为防疯牛症传入 中国禁止英部分牛肉进口
10/11/2021
中国在英国通报疯牛病个案后，于上个月29日起禁止进口30月龄以下的英国剔骨牛肉。
中国海关总署和农业农村部今天（11日）在微信公告中公布，英国“近日”通报发生一起典型疯牛病疫情，禁止进口上述产品是为了防止疯牛病传入，保护中国畜牧业生产安全和人民群众健康。
英国广播公司上个月17日报道，英国南部萨默塞特地区一个农场出现了一起俗称“疯牛症”的牛海绵状脑病（BSE）个案。
英国动植物卫生局（APHA）公布，受感染的动物已经死亡，并被移除。
China bans British beef again over mad cow disease
BBC
10/11/2021
China has banned British beef imports of cattle under 30 months of age after a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or “mad cow” disease, in the UK last month.
The ban took effect from 29 September, according to a statement from the General Administration of Customs.
China has yet to restart buying beef from the UK after agreeing in 2018 to lift previous restrictions.
Beijing imposed a ban in the 1990s during earlier outbreaks of BSE.
In September, the UK’s Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) said a case of BSE had been confirmed on a farm in Somerset.
In 2018, China ended a two-decades-long ban on imports of beef from the UK, which as first introduced after the outbreak of BSE in the 1990s.
At the time, the UK government said the lifting of the ban would be worth £250m to British producers over the next five years.
It came after years of site inspections and negotiations between officials in London and Beijing.
In response to the latest move, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said it was working to reassure Chinese authorities that the case of BSE had been successfully managed and to ensure that import conditions can be met.
The UK’s chief veterinary officer, Christine Middlemiss, said: “We have some of the highest levels of biosecurity in the world, which are supported by robust control systems. Our products are safe and should continue to be traded.”
In September this year, the US announced it was lifting its decades-old ban on imports of British lamb.
The US had stopped British lamb imports since 1989, following the first outbreaks of BSE.
The previous year British beef exports to the US resumed for the first time in more than 20 years.
