塔利班称攻下潘杰希尔省 完全控制阿富汗
文 / 廖慧婷
9/06/2021
（早报讯）阿富汗塔利班周一（9月6日）宣称已攻下最后一个据点潘杰希尔省，打赢了潘杰希尔山谷的关键之战，完全掌控阿富汗。
潘杰希尔省（Panjshir）是阿富汗34个省份中最后一个未被塔利班控制的地区。反对派的民族抵抗运动主要由北方联盟和原政府副总统萨利赫等派系组成。地势险要的潘杰希尔山谷只有一个狭窄的出入口。
据法新社报道，塔利班今年8月初加强对阿富汗政府军发动攻势，并于8月15日进入首都喀布尔，塔利班随后将战力转向在潘杰希尔山谷的反对派势力。
塔利班发布了一段视频，展示了他们在潘杰希尔州长官邸高举塔利班旗帜。塔利班主要发言人穆贾希德说：“凭借这场胜利，我们的国家完全脱离了战争泥潭。任何试图发动叛乱的人都会受到重创，我们不会允许另一起叛乱”。
不过，反对派的民族抵抗运动星期天（9月5日）虽然承认在战场上遭到重创并呼吁停火，但该组织周一在推文中表示，其战士仍处于山谷的“战略性位置”。
据守潘杰希尔的反塔利班领袖准备与塔利班谈判
文 / 陈慧璋
9/05/2021
（早报讯）据守在阿富汗喀布尔北部潘杰希尔省的一名反塔利班领袖对宗教学者提出通过谈判结束战斗表示欢迎，并称已为此做好准备。
路透社报道，阿富汗媒体早前称，宗教学者呼吁塔利班接受谈判解决方案，以结束潘杰希尔的战斗。塔利班没有立即做出回应。
阿富汗民族抵抗阵线（NRFA）领袖艾哈迈德·马苏德（Ahmad Massoud）星期天（5日）在该组织面簿页面帖文说：“民族抵抗阵线原则上同意，解决当前问题，立即结束战斗并继续进行谈判。”
马苏德还说：“为了实现持久和平，民族抵抗阵线现在准备停止与塔利班的战斗，条件是塔利班也停止对潘杰希尔和安达拉布地区（Andarab）的袭击和军事行动。”他所指的是潘杰希尔邻近巴格兰省（Baghlan）的安达拉布山谷地区。
马苏德表示，战斗停止后，所有各方就可以到阿富汗乌里玛理事会（Ulema Council，又称和平理事会）举行谈判。
另外，阿富汗民族抵抗阵线星期天证实，其主要发言人达什蒂（Fahim Dashti）在当天的战役中遇害。
塔利班部队同日早前说，他们拿下潘杰希尔周边地区后，已朝着潘杰希尔的省府继续推进。
塔利班在三个星期前占领了阿富汗34个省中的33个省，获西方国家支持的阿富汗前总统加尼逃出国后，塔利班在8月15日攻陷首都喀布尔。
塔利班称攻陷反抗军最后据点 民族抵抗运动否认失守
文 / 陈慧璋
9/03/2021
（早报讯）三名塔利班消息人士说，反塔利班武装人员的最后据点潘杰希尔省周五（3日）被塔利班占领。不过，由“北方联盟”与原政府副总统萨利赫等派系所组成的民族抵抗运动否认已经沦陷。
路透社引述其中一名塔利班司令说：“在全能真主的恩典下，我们控制了整个阿富汗。麻烦制造者已被挫败，潘杰希尔现在在我们的统领之下。”
欢庆的枪声响彻喀布尔，面簿页面出现许多谈论潘杰希尔省沦陷的消息。
潘杰希尔省是阿富汗反塔利班力量最后坚守之地。目前仍无法立即确认潘杰希尔省沦陷消息的真伪。如果消息属实，这表示塔利班完全控制了整个阿富汗，这是该武装组织1996年至2001年首次统治阿富汗时没有实现的目标。
萨利赫在英国广播公司国际频道（BBC World）一名记者的推特账号上载一个视频说，他们仍没有放弃。萨利赫说：“毫无疑问，我们正身处困境。我们受到塔利班入侵，（但）我们坚守阵地，我们进行了反抗。”
另有几名反塔利班领袖也驳斥潘杰希尔省失守的消息，该地区集结了数以千计的地方民兵武装人员和原政府军的残余部队。
