当前对娱乐圈、文艺圈、影视圈的整治力度还远远不够，要使用一切手段打击当前社会上存在的各种追星、饭圈现象，彻底杜绝社会性格中的娘炮和小鲜肉现象，真正让娱乐圈、文艺圈、影视圈风正、气正，我们的各类文学艺术工作者、影视工作者都要下基层，让普通劳动者、普通老百姓成为文学艺术的主人翁和主角。
当前中国面临着越来越严峻复杂的国际环境，美国正在对中国实施越来越严厉的军事威胁、经济及科技封锁、金融打击、政治及外交围剿，正在对中国发动生物战、网络战、舆论战、太空战，力度越来越大地通过中国内部的第五纵队对中国发动颜色革命。如果这个时候，我们还要依靠那些大资本家作为反帝国主义、反霸权主义的主力、还在迎合美国的奶头乐战略，让我们的青年一代失去强悍和阳刚的雄风，那么我们不用敌人来打就自己先倒下了，就像当年苏联一样，任国家崩溃、任国家财富被洗劫、任人民陷入深重灾难。因此当前我们中国正在发生的这场深刻变革，正是为了应对当前严峻而复杂的国际形势，正是为了应对美国已经开始对中国发动的野蛮而凶猛的攻击。
我们每个人都能感受到，一场深刻的社会变革已经开始，不仅资本圈，也不仅娱乐圈，不仅要摧枯拉朽，而且要刮骨疗伤，还要清扫屋子，清新空气，让我们社会更加健康，让社会主体能够感到身心愉悦。（李光满）
Biden’s China Doctrine?
By Raihan Ronodipuro
7/19/2021
The current issue of “The Economist,” published recently, features a cover story on Biden’s China Doctrine. According to the report, “Bidenism” has converted the rhetoric of the “Trumpism” era into a policy prescription of Sino-US clashes (particularly institutional confrontation), with only one winner.
Biden and his team think that China is not interested in coexisting with the US, and they anticipate an early domination. Because of this, the goal of US policy toward China is to undermine China’s objectives. The US can collaborate with China on topics of mutual interest, such as climate change, but on problems such as the economics, technology, diplomacy, military, and values, the US focuses opposing China’s aspirations by strengthening itself and expanding cooperation with allies.
The report calls Biden’s China Doctrine into doubt. Internally, although Biden wishes to utilize China to unify the two parties and push his own agenda, the Republican Party is clearly not foolish enough to readily embrace Biden’s proposals as long as Biden includes a “China” chapter on the bill’s cover.
Diplomatically, Biden not only misjudged the United States’ present global power, but also miscalculated the losses that American allies would suffer if they faced China. In reality, instead of promoting cohabitation, the US administration has turned the relationship between major powers into a “zero sum” game.
The article provides an illustration of how China is on the verge of dominating the economic sphere. Aside from becoming the world’s largest economy, the number of nations with China as their primary trade partner has nearly doubled that of countries with the United States as their primary trading partner.
When it comes to the Sino-US competition, Germany’s perspective is clearly influenced by economic reasons. Southeast Asian countries turn to the United States only for security, and they look to China for economic growth. As a result, if forced to choose between China and the United States, many countries will go with China.
Biden has continued to utilize China’s difficulties to push the domestic agenda, despite the US’s capacity to re-defend norms. His policy proposals include industrial strategies, government involvement, planning, and control. According to rumors, the Biden administration may employ further subsidies and oversight to ensure that jobs and manufacturing remain in the United States.
So, in effect, Biden’s policy proposals have followed a moderate kind of trade protectionism. If the Biden administration withdraws its friends from China, if the goal is to allow the US to leave more employment possibilities, the allies who have not benefitted will understandably wonder, “Why on earth should I join the US in doing this?”
The cover story of The Economist may be considered to have struck the high points of Bi’s China policy since taking office. The Biden administration appears to have clear stances and propositions on China policy, but both its logic and the actions of relevant officials send a strong signal that it serves only the internal affairs of the United States – as if the United States is unconcerned about the affairs of other countries.
Benefits and emotions For example, Southeast Asia was originally given significant weight in the United States’ Asia-Pacific policy, but when the ASEAN foreign ministers met at the end of May, Anthony Blinken, who had been invited, not only did not attend, but instead decided to travel from Ireland to Israel. Connected to join, however because to technical difficulties, other individuals waited on the scene for over an hour before connecting successfully. Despite the fact that it is only a technical problem, the impression provided to ASEAN nations is that the Biden administration does not value Southeast Asia.
A few weeks later, the same group of ASEAN foreign ministers traveled to Chongqing for the meeting. China not only laid out the red carpet for them, but Foreign Minister Wang Yi also had constructive face-to-face talks with them. When ASEAN nations compare their sentiments to those of China and the United States, they realize how frigid they are.
