美F-35C在南海发生降落事故，7名航母舰员受伤曝光
世界新闻网
01/25/2022
据美国海军协会网站（USNI）1月24日报道，美国海军当地时间1月24证实，一架F-35C舰载机24日在“卡尔·文森”号航空母舰（CVN-70）甲板上降落时发生“降落事故”，造成7名航母船员受伤，F-35C的飞行员“安全弹射”，飞机情况未知。这是美国海军F-35C机队首次在海上部署任务中出现降落事故
事故发生时，“卡尔·文森”号航母正在南海航行。值得一提的是，美军当下在中国周边海域有部署两个F-35C舰载战斗机中队，分别部署在“卡尔·文森”号航母和“林肯”号航母上，共计20架F-35C战机，USNI网站此前吹嘘称，这是美国海军历史上在印太地区部署五代机数量最多的一次。
美国海军机动部队的主力全数到场。参演舰艇美国海军航母“卡尔文森”号（CVN-70）、“林肯”号（CVN-72）；两栖攻击舰“美国”号（LHA-6）、“埃塞克斯”号（LHD-2）；提康德罗加级巡洋舰“莫尔比湾”号（CG-53）、“尚普兰湖”号（CG-57）；驱逐舰“查菲”号（DDG-90）、“格瑞德利”号（DDG-101）、“斯普鲁恩斯”号（DDG-111）以及日本海上自卫队“日向”号直升机母舰（DDH-181）。
值得一提的是，美国海军此次携带了多达3个中队，共20余架F-35系列战机前往南海，分别是部署在“卡尔·文森”号航母上的VFA-147攻击战斗机中队，有10架F-35C；部署在“林肯”号航母上的美国海军陆战队314攻击中队(VMFA-314），也有10架F-35C；以及部署在“美国”号两栖攻击舰上的F-35B中队，可能有6-8架战机。
美国海军协会此前吹嘘，这是美国海军历史上在印太地区部署五代机数量最多的一次。
在美军加强南海地区的兵力以后，我军也有了新的动作。台湾地区防务部门网站1月23日称，当天共有39架次解放军军机进入所谓“西南空域”，其中包括2架次运-9通信对抗机、10架次歼-10战斗机、24架次歼-16战斗机、2架次运-8电子侦察机、1架次轰-6轰炸机。随后台军在1月24日发现了我军歼-16D，1月24日，台防务部门称当天13架解放军军机进入台所谓“西南空域”，其中首次出现了解放军歼-16D新型电子战飞机（J-16D）。
美誤炸阿富汗平民 倖存者：光道歉不夠 要懲罰主事者
来源：聯合報
9/18/2021
美國國防部17日證實，美軍上月29日在阿富汗喀布爾執行無人機攻擊任務時錯殺10位平民，國防部部長奧斯丁、參謀首長聯席會議主席密利和負責指揮當地行動的美軍中央司令部司令麥肯齊公開致歉。
被美軍誤認為呼羅珊伊斯蘭國自殺炸彈客的阿富汗平民艾哈邁迪（Zemari Ahmadi）的弟弟阿馬爾，18日告訴美聯社，他的3歲女兒瑪莉卡遇害，「美國道歉還不夠」，他的家族要求美國調查是誰操縱無人機開火，並懲罰相關軍事人員。
阿馬爾說：「對我們來說，道歉還不夠，美國應該找出做這件事的人。」
阿馬爾說，家族還要求美國支付賠償金，並將家族中幾名成員轉移到第三國。
美军承认对喀布尔的空袭造成10名平民死亡
来源：新华社
9/17/2021
美国军方17日承认，美军8月29日在阿富汗首都喀布尔实施的无人机袭击造成当地10名平民死亡，其中包括7名儿童。
美国中央司令部司令麦肯齐当天在国防部记者会上说，经调查评估，美军当时袭击的汽车及死难者都不太可能与极端组织“伊斯兰国”阿富汗分支有关联，也不会对美军构成直接威胁。此次袭击是一个“悲剧性错误”，他对此表示道歉，并承担全部责任。
美国防部长奥斯汀当天发表声明，称美方对此次袭击表示道歉，会尽力从“可怕的错误”中吸取教训。他已要求重新审视美国中央司令部的相关调查，以评估调查信息的完整性，采取问责的必要性和程度，以及打击权限和程序是否需要改变等。
美国中央司令部8月29日说，美军无人机当天在喀布尔对一辆汽车实施空袭，解除了“伊斯兰国”阿富汗分支对喀布尔机场的威胁。据阿富汗黎明电视台报道，美军此次无人机打击行动造成包括5名儿童在内的10人死亡。
另据英国研究机构“空中战争”发布的数据，在过去20年中，因美军空袭造成的平民死亡人数至少有2.2万人。
‘Tragic mistake’: U.S. determines Kabul drone strike killed innocent aid worker, nine family members
The revelation comes one week after a New York Times investigation determined the target actually worked for an American aid organization.