塔利班消息人士周五早前表示，塔利班联合创始人巴拉达尔（Mullah Baradar）将成为阿富汗新政府的领导人，塔利班创建领袖奥马尔的儿子雅各布（Mullah Yaqoob）和另一高层斯坦内克扎伊（Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai）也将在新政府担任要职，并指塔利班很快就会宣布新内阁班底。
塔利班代表：计划在未来几天内拿下潘杰希尔省
文 / 张佳莹
9/03/2021
（早报讯）阿富汗塔利班发言人比拉勒·卡里米表示，塔利班方面计划在几天内拿下抵抗运动聚集地潘杰希尔省。
据俄罗斯卫星通讯社报道，卡里米说：“潘杰希尔省战事仍在继续，该省多个地区已被伊斯兰酋长国攻占。我们认为，未来几天内就能控制全省。具体什么时候，无法告知，但将是在未来几天。”
卡里米表示，战斗时而继续，时而平息。他说：”战斗全面展开，我们正在向潘杰希尔省中心地区进发。目前已被我们控制的战略地区是哈瓦克。东部多个地区也已经在我们控制之下，无论是从幅员面积，还是从人口数量上看，这都是很大的一片地区。南部方向，卡比萨地区也已经被塔利班控制。潘杰希尔省大约20%的地区已在我们的控制之下。”
塔利班重新控制阿富汗北部三地区 希望与反抗军“和平解决”问题
来自 / 联合早报
8/23/2021
（喀布尔综合电）塔利班已重新控制上周被民兵组织夺下的三个北部地区，并将反塔利班力量围堵在潘杰希尔山谷中。尽管如此，塔利班仍表示，希望能够“和平解决”与反抗军之间的问题。
塔利班发言人穆贾希德周一（8月23日）在推特发文说，塔利班部队已重夺北部巴格兰省的巴诺（Bano）、德萨拉（Deh Saleh）和普勒赫萨（Pul e-Hesar）三个地区，并在潘杰希尔山谷（Panjshir Valley）附近三地点部署。
穆贾希德说，阿富汗北部交通要道萨朗山口仍开放，敌军被堵在潘杰希尔山谷内。他还称，阿富汗“伊斯兰酋长国正尝试和平解决问题”，显示双方目前没有交战。
社交媒体上则有消息称，塔利班同抵抗军爆发激烈战斗，约有300名塔利班成员战死。
塔利班10天前拿下喀布尔后，反抗力量集结到喀布尔以北150公里的潘杰希尔山谷，在“阿富汗民族抵抗阵线”领袖艾哈迈德（Ahmad Massoud）带领下与塔利班抗衡。艾哈迈德的父亲马苏德（Ahmad Shah Massoud）曾领导反苏联游击队，并在塔利班首次执政期间与其对抗，有“民族英雄”之称。
阿富汗副总统萨利赫也逃入该山谷，连同艾哈迈德号召阿富汗人反抗塔利班。艾哈迈德星期天警告，如果没有全面的权力分享协议，阿富汗将陷入新的内战。他表示，希望和塔利班展开和平谈判，但如果塔利班试图攻入山谷，他的部队也做好了战斗准备。
他告诉路透社：“我们希望让塔利班明白，谈判是唯一的出路……我们不希望爆发战争。”
据艾哈迈德的助手说，艾哈迈德已集结一支超过6000人的部队。艾哈迈德此前在《华盛顿邮报》撰文，促请美国为其部队提供武装。分析员指出，艾哈迈德和萨利赫之间存在矛盾，合作关系薄弱，若塔利班发动全面攻击，潘杰希尔山谷可能很快失守。
塔利班宣布成立阿富汗伊斯兰酋长国
文 / 林煇智
8/19/2021
（早报讯）阿富汗塔利班宣布成立阿富汗伊斯兰酋长国。
塔利班官方发言人扎比乌拉·穆贾希德周四（19日）在社交媒体推特上宣布，塔利班成立一个新国家——阿富汗伊斯兰酋长国（Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan）。据报道，塔利班在上世纪90年代末在阿富汗掌权时也使用了同个名称。