Aside from technical problems, Blinken opted to visit the Middle East rather than Southeast Asia, which rendered the Biden administration’s “return to Asia-Pacific” rhetoric unconvincing to many countries. The US Department of Defense relocated its lone aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific to facilitate military departure from Afghanistan, sending an incredible signal to US allies.
Similar events took place several times in the six months after Biden entered the stage. For example, when the Indonesian foreign minister visited New York last month for a UN meeting, he requested a foreign minister-level meeting with Blinken, but Blinken wasn’t sure if he couldn’t spare the time or didn’t want to see each other at all.
Other nations’ bewilderment, as well as the United States’ skepticism of the Biden administration, has inevitably been felt. Biden and his staff are now pushing for a solution. Blinken, for example, stated last Sunday that the Biden administration maintained the Trump administration’s policy of rejecting China’s South China Sea sovereignty claims, and that the US and the Philippines have signed a mutual defense treaty, and that any attacks on the Philippines will result in a response from the US.
Trying to win the approval of the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, studying Pompeo will not help the US diplomatic position. If Biden’s China policy proposal continues to follow the thinking and operations of the Trump era, it may face significant domestic and foreign problems.
US must outcompete China for a stable relationship: Daniel Russel
Beijing’s aggression comes from perception that America is declining, former official says
TSUYOSHI NAGASAWA, Nikkei staff writer
7/10/2021
WASHINGTON — The secret visit of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, kicked off an American policy of engagement with China. Fifty years later, with China on track to overtake the U.S. economy as early as 2028, bilateral relations are at a crossroad.
In an interview with Nikkei, Daniel Russel, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration, said the nature of the relationship is changing, and it would be wrong to assume that Washington would return to the “good old days,” supporting China’s growth while making an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
But Russel, now vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute, also stressed that aiming for regime change in Beijing is unrealistic and unwise, and would be in line with the “catastrophic” failures of attempted regime changes in the Middle East.
Edited excerpts from the interview follow:
Q: Since Kissinger began an engagement policy with China in the 1970s, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively stable. The U.S. has invited China into the international system. Looking back, how do you evaluate the pros and cons of this policy?
A: If we took a step back and looked broadly at the historical record, we see that the United States deliberately chose a policy of engaging China and supporting its development, first back in 1972 under President Richard Nixon, where this was part of the strategy for containment of the Soviet Union, but then again in the ’90s, when Bill Clinton was president, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a second policy of engaging China that led up to the entry of China into the WTO.
From the Clinton era on, America’s policy toward China was based on the view that a stable China, a prospering China, would serve the best interests of the United States, in part because a weak China, or an insecure China, would likely pose a lot of risks to U.S. interests and to our allies.
I’ve never heard a persuasive argument that it would have been better to do something different than engagement, at those junctures. The United States made a common-sense decision, to try to engage China and to shape its behavior, to integrate China and to give it a stake in the international system, that the United States had largely designed.
And, while people hoped for political liberalization, I don’t think that political liberalization was the reason that the U.S. government and other governments took this approach, because what was the alternative?
Who is going to argue that an effort to isolate China and to contain China, or to destabilize China would have been a better strategy? It would have been a recipe for disaster.
Today, there is a kind of new conventional wisdom that is based on the view that cooperation with China is impossible, that engagement with China is a failure.
If you look at the historical record, that’s just not defensible, that’s not true.
But that doesn’t mean that we can go back to the “good old days” where we tried to support China’s growth, where we made an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
There are two reasons for this.
In the past, as long as there was a large disparity, a gap, in military power and economic power between the two countries, the relationship was reasonably stable. But China has become much more economically successful and much more militarily and technologically capable. China is now close to being a peer power to the United States, which it never was.
Secondly, in the Xi Jinping era — which now is about almost nine years — China’s leadership has become more assertive, more ideological, and more brazen, more overt, in challenging global norms and challenging U.S. leadership. We’ve seen bullying behavior intensify by China.
Q: What were negotiations with China like in the years of President Barack Obama?
A: We had two very different experiences with the Chinese. On the South China Sea, Obama had very direct, very blunt, discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping repeatedly, from 2013 and the Sunnylands meeting on, each time more forcefully warned Xi that China’s island building, its reclamation, its activities, were creating risk, and that the United States had a responsibility to the defense of the Philippines and more broadly had a strong commitment to freedom of navigation, and could not accept efforts by China to claim the so-called nine-dashed line, or to develop outposts in international waters, and that this was damaging the U.S.-China relationship.
Finally, in the meeting in 2015, Xi made an assurance, and he made a public assurance as well, that China would not militarize the outposts that it built.
But, in that case, China did not ultimately honor that commitment, and the problematic behavior continued. And it had a very damaging effect on U.S. relations with China.
The issue of cyber theft, and particularly the Chinese government’s sponsorship of cyber-enabled theft of American intellectual property from companies, that was a different experience, because for years Obama raised this issue with Xi and warned of consequences, and told Xi that, although China was denying it, the United States knew that China was conducting these attacks, and that they couldn’t hide from us.