By LARA SELIGMAN
9/17/2021
Taliban fighters widen the perimeter outside the airport as the U.S. military completes its withdrawal from the country, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Sunday, Aug. 29, 2021.
An investigation by U.S. Central Command has determined that an Aug. 29 drone strike in Kabul killed an innocent aid worker and nine members of his family, not a member of the ISIS-K terrorist group, a top general announced Friday.
The command now assesses that “it is unlikely” the man and vehicle targeted was affiliated with ISIS-K, the Afghanistan branch of ISIS, or “a direct threat to U.S. forces,” Gen. Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, told reporters Friday.
“This strike was taken in the earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to forces at the airport,” McKenzie said. “Our investigation now concludes that the strike was a tragic mistake.”
The news comes as the Biden administration is already facing criticism over its Afghanistan withdrawal and the fact that the effort left hundreds of Americans and thousands of at-risk Afghans in the country at the end of August. More than 120,000 people were airlifted from Hamid Karzai International Airport before U.S. troops pulled out.
The revelation also comes one week after a New York Times investigation determined the target actually worked for an American aid organization.
Central Command ordered the Aug. 29 strike based on intelligence that the man was planning an “imminent” attack on the airport, where the military was scrambling to evacuate tens of thousands of American citizens and at-risk Afghans before the clock ran out on the withdrawal.
Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in early September called the strike “righteous.”
But instead, the strike “tragically” killed “as many as 10 civilians,” including up to seven children, McKenzie said.
Milley on Friday acknowledged the mistake, calling the “heart wrenching” strike “a horrible tragedy of war.”
“In a dynamic high threat environment, the commanders on the ground had appropriate authority and had reasonable certainty that the target was valid,” Milley said in a statement. “But after deeper post strike analysis our conclusion is that innocent civilians were killed.”
McKenzie on Friday stood by the intelligence the military used to determine the target, noting the threat to the airport was posed by a “white Toyota Corolla,” the same type of car that was destroyed in the strike, and that the military had “no indication that the strike would result in civilian casualties.”
The strike must be considered “in the context of the situation on the ground,” McKenzie said, adding that just days before an ISIS-K suicide bombing had killed 13 U.S. service members and more than 100 civilians at the airport.
In the 48 hours before the strike, the military had “a substantial body of intelligence” indicating that there would be another attack, and one recurring theme was that ISIS-K would use a white Toyota Corolla as a key element, McKenzie said.
Based on that intelligence, the military began surveilling the car belonging to the target, identified as Zemari Ahmadi, the morning of the strike, and continued observing its movements for eight hours, McKenzie said.
The strike was executed at 4:53 p.m. that afternoon because the military determined there was little potential for civilian casualties, McKenzie said. That assessment turned out to be wrong, he acknowledged.
McKenzie declined to comment as to whether anyone will be disciplined over the strike, noting that the investigation is ongoing. “I have nothing for you now because that involves personnel issues,” he said.