穆贾希德称，阿富汗伊斯兰酋长国成立，恰逢阿富汗脱离英国统治、独立102周年纪念日。8月19日是阿富汗的独立日，纪念其摆脱殖民统治成为一个独立国家。
塔利班政治领袖巴拉达尔回返阿富汗
文 / 陈慧璋
8/18/2021
（早报讯）塔利班政治委员会负责人巴拉达尔已抵达阿富汗，这是他时隔多年首次回返阿富汗，传闻他将出任总统一职。
路透社报道，现年53岁的巴拉达尔（Mullah Baradar）曾担任塔利班已故领袖奥马尔（Mullah Omar）的副手。
俄罗斯卫星通讯社日前引述消息人士称，以巴拉达尔为首的代表团将接管阿富汗总统办公厅，这意味着巴拉达尔或将成为阿富汗的下一任总统。
尽管阿洪扎达是目前塔利班的最高领导人，但他的角色为精神领袖。身为二号人物的巴拉达尔才是塔利班真正的政治领袖，也是最常公开露面的代表人物。
塔利班在上世纪1990年代成立后，巴拉达尔作为关键领导人，负责指挥该组织的战略行动，并掌控塔利班的财务运作，从全球各地获得资金。
外媒指巴拉达尔是塔利班1996年成功夺取政权的“关键缔造者”。在塔利班执政期间，他一直担任军事和行政要职。2001年美国入侵推翻塔利班政权时，巴拉达尔正担任阿富汗国防部副部长一职。
而在塔利班倒台后的20年里，巴拉达尔一直被西方国家认为是该组织关键的军事领导人和“政治操纵者”。
2010年2月，巴拉达尔在巴基斯坦南部城市卡拉奇的一次美巴联合行动中被捕。之后他一直被巴基斯坦政府扣押在狱中。
特朗普担任美国总统期间开始加速推进阿富汗撤军计划。2018年9月21日，作为阿富汗政府与塔利班谈判的条件，特朗普政府施压巴基斯坦释放了巴拉达尔。
回到塔利班后，巴拉达尔重新进入了决策层，并被任命为塔利班驻卡塔尔多哈的“政治委员会”负责人，负责与美国进行谈判。
塔利班宣布暂停喀布尔机场所有航班起降
文 / 张佳莹
8/17/2021
（早报讯）据阿拉伯天空新闻电视台（Sky News Arabia）报道，塔利班运动已宣布暂停喀布尔机场所有航班起降。
据俄罗斯卫星通讯社援引半岛电视台此前报道称，机场附近发生枪击以驱散人群。电视台的数据显示，机场附近的枪击和拥挤仍在继续。
周一，喀布尔机场一片混乱，因为外交使团的工作人员搭载的直升机多次起降。许多试图离开祖国的阿富汗人来到机场，涌向机场大厅和飞机。在媒体和社交网络上，出现了人们爬上已经准备起飞的飞机的照片和视频，在一些视频中可以看到飞机起飞时起落架上有人。
据阿富汗“黎明新闻”电视台（Tolo News）星期天晚上报道，由于疏散过程中的混乱，机场的死亡人数已上升至10人。
塔利班宣布控制总统府 赢得胜利
文 / 陈慧璋
8/15/2021
（早报讯）阿富汗总统加尼匆促离开阿富汗后，塔利班一名最高司令星期天（15日）告诉路透社，该武装组织已控制了总统府。
大批塔利班武装分子在总统府内四处走动，并向电视台的摄像机展示他们的武器和举起胜利的手势。
Aug 15, 2021
The Taliban has entered the presidential palace in Kabul after President Ashraf Ghani left the country.
Ghani’s move came amid negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban fighters.