British beef was banned by Washington after the BSE outbreak in 1996.
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退出海外煤电项目 或使中国损失500亿美元投资
9/23/2021
多位分析师认为，中国承诺将停止在国外建设燃煤电厂，可能使500亿美元（675.62亿新元）投资转眼成空。
据路透社报道，美国智库Global Energy Monitor（GEM）认为，中国停止在国外建设燃煤电厂，可能影响到中国政府准备对44家煤电厂的拨款，总计500亿美元，这有可能使未来二氧化碳年排放降低2亿吨。
中国国家主席习近平周二在为联合国大会预先录制的视频讲话中宣布，将帮助发展中国家建设绿色能源生产，并停止在国外建设燃煤发电厂。
路透社评论说，中国是全球煤电厂最大的融资来源，习近平的声明将对孟加拉、印尼、越南和南非等国的煤电扩建计划产生深远影响。
GEM煤炭项目主管希勒（Christine Shearer）说：“中国宣布的消息是今年气候方面最重要的进展之一，因为这可能标志着全球对煤电厂公开资金支持的结束。我们会发现许多国家转向替代能源发电，希望他们能得到支持以确保使用的是清洁能源。”
环保团体还认为，这将迫使中国银行这样的大型煤电项目贷款机构制定退出该行业的时间表。中国银行提供资金支持的全球煤炭发电项目超过10千兆瓦。
路透评论也指出，尽管人们对中国的声明普遍持乐观态度，但习近平措辞谨慎的声明几乎没有透露任何细节，并为现有项目继续进行留出了余地。
根据波士顿大学全球发展政策研究中心的数据，在南非、巴基斯坦、印尼、越南、孟加拉国、津巴布韦、塞尔维亚和阿联酋，有超过20个中国资助的火力发电机组正在建设中。另有17个正处于规划阶段。
路孚特首席碳分析师秦炎说：“退出海外煤电项目的具体细节尚未确定，包括时间表、资格、公私融资分离等，但我对这些细节不太担心。当中国领导人宣布这一目标时，声明可以这么简单和简短，但它将得到彻底执行。”
新的承诺也没有涉及中国扩建国内燃煤电厂的计划。
根据欧洲气候智库E3G本月发布的一份报告，中国国内的煤电项目占全球所有在建煤电厂的一半以上。虽然中国已承诺在2021至2025年期间“严格控制”国内新的煤电产能，但中国要到2026年才会开始减少煤炭使用量。
绿色和平组织资深气候顾问李硕说：“随着为海外煤炭设定新的方向，中国现在需要更加努力地解决国内对煤炭的依赖。”
习近平在联大会议宣布停止新建境外煤电项目
文 / 黄小芳
9/21/2021
在中国的减排力度受外界关注之际，中国国家主席习近平在联合国大会上承诺，中国将不再新建境外煤电项目。
中国国家主席习近平今天（22日）凌晨（纽约时间21日下午3时25分）通过预录视频在第76届联合国大会一般性辩论致辞时作出新的减排承诺，试图向国际社会彰显中国的负责任大国形象。习近平强调，中国会“全力以赴”，大力支持发展中国家能源绿色低碳发展，加快落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程。
习近平在15分钟的讲话中，围绕战胜疫情、复苏经济、加强合作共赢的国际关系理念，以及完善全球治理四大主题，对参与大会的联合国会员国元首和外交官阐述中国的立场。
在中美上月因美国冠病溯源报告展开激烈交锋的背景下，习近平在呼吁各国战胜疫情时重申，要弘扬科学精神，秉持科学态度，以及遵循科学规律。
随着福建省出现新一波疑似由入境人员引起的疫情，习近平也提醒各国加强国际联防联控，最大限度降低疫情跨境传播风险；凸显出中国继续严守边境的决心。
中美之间的疫苗外交竞赛持续白热化，在美国总统拜登预示将在明天的冠病峰会上宣布新的抗疫承诺后，习近平也提出将在全年对外提供20亿剂疫苗，以及向全球冠病疫苗获取机制（COVAX）捐赠1亿美元（1.35亿新元）的基础上，年内再向发展中国家无偿捐赠1亿剂疫苗。
习近平也表明，中国将继续支持和参与全球科学溯源，并坚决反对任何形式的政治操纵。
习近平在敦促各国推动经济复苏时，则对持续推进高科技中企打压政策的拜登政府隔空喊话，呼吁“打造开放、公平、公正、非歧视的科技发展环境”。
他接着把焦点转向气候变化议题，重申中国力争在2030年前实现碳达峰，2060年前实现碳中和的目标；习近平也宣布，中国将不再新建境外煤电项目。美国总统气候问题特使克里8月31日至9月3日访华时曾敦促中国停止煤电厂投资，但当时的谈判未取得成果。
中美在大会上也再次展开围绕民主定义的意识形态论战。拜登较早致辞时不点名批评“世界上的威权主义正试图宣告民主时代的结束”（the authoritarianism of the world may seek to proclaim the end of the age of democracy），习近平则指出，一个和平发展的世界应该承载不同形态的文明，必须兼容走向现代化的多样道路。“民主不是哪个国家的专利，而是各国人民的权利”。