美国士兵忏悔：曾经想当个英雄，却杀了阿富汗儿童
文章来源: 海外网
9/13/2021
美国于8月底完成撤兵，长达二十年的阿富汗战争仓皇落幕。美国一名曾参与阿富汗战争的士兵日前受访时感慨：“曾经想当个英雄，却杀死了儿童。”
据今日俄罗斯10日报道，2005年入伍的美军士兵布兰登(Brandon)说，“我曾经想当个英雄，想帮人们做点好事。”然而，他却发现自己在一次操作无人机任务中杀死了一名儿童，“这让我感到震惊，就像匕首插进胸口。”
“按下按钮并杀死目标，这很容易，任何人都能操作。”布兰登忏悔地表示，孩子们被当做狗来对待，无辜的人受到伤害，就像书本里的标记一样被轻描淡写。
塔利班一名前法官杰拉鲁丁·辛瓦里(Jelaluddin Shinwari)说，一些阿富汗人最初还相信，这个国家会在美国的带领下繁荣昌盛，然而一旦入侵发生，人们即刻明白美国的本质和美式民主的代价。
塔利班前任高级指挥官赛义德·穆罕默德·阿克巴·阿贾(Sayed Mohammad Akbar Aga)也认为，美国及其盟国在二十年的时间里几乎没有为阿富汗建造什么。
与官方不同视角 美军队员公开8分钟仓促撤军影片
文章来源: Newtalk
9/05/2021
美国海军陆战队员马克兰(Michael Markland)近日在社群媒体上发布影片，从幕后视角呈现了喀布尔撤离时的混乱与恐慌。
根据《今日俄罗斯》（RT）报导，这段长达8分钟，是对这场仓促的疏散行动进行了一次”原始的、未经修饰的审视。”
RT描述说，这段8分钟的影片由多段镜头剪辑在一起。影片开头，美军在一个未知的机场登上了一架美军C-17运输机。在抵达喀布尔机场后，人们可以看到武装的海军陆战队员们在机场周围站岗。
随后，影片纪录到了喀布尔机场外的”混乱时刻”。一群平民挤在机场外的铁丝网上，美军士兵朝空中开枪以维持秩序。报导称，还有另外一名看上去不像是美军士兵的武装人员朝着离平民只有几英寸远的地方开枪。
影片还纪录了驻守喀布尔机场美军士兵的日常生活。有人在围墙上画下世界地图，还有士兵聚在一起聊天休息。
美军砸毁设备的画面也被纪录了下来。报导称，马克兰的影片捕捉到了一些士兵正在砸毁车辆、计算机等设备的画面。
Sep 3, 2021
然而，报导指出，马克兰最终删除了这段影片，他说：”重要人物正强迫我删除它”，但他希望这段影片能引发公众讨论，让人们对美国撤离阿富汗有一个更现实的看法。尽管如此，他鼓励网友保存这段影片。
RT还称，马克兰拍摄的这段影片提供了一个与美国官方公布的疏散行动画面”完全不同的视角”，五角大楼公布的1100多张照片和数十段任务期间拍摄的影片基本上呈现了一种”有序且负责任的”撤离，而忽略了仓促撤离的”丑陋画面”。
Inside Reach 871, A US C-17 Packed With 640 Afghans Trying to Escape the Taliban
The Air Force evacuation flight from Kabul to Qatar came near the record for most people ever flown in the Boeing airlifter.
By TARA COPP and MARCUS WEISGERBER
8/16/2021
A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III safely evacuated some 640 Afghans from Kabul late Sunday, according to U.S. defense officials and photos obtained by Defense One.
That’s believed to be among the most people ever flown in the C-17, a massive military cargo plane that has been operated by the U.S. and its allies for nearly three decades. Flight tracking software shows the plane belongs to the 436th Air Wing, based at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.
Aug 16, 2021
Comparisons are being drawn between the rush to escape Kabul after the Taliban takeover and the evacuation of Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War.
There were chaotic scenes at Kabul Airport as hundreds of people attempted to flee Afghanistan. People were filmed climbing on to airplanes and running across the tarmac in an attempt to secure a seat on a flight out of the capital.
These scenes appeared akin to the evacuation from Saigon in 1975, when hundreds of Vietnamese and Americans flocked to the US Embassy to be airlifted out of the country when the Vietnam War ended.
The C-17, using the call sign Reach 871, was not intending to take on such a large load, but panicked Afghans who had been cleared to evacuate pulled themselves onto the C-17’s half-open ramp, one defense official said.
Instead of trying to force those refugees off the aircraft, “the crew made the decision to go,” a defense official told Defense One. “Approximately 640 Afghan civilians disembarked the aircraft when it arrived at its destination,” the defense official said.
Word of the flight spread across late Sunday in the United States when audio from the crew estimating they were carrying 800 passengers was posted online. A defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the true number was about 640 people.
The flight was one of several that was able to take off with hundreds of people aboard, and some of the others may have had an even larger load than 640, the official said.
In 2013, a C-17 evacuated 670 people fleeing a typhoon in the Philippines. Like that evacuation, the Afghans flown from Kabul to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, sat on the floor of the plane’s capacious hold. The procedure is known as “floor loading”; the passengers hang onto cargo straps run from wall to wall serving as makeshift seatbelts, according to a source familiar with the plane’s operating manuals.
Aug 16, 2021
Thousands of Afghans have amassed on the tarmac at Kabul’s international airport in the hours after the Taliban captured the capital.
The chaotic scenes Monday at Hamid Karzai International Airport captured by news crews and cellphones convey a terror and desperate rush to escape the country, which is now overrun by Taliban militants in the lead-up to the complete departure of U.S. forces.
A video shared on Twitter appears to shows large crowds of people, including children, moving toward passenger aircraft on the tarmac.
“No one can really leave,” Kamal Alam, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and senior adviser to the Massoud Foundation, told CNBC in a phone interview. Alam was stuck in Afghanistan, his flight out of the country canceled. “If you don’t have a visa or passport, which the majority of Afghans don’t, you’re not going.”