一名战士向在皇宫内进行拍摄的半岛电视台（Al Jazeera）记者说：“我们的国家解放了，圣战者（Mujahideen）在阿富汗取得了胜利。”
塔利班政治局局长巴拉达尔（Baradar）同日发表简短视频声明说，塔利班在一周之内就迅速攻占全国所有主要城市，世界上无人能及。
不过，巴拉达尔也表示，真正的考验现在才开始，他们必须满足阿富汗人民的期望，解决他们的问题，为他们服务。
Abandoning Afghan Allies: The Latest Chapter in Shameful History of US in Afghanistan
By Susan Akram
8/15/2021
The United States is withdrawing, messily, from its longest war. The last U.S. and NATO troops are expected to depart by the end of the month – though recent developments may accelerate this timeline. With the pullout of the remaining soldiers and evacuation of the U.S. embassy comes renewed assessments about the costs and consequences of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. The toll of the last two decades – an estimated $2 trillion and tens of thousands of lives lost – does not capture the full costs of this 20-year war. Costs will continue to accrue to the millions of civilians who will be uprooted by further instability and increased violence that will ensue, perhaps most acutely to thousands of Afghans who have aided U.S. and NATO troops. U.S. policymakers are now grappling with how to evacuate some Afghans who served alongside NATO troops. But the emergency evacuation of the few allies who can qualify for this assistance will not be enough to avert catastrophe. Indeed, the fate of those Afghans who worked with and for U.S. forces in Afghanistan must be assessed in the wider context of their role in supporting an illegitimate U.S. invasion and long-term troop presence in their country.
This article examines the failures of U.S. refugee assistance programs so far in the context of the long U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The origins of the current refugee crisis should not be lost in the urgency of the moment: the United States is directly responsible for much of the current chaos and many of its past actions placed Afghans in jeopardy during decades of war dating back to the 1970s, in addition to the specific threats to those who are targeted for having aided U.S. forces. If the United States is to avoid adding yet another chapter to its shameful history in Afghanistan, it must massively expand programs to bring Afghans to safety.
Short History of U.S. Intervention and Invasion of Afghanistan
Without a doubt, Afghans have already paid the heaviest price in what for them has not been a 20 but a 40-year conflict – Afghanistan has essentially been at war since 1979. The first U.S. intervention in Afghanistan began then, too, following a coup that brought a Marxist-leaning government to power in 1978. In July 1979, President Jimmy Carter authorized a joint CIA operation with Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) to fund the mujahideen, Afghan fundamentalist militants, in their fight against the newly installed Afghan Marxist government. Although it is widely claimed that U.S. intervention in Afghanistan followed and was aimed at stopping the Russian invasion, the Russians entered Afghanistan in December 1979 – over five months after U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan had already begun. U.S. military and economic assistance to the mujahideen and Pakistani military and intelligence forces between 1979 and the 1990s amounted to approximately $20 billion, initially through the Carter-Brzezinski covert funding program code-named Operation Cyclone, and later through years of U.S. assistance to Pakistan to support Afghan militants. Eventually, the United States’ stated goal of forcing the Russians out of Afghanistan succeeded; in 1989 the Russians withdrew, ushering in a long, multi-phased civil war between mujahideen factions that ended with the most extreme group taking over Afghanistan in 1996: the Taliban.
Among the beneficiaries – indirectly if not directly – of the massive U.S. assistance through Operation Cyclone were al Qaeda and the most radical faction of the mujahideen, the Taliban. During their brutal rule from 1996-2001, the Taliban allowed the militant organization al Qaeda and its Saudi leader, Osama bin Laden, to establish its base of operations in Afghanistan, where both the Taliban and al Qaeda purchased or acquired U.S.-supplied weaponry from Pakistan. Throughout the 1990s, Al Qaeda cultivated its grievances with the West to draw recruits from across the world to organize, train, and carry out terrorist attacks against the United States. Their operations in Afghanistan culminated, of course, with the hijacking and crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001 causing the deaths of almost 3,000 Americans. This attack led to the U.S. decision to attack and invade Afghanistan a month later.
Seeking Refuge from Invasion and Occupation
The Bush administration publicly justified its Oct. 7, 2001 air strikes and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan as self-defense. However, it is contested whether the use of armed force by the United States and its allies against Afghanistan for a terrorist attack carried out by al Qaeda rested on a valid claim of self-defense consistent with the U.N. Charter. The subsequent U.S.-led air strikes and bombings led to the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians – at least as many as the number of Americans killed on Sept. 11. Following the invasion, the Bush administration initiated a massive detention, torture and extraordinary rendition policy, with Afghans becoming victims of torture and suffering years of detention without charge or trial, including those who were subject to long-term detention at Guantanamo.