他也隐射阿富汗局势称，“近期国际形势的发展再次证明外部军事干涉和所谓的民主改造遗憾无穷”。各国要大力弘扬和平、发展、公平正义、民主、自由的全人类共同价值，摒弃小圈子和零和博弈。
习近平重申了中美合作的前提，强调“国与国难免存在分歧和矛盾，但要在平等和相互尊重基础上开展对话合作”。
中国官方去年起开始明确“东升西降”的战略判断，但习近平在此次讲话中提出较温和的立场；他称，一国的成功并不意味着另一国必然失败，这个世界完全容得下各国共同成长和进步。他呼吁“要坚持对话而不对抗、包容而不排他，构建相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的新型国际关系，扩大利益汇合点，画出最大同心圆。”
中国曾多次在国际场合中批评美国的“伪多边主义”，并表明要改革和完善全球治理体系。在美国加速与盟友建立区域机制的同时，习近平呼吁“联合国应该高举真正的多边主义旗帜，成为各国共同维护普遍安全，共同分享发展成果，共同掌握世界命运的核心平台”。
他敦促联合国提升广大发展中国家在国际事务中的代表性和发言权，在推动国际关系民主化和法制化方面走在前列，并且要平衡推进安全、发展、人权三大领域，制定共同议程，聚焦突出问题，“重在采取行动”，把各方对多边主义的承诺落到实处。
习近平在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话（全文）
来源： 央视新闻客户端
9/21/2021
摘要
【习近平在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话（全文）】国家主席习近平21日在北京以视频方式出席第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论并发表重要讲话。习近平强调，加大发展资源投入，重点推进减贫、粮食安全、抗疫和疫苗、发展筹资、气候变化和绿色发展、工业化、数字经济、互联互通等领域合作，加快落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，构建全球发展命运共同体。中国已宣布未来3年内再提供30亿美元国际援助，用于支持发展中国家抗疫和恢复经济社会发展。（央视新闻客户端）
坚定信心 共克时艰
共建更加美好的世界
——在第七十六届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话
(2021年9月21日)
中华人民共和国主席 习近平
主席先生：
2021年对中国人民是一个极其特殊的年份。今年是中国共产党成立100周年。今年也是中华人民共和国恢复在联合国合法席位50周年，中国将隆重纪念这一历史性事件。我们将继续积极推动中国同联合国合作迈向新台阶，为联合国崇高事业不断作出新的更大贡献。
主席先生！
一年前，各国领导人共同出席了联合国成立75周年系列峰会，发表了政治宣言，承诺合作抗击疫情，携手应对挑战，坚持多边主义，加强联合国作用，构建今世后代的共同未来。
一年来，世界百年未有之大变局和新冠肺炎疫情全球大流行交织影响。各国人民对和平发展的期盼更加殷切，对公平正义的呼声更加强烈，对合作共赢的追求更加坚定。
当前，疫情仍在全球肆虐，人类社会已被深刻改变。世界进入新的动荡变革期。每一个负责任的政治家都必须以信心、勇气、担当，回答时代课题，作出历史抉择。
Sep 21, 2021
第一，我们必须战胜疫情，赢得这场事关人类前途命运的重大斗争。一部世界文明史也是同瘟疫斗争的历史，人类总是在不断战胜挑战中实现更大发展和进步。这次疫情虽然来势凶猛，我们终将战而胜之。
我们要坚持人民至上、生命至上，呵护每个人的生命、价值、尊严。要弘扬科学精神、秉持科学态度、遵循科学规律，统筹常态化精准防控和应急处置，统筹疫情防控和经济社会发展。要加强国际联防联控，最大限度降低疫情跨境传播风险。
疫苗是战胜疫情的利器。我多次强调，要把疫苗作为全球公共产品，确保发展中国家的可及性和可负担性，当务之急是要在全球范围内公平合理分配疫苗。中国将努力全年对外提供20亿剂疫苗，在向“新冠疫苗实施计划”捐赠1亿美元基础上，年内再向发展中国家无偿捐赠1亿剂疫苗。中国将继续支持和参与全球科学溯源，坚决反对任何形式的政治操弄。
第二，我们必须复苏经济，推动实现更加强劲、绿色、健康的全球发展。发展是实现人民幸福的关键。面对疫情带来的严重冲击，我们要共同推动全球发展迈向平衡协调包容新阶段。在此，我愿提出全球发展倡议：
——坚持发展优先。将发展置于全球宏观政策框架的突出位置，加强主要经济体政策协调，保持连续性、稳定性、可持续性，构建更加平等均衡的全球发展伙伴关系，推动多边发展合作进程协同增效，加快落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程。