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country on Sunday evening, reportedly to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, as the Taliban entered the presidential palace and declared the war “over.” Ghani said he fled to prevent “a flood of bloodshed.”
“The Taliban have won with the judgment of their swords and guns, and are now responsible for the honor, property and self-preservation of their countrymen,” Ghani said.
The rapid departure of high-ranking Afghan officials — along with substantial amounts of cash — in recent days is what initially prompted the rush to leave and a flood of anger at the Afghan government, Alam said. He was at Hamid Karzai International Airport a few days ago.
“All the VIPs were being allowed to fly out first, all their cash was being transported first … whether on commercial airlines or private jets from [an] unnamed Gulf country,” he said, not specifying the country due to the sensitive nature of the issue.
“So people were seeing this, there was a lot of resentment and anger from the airport security, and that is really where the rot started. That’s when people started saying this government and this president is not worth defending, let’s get out of here.”
The panic is unfolding as an expanded force of about 6,000 U.S. troops return to the country to evacuate Western diplomats. The forces were tasked, according to the State Department, with the “very narrowly focused mission” of evacuating embassy staff in Kabul. As of late Sunday, the U.S. Embassy was effectively moved into the airport.
“We can confirm that the safe evacuation of all Embassy personnel is now complete,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said in a statement Monday. “All Embassy personnel are located on the premises of Hamid Karzai International Airport, whose perimeter is secured by the U.S. Military.”
Before Sunday, Kabul was the last major city to have been spared takeover by the militants.
A Taliban spokesperson said the fighters intended to negotiate a “peaceful surrender” of the city.
Since President Joe Biden’s April decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan before Sept. 11, the Taliban have made stunning battlefield advances with now the entirety of the nation of 38 million people under their control.
The rapid disintegration of Afghan security forces and the country’s government have shocked the world and led many to question how a collapse could happen so quickly after two decades of American nation-building and training efforts.
Aug 16, 2021
The Afghan president has fled the country, and U.S. troops have taken control of the city’s airport where thousands of Afghans are also desperate to leave.
Aug 16, 2021
There have been scenes of panic at Kabul airport as desperate residents try to flee following the seizure of the Afghan capital by the Taliban.
Witnesses say at least three civilians died on Monday in the chaos at the airport, which is being secured by US troops. It is not clear whether they were shot or died in a stampede.
With scheduled flights suspended, many foreigners and Afghans are stranded.
The US and other countries are rushing to evacuate staff and allies.
Abandoning Afghan Allies: The Latest Chapter in Shameful History of US in Afghanistan
By Susan Akram
8/15/2021
The United States is withdrawing, messily, from its longest war. The last U.S. and NATO troops are expected to depart by the end of the month – though recent developments may accelerate this timeline. With the pullout of the remaining soldiers and evacuation of the U.S. embassy comes renewed assessments about the costs and consequences of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. The toll of the last two decades – an estimated $2 trillion and tens of thousands of lives lost – does not capture the full costs of this 20-year war. Costs will continue to accrue to the millions of civilians who will be uprooted by further instability and increased violence that will ensue, perhaps most acutely to thousands of Afghans who have aided U.S. and NATO troops. U.S. policymakers are now grappling with how to evacuate some Afghans who served alongside NATO troops. But the emergency evacuation of the few allies who can qualify for this assistance will not be enough to avert catastrophe. Indeed, the fate of those Afghans who worked with and for U.S. forces in Afghanistan must be assessed in the wider context of their role in supporting an illegitimate U.S. invasion and long-term troop presence in their country.
This article examines the failures of U.S. refugee assistance programs so far in the context of the long U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The origins of the current refugee crisis should not be lost in the urgency of the moment: the United States is directly responsible for much of the current chaos and many of its past actions placed Afghans in jeopardy during decades of war dating back to the 1970s, in addition to the specific threats to those who are targeted for having aided U.S. forces. If the United States is to avoid adding yet another chapter to its shameful history in Afghanistan, it must massively expand programs to bring Afghans to safety.