The invasion led to a formal occupation, followed by an extended, large-scale troop presence in Afghanistan. During the Obama administration, both U.S. and NATO troop levels were massively increased – and both U.S. and Afghan casualties doubled. The Obama administration’s expansion of the drone program led to the tracking of thousands of individuals and by the end of his term, Obama had authorized a program that led to the killing of “at least 3,000 suspected militants and hundreds of civilians.” The expanded drone program also authorized the CIA to use drones to kill suspected militants through signature strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries. Meanwhile, countless civilians and detainees were subjected to abuse, and in some cases war crimes, by U.S. forces, CIA units, allies, warlords, and corrupt Afghan officials.
The Brown-Boston University Costs of War Project and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, among other researchers, have tracked civilian casualties from air and drone attacks in Afghanistan over the course of the conflict. The Costs of War Project found that in 2019 alone about 700 Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes (at least 546 of those attributed to international forces) while Save the Children provided data that between 2005-2019 26,025 Afghan children were maimed or killed by airstrikes, shelling, and bombings by all parties to the conflict. The U.N. annual reports found anti-government forces responsible for the majority of civilian casualties over the years (noting, inter alia, those forces’ deliberate targeting of civilians), the Afghan national security forces responsible for a majority of the remainder of civilian casualties, and the international forces led by the United States accounting for a significant share as well.
This short summary barely scrapes the surface of the complicated history of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the countable and uncountable consequences of it. But this account helps to explain that the costs of this conflict must be placed in a longer and wider historical context.
Massive Forced Displacement of Afghans
The mass displacement and exodus of Afghans over the past few decades must also be put in this context. From 1979 onwards, Afghan refugees have constituted one of the largest refugee populations in the world, and one of the most protracted. During the 1980s and 1990s, over six million Afghan refugees fled the country, primarily hosted by Iran and Pakistan for about two decades. After the Soviet withdrawal, some returned, but renewed displacement followed the Taliban takeover and by the end of 2019, Afghans comprised the third-largest population of forcibly displaced persons in the world. Currently, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran are hosting the vast majority of Afghan refugees, as Europe and the United States maintain restrictive policies to prevent Afghan and other refugees from arriving to their shores and seeking asylum.
Despite being one of the main drivers of Afghan displacement and of the loss of Afghan lives over the last four decades, the United States has taken very little responsibility for either. Between 1987 and 2015, for example, only 16,400 Afghan refugees were granted resettlement slots to the United States. Compared to Iran and Pakistan’s hosting of over 3 million Afghan refugees each for decades, the United States’ welcome towards Afghans fleeing a conflict the United States has helped to both initiate and exacerbate hardly bears mention.
Most recently, Afghans were only one among the global refugee populations that suffered significantly from Trump administration decisions that placed new and extreme restrictions on refugee resettlement and immigration to the United States. Although Afghans were not categorically barred entry under the Trump administration’s 2017 Executive Order 13769 (the so-called Muslim ban), the order suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, and then lowered the admissions numbers yearly until the historically unprecedented low of 18,000 in 2020. Even then, fewer than 12,000 were admitted. Despite promises to rebuild the refugee admissions program by the Biden administration, fiscal year 2021 will again see shockingly low refugee admissions: as of July 31, the United States had welcomed only 6,246 refugees since Oct. 2020. Since January 2021, only 460 Afghans have been admitted as refugees.
The U.S. Afghan SIV Program
Aside from the (anemic) refugee admissions process, the U.S. government has established two separate special visa programs for Afghan nationals who have worked for U.S. forces or allies in Afghanistan, one temporary and one permanent. The first was created in 2006 under Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act, authorizing Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi and Afghan nationals who worked as translators or interpreters for U.S. Armed forces for at least one year. This permanent program has been amended several times, including to extend eligibility to Afghan translators and interpreters working with U.S. Chief of Mission (U.S. embassy and diplomatic missions), but the program retains a 50 per year cap for Afghan translators.