And finally, the Chinese saw evidence that the United States was preparing to take very severe action in retaliation for this, and the Chinese leadership recognized that they were reaching a dangerous, critical point, and so they sent to Washington the top security official in China, Meng Jianzhu, who came with instructions: don’t come home without an agreement.
And he stayed in Washington for several days. He met with the U.S. government team. And you may remember that the U.S. and China issued a four-point agreement. In that agreement, China essentially acknowledged that this cyber theft had occurred, committed to end it, and made some public commitments that they did implement, they did honor.
For several years after that, the U.S. agencies that were monitoring cyberattacks formed a judgment that China had, in fact, scaled back significantly the attacks that at least the government, the state, was supporting.
Q: Based on those lessons, how should the U.S. approach China?
A: My judgment is that Chinese behavior has become much more troubling and dangerous as Chinese leaders have begun to believe that they are as strong as the United States, that they are getting stronger and the U.S. is getting weaker.
I don’t think that it is wise or feasible to pursue a strategy of weakening China. Instead, it is necessary and wise to pursue a strategy of strengthening the United States and its allies because, as I pointed out before, when the power differential between the United States and China was wider, the relationship was very stable.
As long as the Chinese perception is that the United States is weak, is on the decline, is withdrawing from its traditional role in shaping and often leading international affairs, in rules-setting and so on, and has abandoned the sort of moral high ground that gave the United States so much soft power over the decades, China is incentivized to challenge more directly.
If and when the Chinese leaders see more evidence that the United States is demonstrating resilience, is renewing and reinventing itself, that the overall strength of the democratic communities is growing, not shrinking, the Chinese leaders will be much more open to compromise. They will be much more flexible, much more careful, in their behavior.
Chinese leaders are Leninists and Leninists respect strength and have contempt for weakness.
If the United States, over the course of this year, shows, for example, extraordinary ability to stop the spread of COVID-19, an extraordinary ability to develop vaccines that have 96% to 97% effective rates, demonstrates the ability to manufacture billions of doses and make them available to countries around the world, whereas China, despite its very strict and draconian controls, now continues to battle emerging cases of the delta variant, and the Chinese vaccine, Sinovac, which they have distributed around the world, is now revealed to be far less effective in preventing COVID than advertised, that’s a way in which the United States is already demonstrating its strength.
It is already outcompeting. We’re not hurting China. We’re not blocking China. But we are outperforming China.
Q: You talked about the leadership of Xi Jinping himself. How is he different from former presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin before him?
A: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not democrats; they had no interest in sharing power. But they were also pragmatists, and they were continuing the tradition of Deng Xiaoping, the tradition of “hiding and biding,” the tradition of opening and reform.
Xi Jinping represents a more nationalist and a more ideological strain of Leninism. In the Chinese communist system, he is clearly representing those who believe that more control is the right answer, and that political liberalization is a recipe for disaster that China cannot afford.
Q: China hawks in the U.S. have argued that the biggest problem is the Chinese Communist Party and thus the U.S. should seek regime change.
A: Number one, the people who are advocating regime change are the very people that have experimented with regime change in Iraq, in Libya, and other parts of the world. And, in every case, it has been a catastrophic failure. It’s not only that it didn’t succeed; it’s that it created immense problems in the country and immense problems in the United States.
The United States does not have the power to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party, and we know from experience that, even if we were successful, the consequences are unpredictable and immensely dangerous.
We can certainly hope for a change and an improvement. There’s much that we can do to bolster civil society within China, and much we can do to help strengthen institutions other than the Chinese Communist Party, in China.
There is a lot of pressure that can be applied externally on the Chinese leadership to limit their behavior. But the notion of the United States reaching in and changing the government in China is unrealistic and unwise.
Q: Is there a similarity between the current situation and the 1970s, in the sense that the Biden administration is now seeking a stable and predictable relationship with Russia so as to focus more on China and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia?
A: The big difference in the 1970s was that Moscow and Beijing were in an intense rivalry and were virtual enemies. Another difference was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in a very significant Cold War, in which we had very little economic or other mutual dependencies and were largely separated into independent blocs, and we were competing around the world for influence, in a very direct way.
Today, Russia is a relatively weak power that is largely focused on making problems, making mischief for the U.S. and for the West.
And the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is very cooperative, very collaborative. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is well integrated into the global system, the multilateral system, and the degree of economic and technological integration between China, the United States, and the rest of the West, is unimaginably large.
So, I think, in those respects, we’re in a very, very different world. And, while it is problematic for the United States when China and Russia cooperate in causing problems for us and our friends, and while there would be some virtue and value in trying to provide incentives for Moscow to moderate its behavior and to refrain from that kind of mischief-making, I don’t think there is any prospect for a kind of fundamental alteration of the triangular relationship, the way that Kissinger and Nixon changed it in 1972.
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020