——坚持以人民为中心。在发展中保障和改善民生，保护和促进人权，做到发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享，不断增强民众的幸福感、获得感、安全感，实现人的全面发展。
——坚持普惠包容。关注发展中国家特殊需求，通过缓债、发展援助等方式支持发展中国家尤其是困难特别大的脆弱国家，着力解决国家间和各国内部发展不平衡、不充分问题。
——坚持创新驱动。抓住新一轮科技革命和产业变革的历史性机遇，加速科技成果向现实生产力转化，打造开放、公平、公正、非歧视的科技发展环境，挖掘疫后经济增长新动能，携手实现跨越发展。
——坚持人与自然和谐共生。完善全球环境治理，积极应对气候变化，构建人与自然生命共同体。加快绿色低碳转型，实现绿色复苏发展。中国将力争2030年前实现碳达峰、2060年前实现碳中和，这需要付出艰苦努力，但我们会全力以赴。中国将大力支持发展中国家能源绿色低碳发展，不再新建境外煤电项目。
——坚持行动导向。加大发展资源投入，重点推进减贫、粮食安全、抗疫和疫苗、发展筹资、气候变化和绿色发展、工业化、数字经济、互联互通等领域合作，加快落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，构建全球发展命运共同体。中国已宣布未来3年内再提供30亿美元国际援助，用于支持发展中国家抗疫和恢复经济社会发展。
第三，我们必须加强团结，践行相互尊重、合作共赢的国际关系理念。一个和平发展的世界应该承载不同形态的文明，必须兼容走向现代化的多样道路。民主不是哪个国家的专利，而是各国人民的权利。近期国际形势的发展再次证明，外部军事干涉和所谓的民主改造贻害无穷。我们要大力弘扬和平、发展、公平、正义、民主、自由的全人类共同价值，摒弃小圈子和零和博弈。
国与国难免存在分歧和矛盾，但要在平等和相互尊重基础上开展对话合作。一国的成功并不意味着另一国必然失败，这个世界完全容得下各国共同成长和进步。我们要坚持对话而不对抗、包容而不排他，构建相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的新型国际关系，扩大利益汇合点，画出最大同心圆。
中华民族传承和追求的是和平和睦和谐理念。我们过去没有，今后也不会侵略、欺负他人，不会称王称霸。中国始终是世界和平的建设者、全球发展的贡献者、国际秩序的维护者、公共产品的提供者，将继续以中国的新发展为世界提供新机遇。
第四，我们必须完善全球治理，践行真正的多边主义。世界只有一个体系，就是以联合国为核心的国际体系。只有一个秩序，就是以国际法为基础的国际秩序。只有一套规则，就是以联合国宪章宗旨和原则为基础的国际关系基本准则。
联合国应该高举真正的多边主义旗帜，成为各国共同维护普遍安全、共同分享发展成果、共同掌握世界命运的核心平台。要致力于稳定国际秩序，提升广大发展中国家在国际事务中的代表性和发言权，在推动国际关系民主化和法治化方面走在前列。要平衡推进安全、发展、人权三大领域工作，制定共同议程，聚焦突出问题，重在采取行动，把各方对多边主义的承诺落到实处。
主席先生！
世界又站在历史的十字路口。我坚信，人类和平发展进步的潮流不可阻挡。让我们坚定信心，携手应对全球性威胁和挑战，推动构建人类命运共同体，共同建设更加美好的世界！
China – President Addresses United Nations General Debate, 76th Session (English)
9/21/2021
Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, addresses the general debate of the 76th Session of the General Assembly of the UN (New York, 21-27 September 2021).
Chinese President Xi today told the General Assembly, “Democracy is not a special right reserved to an individual country, but a right for the people of all countries to enjoy,” adding that recent global developments show once again that “military intervention from the outside and so-called democratic transformation entail nothing but harm.”