In belated recognition that many more Afghans than just translators and interpreters have become particularly vulnerable because of their work with U.S. entities in Afghanistan, Congress passed the Afghan Allies Protection Act in 2009 to resettle Afghans who were employed by the U.S. government or its allied forces and whose lives were at risk, regardless of their position with the coalition. The Act initially required at least one year of employment with the U.S. government in Afghanistan on or after October 7, 2001. Visas under this program were capped at 1,500 annually, but the numbers have been increased several times to the current cap of 26,500. Unused numbers can be carried over from one year to the next, and the program terminates when all allocated visa numbers are used. The deadline for all applications under this temporary program is December 31, 2022.
Essentially, both programs authorize Special Immigrant Visas for Afghan nationals who were employed in Afghanistan by or on behalf of the U.S. government, or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whether as interpreters or in performing sensitive activities for any U.S. personnel. The programs require at least one year of the requisite employment between October 2001 and December 2022, or a minimum of two years of eligible employment for petitions filed after September 30, 2015. In addition, individuals must provide evidence of ongoing serious threats “as a consequence” of this U.S. employment.
The Flaws of the SIV Programs
These two programs have been amended several times, supposedly to make the visa issuance process more efficient. However, a number of credible assessments of the program have concluded that the process offers too few visas, includes onerous requirements that most of those eligible cannot satisfy, is rife with corruption, places applicants at greater risk, and has so many built-in delays and hurdles that the most of those at greatest risk cannot apply.
First, the visa numbers allocated have been low, and, like overall refugee admissions quotas, the Afghan SIV ceilings have never been met. From FY 2009 to FY 2019, 18,471 visas were available annually, but according to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, by September 2019, 18,864 of those visas (including those unused ‘rolled over’ from prior years), remained “in process.” The latest renewals and amendments of both programs were in December 2020, when another 4,000 visas were approved for Afghan applicants, for the current total of 26,500. However, this number was insufficient even for those whose applications were in the pipeline. The current backlog of pending applications is over 19,000, and there is inadequate staffing throughout the offices that process them to come close to dealing with the backlog.
Moreover, the visa numbers fail to even approach the numbers of Afghan translators and other contractors who have worked closely with U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. U.S. military statistics show the dramatic rise in the use of contractors working with the U.S. military – at the height of the surge in U.S. forces in Afghanistan, one contractor was hired for every U.S. military member. As the drawdown has reduced troop levels, there have been as many as five contractors for every service member. Although contractors of many nationalities are hired, the vast majority in Afghanistan have been Afghan. These ratios illustrate that for many thousands of Afghans who have worked for the United States and who could qualify, there will be no visas available.
The low numbers are a serious enough problem, but the onerous requirements and delays are even more problematic to the success of the program. Completing the application requires documentation to prove both “faithful and valuable service” to the U.S. government or allied forces and an “ongoing serious threat” due to that service. To prove the service aspect, the individual must obtain a positive letter of recommendation from a senior supervisor. To prove the threat aspect, the individual has to produce hard credible evidence that his or her life or safety has been threatened and there is an ongoing and urgent risk of harm. But throughout the program’s history there have been systematic barriers to securing the documentation needed to prove each of these elements.
One of the few studies based on direct interviews with Afghans eligible for or who have applied for the SIV Program details the serious problems applicants have with obtaining the required documentation. Interviewees pointed out that there has been such rapid turnover of military deployed in Afghanistan that most Afghans have trouble tracking down supervisors once they have left Afghanistan. They have problems identifying a supervisor who has known them well enough to provide the recommendation, or even getting responses to their recommendation requests. Another complicated requirement is the definition of who is a “contractor,” which is often applied to exclude a wide range of sub-contractor and affiliate employment relationships. Meanwhile, the requirement to prove an ongoing and serious threat is skewed towards those who receive actual written threats from the Taliban – as opposed to the many verbal, telephone, and “community threats” Afghans who have worked with the United States and their family members encounter that cannot be reduced to written documentation. These documentation requirements have been so difficult to fulfill that an entire industry has sprung up to manufacture “threat letters” and assist applicants in preparing for interviews.