Short History of U.S. Intervention and Invasion of Afghanistan
Without a doubt, Afghans have already paid the heaviest price in what for them has not been a 20 but a 40-year conflict – Afghanistan has essentially been at war since 1979. The first U.S. intervention in Afghanistan began then, too, following a coup that brought a Marxist-leaning government to power in 1978. In July 1979, President Jimmy Carter authorized a joint CIA operation with Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) to fund the mujahideen, Afghan fundamentalist militants, in their fight against the newly installed Afghan Marxist government. Although it is widely claimed that U.S. intervention in Afghanistan followed and was aimed at stopping the Russian invasion, the Russians entered Afghanistan in December 1979 – over five months after U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan had already begun. U.S. military and economic assistance to the mujahideen and Pakistani military and intelligence forces between 1979 and the 1990s amounted to approximately $20 billion, initially through the Carter-Brzezinski covert funding program code-named Operation Cyclone, and later through years of U.S. assistance to Pakistan to support Afghan militants. Eventually, the United States’ stated goal of forcing the Russians out of Afghanistan succeeded; in 1989 the Russians withdrew, ushering in a long, multi-phased civil war between mujahideen factions that ended with the most extreme group taking over Afghanistan in 1996: the Taliban.
Among the beneficiaries – indirectly if not directly – of the massive U.S. assistance through Operation Cyclone were al Qaeda and the most radical faction of the mujahideen, the Taliban. During their brutal rule from 1996-2001, the Taliban allowed the militant organization al Qaeda and its Saudi leader, Osama bin Laden, to establish its base of operations in Afghanistan, where both the Taliban and al Qaeda purchased or acquired U.S.-supplied weaponry from Pakistan. Throughout the 1990s, Al Qaeda cultivated its grievances with the West to draw recruits from across the world to organize, train, and carry out terrorist attacks against the United States. Their operations in Afghanistan culminated, of course, with the hijacking and crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001 causing the deaths of almost 3,000 Americans. This attack led to the U.S. decision to attack and invade Afghanistan a month later.
Seeking Refuge from Invasion and Occupation
The Bush administration publicly justified its Oct. 7, 2001 air strikes and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan as self-defense. However, it is contested whether the use of armed force by the United States and its allies against Afghanistan for a terrorist attack carried out by al Qaeda rested on a valid claim of self-defense consistent with the U.N. Charter. The subsequent U.S.-led air strikes and bombings led to the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians – at least as many as the number of Americans killed on Sept. 11. Following the invasion, the Bush administration initiated a massive detention, torture and extraordinary rendition policy, with Afghans becoming victims of torture and suffering years of detention without charge or trial, including those who were subject to long-term detention at Guantanamo.
The invasion led to a formal occupation, followed by an extended, large-scale troop presence in Afghanistan. During the Obama administration, both U.S. and NATO troop levels were massively increased – and both U.S. and Afghan casualties doubled. The Obama administration’s expansion of the drone program led to the tracking of thousands of individuals and by the end of his term, Obama had authorized a program that led to the killing of “at least 3,000 suspected militants and hundreds of civilians.” The expanded drone program also authorized the CIA to use drones to kill suspected militants through signature strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries. Meanwhile, countless civilians and detainees were subjected to abuse, and in some cases war crimes, by U.S. forces, CIA units, allies, warlords, and corrupt Afghan officials.
The Brown-Boston University Costs of War Project and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, among other researchers, have tracked civilian casualties from air and drone attacks in Afghanistan over the course of the conflict. The Costs of War Project found that in 2019 alone about 700 Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes (at least 546 of those attributed to international forces) while Save the Children provided data that between 2005-2019 26,025 Afghan children were maimed or killed by airstrikes, shelling, and bombings by all parties to the conflict. The U.N. annual reports found anti-government forces responsible for the majority of civilian casualties over the years (noting, inter alia, those forces’ deliberate targeting of civilians), the Afghan national security forces responsible for a majority of the remainder of civilian casualties, and the international forces led by the United States accounting for a significant share as well.
This short summary barely scrapes the surface of the complicated history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the countable and uncountable consequences of it. But this account helps to explain that the costs of this conflict must be placed in a longer and wider historical context.
Massive Forced Displacement of Afghans
The mass displacement and exodus of Afghans over the past few decades must also be put in this context. From 1979 onwards, Afghan refugees have constituted one of the largest refugee populations in the world, and one of the most protracted. During the 1980s and 1990s, over six million Afghan refugees fled the country, primarily hosted by Iran and Pakistan for about two decades. After the Soviet withdrawal, some returned, but renewed displacement followed the Taliban takeover and by the end of 2019, Afghans comprised the third-largest population of forcibly displaced persons in the world. Currently, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran are hosting the vast majority of Afghan refugees, as Europe and the United States maintain restrictive policies to prevent Afghan and other refugees from arriving to their shores and seeking asylum.
Despite being one of the main drivers of Afghan displacement and of the loss of Afghan lives over the last four decades, the United States has taken very little responsibility for either. Between 1987 and 2015, for example, only 16,400 Afghan refugees were granted resettlement slots to the United States. Compared to Iran and Pakistan’s hosting of over 3 million Afghan refugees each for decades, the United States’ welcome towards Afghans fleeing a conflict the United States has helped to both initiate and exacerbate hardly bears mention.