Ongoing Risks, U.S. Responsibility
On July 15, the White House announced that 20,000 Afghans have applied for SIVs so far, although there may be as many as 100,000 Afghans eligible for them. In an effort to expedite evacuations, in addition to the 2,500 SIV-holders who will be able to travel directly to the U.S., the White House has signaled that about 10,000 Afghans applicants with pending background checks will be flown to other countries or to U.S. military bases elsewhere while their visas are processed. Congress has proposed measures, including the HOPE for Afghan SIVs Act that would postpone the requirement for a medical exam until the individuals arrive Stateside; the bill passed the House but is stalled in the Senate. These are steps in the right direction, but should have been contemplated long before the imminent withdrawal of all U.S. troops.
The risks faced by Afghans who have worked in any capacity with the U.S. government or military in Afghanistan are real. The organization No One Left Behind has documented at least 300 Afghan interpreters or their family members killed, while another NGO, Red T, claimed that over 1,000 interpreters had been killed (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) by 2015. As the events of the last few days have shown, thousands more lives will be in greater danger once U.S. forces completely withdraw.
In many ways, the U.S. has left Afghanistan and the Afghan people in as bad or worse condition than when the 2001 conflict began. Nevertheless, in the absence of a stable, democratic government with territorial control over all of Afghanistan, the United States must do more to ensure that more Afghans do not become victims of its longest war. In the short term, the United States must at a minimum accept far more Afghan refugees who are awaiting resettlement, increase the visa numbers for all those who have worked alongside U.S. forces, and expedite processing for all who are eligible under these programs.
美前高官傅立民：美正与中国打着注定会输的比赛
5/10/2021
美国前资深外交官、前助理国防部长傅立民（Chas W Freeman Jr）批评美国政府的对华政策“自欺欺人”（self-defeating），指华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛。
傅立民周日发表在澳洲亚太事务研究网站东亚论坛（ East Asia Forum）上发发表题为《华盛顿正在打一场注定会输的对华比赛（Washington is playing a losing game with China）的文章，指美国应在全球性问题上加强与中国的合作，如果继续选择与中国对抗，只会在国际社会上失道寡助。
他认为目前的美中关系，凸显了弗里曼的战略动力学第三定律（Freeman’s third law of strategic dynamics），即每一次敌对行为都会引来更加敌对的反应。