Most recently, Afghans were only one among the global refugee populations that suffered significantly from Trump administration decisions that placed new and extreme restrictions on refugee resettlement and immigration to the United States. Although Afghans were not categorically barred entry under the Trump administration’s 2017 Executive Order 13769 (the so-called Muslim ban), the order suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, and then lowered the admissions numbers yearly until the historically unprecedented low of 18,000 in 2020. Even then, fewer than 12,000 were admitted. Despite promises to rebuild the refugee admissions program by the Biden administration, fiscal year 2021 will again see shockingly low refugee admissions: as of July 31, the United States had welcomed only 6,246 refugees since Oct. 2020. Since January 2021, only 460 Afghans have been admitted as refugees.
The U.S. Afghan SIV Program
Aside from the (anemic) refugee admissions process, the U.S. government has established two separate special visa programs for Afghan nationals who have worked for U.S. forces or allies in Afghanistan, one temporary and one permanent. The first was created in 2006 under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act, authorizing Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi and Afghan nationals who worked as translators or interpreters for U.S. Armed forces for at least one year. This permanent program has been amended several times, including to extend eligibility to Afghan translators and interpreters working with U.S. Chief of Mission (U.S. embassy and diplomatic missions), but the program retains a 50 per year cap for Afghan translators.
In belated recognition that many more Afghans than just translators and interpreters have become particularly vulnerable because of their work with U.S. entities in Afghanistan, Congress passed the Afghan Allies Protection Act in 2009 to resettle Afghans who were employed by the U.S. government or its allied forces and whose lives were at risk, regardless of their position with the coalition. The Act initially required at least one year of employment with the U.S. government in Afghanistan on or after October 7, 2001. Visas under this program were capped at 1,500 annually, but the numbers have been increased several times to the current cap of 26,500. Unused numbers can be carried over from one year to the next, and the program terminates when all allocated visa numbers are used. The deadline for all applications under this temporary program is December 31, 2022.
Essentially, both programs authorize Special Immigrant Visas for Afghan nationals who were employed in Afghanistan by or on behalf of the U.S. government, or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whether as interpreters or in performing sensitive activities for any U.S. personnel. The programs require at least one year of the requisite employment between October 2001 and December 2022, or a minimum of two years of eligible employment for petitions filed after September 30, 2015. In addition, individuals must provide evidence of ongoing serious threats “as a consequence” of this U.S. employment.
The Flaws of the SIV Programs
These two programs have been amended several times, supposedly to make the visa issuance process more efficient. However, a number of credible assessments of the program have concluded that the process offers too few visas, includes onerous requirements that most of those eligible cannot satisfy, is rife with corruption, places applicants at greater risk, and has so many built-in delays and hurdles that the most of those at greatest risk cannot apply.
First, the visa numbers allocated have been low, and, like overall refugee admissions quotas, the Afghan SIV ceilings have never been met. From FY 2009 to FY 2019, 18,471 visas were available annually, but according to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, by September 2019, 18,864 of those visas (including those unused ‘rolled over’ from prior years), remained “in process.” The latest renewals and amendments of both programs were in December 2020, when another 4,000 visas were approved for Afghan applicants, for the current total of 26,500. However, this number was insufficient even for those whose applications were in the pipeline. The current backlog of pending applications is over 19,000, and there is inadequate staffing throughout the offices that process them to come close to dealing with the backlog.
Moreover, the visa numbers fail to even approach the numbers of Afghan translators and other contractors who have worked closely with U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. U.S. military statistics show the dramatic rise in the use of contractors working with the U.S. military – at the height of the surge in U.S. forces in Afghanistan, one contractor was hired for every U.S. military member. As the drawdown has reduced troop levels, there have been as many as five contractors for every service member. Although contractors of many nationalities are hired, the vast majority in Afghanistan have been Afghan. These ratios illustrate that for many thousands of Afghans who have worked for the United States and who could qualify, there will be no visas available.
The low numbers are a serious enough problem, but the onerous requirements and delays are even more problematic to the success of the program. Completing the application requires documentation to prove both “faithful and valuable service” to the U.S. government or allied forces and an “ongoing serious threat” due to that service. To prove the service aspect, the individual must obtain a positive letter of recommendation from a senior supervisor. To prove the threat aspect, the individual has to produce hard credible evidence that his or her life or safety has been threatened and there is an ongoing and urgent risk of harm. But throughout the program’s history there have been systematic barriers to securing the documentation needed to prove each of these elements.
One of the few studies based on direct interviews with Afghans eligible for or who have applied for the SIV Program details the serious problems applicants have with obtaining the required documentation. Interviewees pointed out that there has been such rapid turnover of military deployed in Afghanistan that most Afghans have trouble tracking down supervisors once they have left Afghanistan. They have problems identifying a supervisor who has known them well enough to provide the recommendation, or even getting responses to their recommendation requests. Another complicated requirement is the definition of who is a “contractor,” which is often applied to exclude a wide range of sub-contractor and affiliate employment relationships. Meanwhile, the requirement to prove an ongoing and serious threat is skewed towards those who receive actual written threats from the Taliban – as opposed to the many verbal, telephone, and “community threats” Afghans who have worked with the United States and their family members encounter that cannot be reduced to written documentation. These documentation requirements have been so difficult to fulfill that an entire industry has sprung up to manufacture “threat letters” and assist applicants in preparing for interviews.
Ongoing Risks, U.S. Responsibility
On July 15, the White House announced that 20,000 Afghans have applied for SIVs so far, although there may be as many as 100,000 Afghans eligible for them. In an effort to expedite evacuations, in addition to the 2,500 SIV-holders who will be able to travel directly to the U.S., the White House has signaled that about 10,000 Afghans applicants with pending background checks will be flown to other countries or to U.S. military bases elsewhere while their visas are processed. Congress has proposed measures, including the HOPE for Afghan SIVs Act that would postpone the requirement for a medical exam until the individuals arrive Stateside; the bill passed the House but is stalled in the Senate. These are steps in the right direction, but should have been contemplated long before the imminent withdrawal of all U.S. troops.
The risks faced by Afghans who have worked in any capacity with the U.S. government or military in Afghanistan are real. The organization No One Left Behind has documented at least 300 Afghan interpreters or their family members killed, while another NGO, Red T, claimed that over 1,000 interpreters had been killed (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) by 2015. As the events of the last few days have shown, thousands more lives will be in greater danger once U.S. forces completely withdraw.
In many ways, the U.S. has left Afghanistan and the Afghan people in as bad or worse condition than when the 2001 conflict began. Nevertheless, in the absence of a stable, democratic government with territorial control over all of Afghanistan, the United States must do more to ensure that more Afghans do not become victims of its longest war. In the short term, the United States must at a minimum accept far more Afghan refugees who are awaiting resettlement, increase the visa numbers for all those who have worked alongside U.S. forces, and expedite processing for all who are eligible under these programs.