文章指华盛顿发起贸易战，只是因为对中国超越美国的潜力感到担忧，并试图通过不断升级的“极限施压”来削弱、遏制中国。
他说，在国际象棋中，美国就是一个很容易被识别的选手：除了激进的开局外，没有其他的战略。
傅立民在文中以数据证明，美国老百姓深受政府发起贸易战的伤害。他指出，美国农民失去了价值240亿美元（318亿新元）的大部分中国市场；美国公司利润降低，转而削减员工工资和工作岗位、推迟加薪，并提高美国消费品的价格；据估计，美国损失了24.5万个就业岗位，同时减少了约3200亿美元的国内生产总值（GDP），美国家庭平均每年要多花1277美元购买消费品；预计到2025年，美国将失去32万个工作岗位，GDP将比预期的低1.6万亿美元。
文章指出，在另一边，中国正稳步前进。2020年，中国总体贸易顺差达到5350亿美元，再创新高；与此同时，中国正通过降低贸易壁垒、与美国以外的国家达成自由贸易协议、发起贸易争端解决机制等方法，提高了自己的地位。
此外，傅立民还称，中国给美国带来的挑战主要是经济和技术上的，并不是军事上的。但现实是，“美国的飞机和战舰总在中国边界周围活动，中国的飞机和战舰并没有在美国的海岸外巡逻；中国周围到处是美军基地，而美国附近却没有中国的基地”。
傅立民强调：“如果美国继续选择对抗，只会发现自己越来越孤立。如果美国对华政策被定义为一种道德努力，大多数其他国家将选择远离，而不是被吸引”。他指出，各国想要的是获得多边支持来应对挑战，而不是美国的单边对抗；希望在主权最大化的条件下容纳中国，而不是让中国成为敌人。
傅立民认为，除对抗无益外，中美两国合作还有许多必然性。首先，在美国国内，没有中国的参与，市场投资、供应链等很多问题都无法解决；其次，在国际上，两国应合作改革全球治理，解决共同关心的全球性问题，如环境恶化、流行病、核武器扩散、全球经济和金融不稳定、全球贫困等等，并为新技术制定标准。
在文章最后，傅立民强调，“为了在与中国（竞争中）保持优势，美国必须提升竞争力，建设一个治理更好、教育更好、更平等、更开放、更创新、更健康和更自由的社会”。他断言，显然对抗不是通往这一美好愿景的方式，合作才是。
傅立民目前是美国布朗大学沃森国际与公共事务研究所访问学者，曾作为美国前总统尼克逊的首席中文翻译陪同访华，之后他先后在国务院主管中国事务、担任美国驻华公使和负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长。
陆克文斥莫里森草率介入台海议题幼稚
5/10/2021
在中澳关系持续恶化的背景下，澳大利亚前总理陆克文撰文批评，莫里森政府最近声称若台海爆发战争，澳洲将支援美国等盟友的有关言论，“在政治上是幼稚的”（politically juvenile），可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
莫里森上周接受澳洲3AW电台的访问时说，澳洲政府对台政策将坚定不变，若中国大陆武力进攻台湾，澳洲将会履行支援美国及盟友的承诺。
对此，陆克文前天（8日）在《悉尼先驱晨报》发表署名文章称，莫里森政府最近对澳洲军事介入未来美中对台湾战争的可能性所发表的草率评论，在政治上是幼稚的，可能损害澳洲核心国家安全利益。
文章说，50年来，澳洲历届政府都没有在台海冲突的课题上，公开猜测澳洲会怎么做，但在过去两周，总理莫里森、国防部长达顿，以及内政部秘书长佩祖洛，都严重违反了这一澳洲两党共识。
陆克文在文章中指出，澳洲政府此前有充分理由对潜在的台湾军事方案保持沉默（tight-lipped），因为该冲突将涉及中美两个世界上最大的军事力量，并有可能成为自1945年以来亚洲最暴力和最具破坏性的战争。因此，澳洲现阶段不应该损害国家决策的独立性和灵活性。
文章也说，澳洲官员一直周旋在华盛顿、北京和台北之间，竭尽全力防止此类战争发生。面对美国，澳洲官员要同美国一道，确保美国在亚太地区的军事威慑力，以此对中国大陆产生遏制效果；面对中国大陆，澳洲官员则进行游说，试图让北京相信美国会武装介入台海冲突；而面对台湾，澳洲官员要试图阻止台湾单方面宣布“台独”（或采取走向“台独”的步骤），因为这将越过北京最基本的红线。
文章接着称，莫里森政府在台湾问题上像不成熟地捶胸示强（adolescent chest-thumping），不仅让美国人感到困惑，让大陆民众感到愤怒，让台湾百姓不解，也让亚太地区其他国家感到迷惑。
陆克文随后在文章中质问，为什么莫里森、达顿等要在台湾问题上，公开发出“红色警报”信号？难以想象（inconceivable）澳洲的国家安全机构会建议他们这样做，因为这不符合国家利益。“事实上，这在战略上将适得其反。”
陆克文在文中指出，目前澳洲疫苗和检疫程序一团糟、债务和赤字居高不下、执政党自由党内歧视女性问题严重，莫里森政府此时发表草率涉台言论唯一可能的动机是想转移国内视线，以获得多数支持赢得选举。对自由党来说，把工党打成“亲共”是最好的伪装。
文章称，坎培拉还有一个最广为人知的秘密：达顿和莫里森之间存在未公开的领导权之争。达顿认为，在自由党内部，中国议题是击败莫里森的最佳工具。这是可耻的，纯粹为了政治私利，用澳洲核心国家经济和安全利益做赌注。
陆克文最后在文中说，中国日益增长的实力以及特朗普政府的失败，让莫里森政府难以处理澳中关系。面对复杂的挑战，澳洲领导者需要有明智、冷静和慎重的判断，国家安全不是政治游戏。然而，莫里森和达顿过去两周的表现无疑表明，面对复杂的国家安全性势，这届澳洲政府缺乏应对挑战的勇气。
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020