美前高官傅立民：美正与中国打着注定会输的比赛
5/10/2021
美国前资深外交官、前助理国防部长傅立民（Chas W Freeman Jr）批评美国政府的对华政策“自欺欺人”（self-defeating），指华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛。
傅立民周日发表在澳洲亚太事务研究网站东亚论坛（ East Asia Forum）上发发表题为《华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛（Washington is playing a losing game with China）的文章，指美国应在全球性问题上加强与中国的合作，如果继续选择与中国对抗，只会在国际社会上失道寡助。
他认为目前的美中关系，凸显了弗里曼的战略动力学第三定律（Freeman’s third law of strategic dynamics），即每一次敌对行为都会引来更加敌对的反应。
文章指华盛顿发起贸易战，只是因为对中国超越美国的潜力感到担忧，并试图通过不断升级的“极限施压”来削弱、遏制中国。
他说，在国际象棋中，美国就是一个很容易被识别的选手：除了激进的开局外，没有其他的战略。
傅立民在文中以数据证明，美国老百姓深受政府发起贸易战的伤害。他指出，美国农民失去了价值240亿美元（318亿新元）的大部分中国市场；美国公司利润降低，转而削减员工工资和工作岗位、推迟加薪，并提高美国消费品的价格；据估计，美国损失了24.5万个就业岗位，同时减少了约3200亿美元的国内生产总值（GDP），美国家庭平均每年要多花1277美元购买消费品；预计到2025年，美国将失去32万个工作岗位，GDP将比预期的低1.6万亿美元。
文章指出，在另一边，中国正稳步前进。2020年，中国总体贸易顺差达到5350亿美元，再创新高；与此同时，中国正通过降低贸易壁垒、与美国以外的国家达成自由贸易协议、发起贸易争端解决机制等方法，提高了自己的地位。
此外，傅立民还称，中国给美国带来的挑战主要是经济和技术上的，并不是军事上的。但现实是，“美国的飞机和战舰总在中国边界周围活动，中国的飞机和战舰并没有在美国的海岸外巡逻；中国周围到处是美军基地，而美国附近却没有中国的基地”。
傅立民强调：“如果美国继续选择对抗，只会发现自己越来越孤立。如果美国对华政策被定义为一种道德努力，大多数其他国家将选择远离，而不是被吸引”。他指出，各国想要的是获得多边支持来应对挑战，而不是美国的单边对抗；希望在主权最大化的条件下容纳中国，而不是让中国成为敌人。
傅立民认为，除对抗无益外，中美两国合作还有许多必然性。首先，在美国国内，没有中国的参与，市场投资、供应链等很多问题都无法解决；其次，在国际上，两国应合作改革全球治理，解决共同关心的全球性问题，如环境恶化、流行病、核武器扩散、全球经济和金融不稳定、全球贫困等等，并为新技术制定标准。
在文章最后，傅立民强调，“为了在与中国（竞争中）保持优势，美国必须提升竞争力，建设一个治理更好、教育更好、更平等、更开放、更创新、更健康和更自由的社会”。他断言，显然对抗不是通往这一美好愿景的方式，合作才是。
傅立民目前是美国布朗大学沃森国际与公共事务研究所访问学者，曾作为美国前总统尼克逊的首席中文翻译陪同访华，之后他先后在国务院主管中国事务、担任美国驻华公使和负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长。
陆克文斥莫里森草率介入台海议题幼稚
5/10/2021
在中澳关系持续恶化的背景下，澳大利亚前总理陆克文撰文批评，莫里森政府最近声称若台海爆发战争，澳洲将支援美国等盟友的有关言论，“在政治上是幼稚的”（politically juvenile），可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
莫里森上周接受澳洲3AW电台的访问时说，澳洲政府对台政策将坚定不变，若中国大陆武力进攻台湾，澳洲将会履行支援美国及盟友的承诺。
对此，陆克文前天（8日）在《悉尼先驱晨报》发表署名文章称，莫里森政府最近对澳洲军事介入未来美中对台湾战争的可能性所发表的草率评论，在政治上是幼稚的，可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
文章说，50年来，澳洲历届政府都没有在台海冲突的课题上，公开猜测澳洲会怎么做，但在过去两周，总理莫里森、国防部长达顿，以及内政部秘书长佩祖洛，都严重违反了这一澳洲两党共识。
陆克文在文章中指出，澳洲政府此前有充分理由对潜在的台湾军事方案保持沉默（tight-lipped），因为该冲突将涉及中美两个世界上最大的军事力量，并有可能成为自1945年以来亚洲最暴力和最具破坏性的战争。因此，澳洲现阶段不应该损害国家决策的独立性和灵活性。
文章也说，澳洲官员一直周旋在华盛顿、北京和台北之间，竭尽全力防止此类战争发生。面对美国，澳洲官员要同美国一道，确保美国在亚太地区的军事威慑力，以此对中国大陆产生遏制效果；面对中国大陆，澳洲官员则进行游说，试图让北京相信美国会武装介入台海冲突；而面对台湾，澳洲官员要试图阻止台湾单方面宣布“台独”（或采取走向“台独”的步骤），因为这将越过北京最基本的红线。
文章接着称，莫里森政府在台湾问题上像不成熟地捶胸示强（adolescent chest-thumping），不仅让美国人感到困惑，让大陆民众感到愤怒，让台湾百姓不解，也让亚太地区其他国家感到迷惑。
陆克文随后在文章中质问，为什么莫里森、达顿等要在台湾问题上，公开发出“红色警报”信号？难以想象（inconceivable）澳洲的国家安全机构会建议他们这样做，因为这不符合国家利益。“事实上，这在战略上将适得其反。”
陆克文在文中指出，目前澳洲疫苗和检疫程序一团糟、债务和赤字居高不下、执政党自由党内歧视女性问题严重，莫里森政府此时发表草率涉台言论唯一可能的动机是想转移国内视线，以获得多数支持赢得选举。对自由党来说，把工党打成“亲共”是最好的伪装。
文章称，坎培拉还有一个最广为人知的秘密：达顿和莫里森之间存在未公开的领导权之争。达顿认为，在自由党内部，中国议题是击败莫里森的最佳工具。这是可耻的，纯粹为了政治私利，用澳洲核心国家经济和安全利益做赌注。
陆克文最后在文中说，中国日益增长的实力以及特朗普政府的失败，让莫里森政府难以处理澳中关系。面对复杂的挑战，澳洲领导者需要有明智、冷静和慎重的判断，国家安全不是政治游戏。然而，莫里森和达顿过去两周的表现无疑表明，面对复杂的国家安全性势，这届澳洲政府缺乏应对挑战的勇气。
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/