Sep 21, 2021
In a pre-recorded video to the General Assembly’s General Debate, Chinese President Xi Jinping today (21 Sep) said that the world is facing combined impacts of changes unseen in a century and the COVID-19 pandemic. He said that it falls on each and every responsible statesman to answer the question of our time and make a historical choice with confident, courage and a sense of mission.
He said that the world must beat COVID-19 and win this decisive fight crucial to the future of humanity. He reiterated that we should always put people and their lives first, adding that we need to respect science.
President Xi said, “vaccination is our powerful weapon against COVID-19. I have stressed on many occasions the need to make vaccines a global public good and ensure vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries.”
The Chinese President continued, “of pressing priority is to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of vaccines globally.”
He added, “China will strive to provide a total of two billion doses of vaccines to the world by the end of this year. In addition to donating 100 million US dollars to COVAX, China will donate 100 million doses of vaccines to other developing countries in the course of this year.”
The Chinese President also said China will continue to support and engage in global science-based origins, and stands firmly opposed to political maneuvering in whatever form.
President Xi also highlighted the world “must revitalize the economy and pursue more robust, greener and more balanced global development.”
He reiterated, “development holds the key to people’s wellbeing. Facing the severe shocks of COVID-19, we need to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated and inclusive growth.”
The Chinese President proposed a Global Development Initiative which includes the needs of staying committed to development as a priority, staying committed to a people-centred approach, staying committed to benefits for all, staying committed to innovation-driven development, staying committed to harmony between man and nature, and staying committed to results-orientated actions.
Regarding the need to accelerate transition to a green and low-carbon economy and achieve green recovery and development, President Xi said, “China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.”
He continued, “this requires tremendous hard work, and we will make every effort to meet these goals. China will step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energy, and will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.”
________
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) is the main policy-making organ of the Organization. Comprising all Member States, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter of the United Nations. Each of the 193 Member States of the United Nations has an equal vote.
The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter.
The UN has evolved over the years to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.
But one thing has stayed the same: it remains the one place on Earth where all the world’s nations can gather together, discuss common problems, and find shared solutions that benefit all of humanity.
General debate website: https://gadebate.un.org/
9/21/2021
Biden’s China Doctrine?
By Raihan Ronodipuro
7/19/2021
The current issue of “The Economist,” published recently, features a cover story on Biden’s China Doctrine. According to the report, “Bidenism” has converted the rhetoric of the “Trumpism” era into a policy prescription of Sino-US clashes (particularly institutional confrontation), with only one winner.
Biden and his team think that China is not interested in coexisting with the US, and they anticipate an early domination. Because of this, the goal of US policy toward China is to undermine China’s objectives. The US can collaborate with China on topics of mutual interest, such as climate change, but on problems such as the economics, technology, diplomacy, military, and values, the US focuses opposing China’s aspirations by strengthening itself and expanding cooperation with allies.
The report calls Biden’s China Doctrine into doubt. Internally, although Biden wishes to utilize China to unify the two parties and push his own agenda, the Republican Party is clearly not foolish enough to readily embrace Biden’s proposals as long as Biden includes a “China” chapter on the bill’s cover.
Diplomatically, Biden not only misjudged the United States’ present global power, but also miscalculated the losses that American allies would suffer if they faced China. In reality, instead of promoting cohabitation, the US administration has turned the relationship between major powers into a “zero sum” game.
The article provides an illustration of how China is on the verge of dominating the economic sphere. Aside from becoming the world’s largest economy, the number of nations with China as their primary trade partner has nearly doubled that of countries with the United States as their primary trading partner.
When it comes to the Sino-US competition, Germany’s perspective is clearly influenced by economic reasons. Southeast Asian countries turn to the United States only for security, and they look to China for economic growth. As a result, if forced to choose between China and the United States, many countries will go with China.
Biden has continued to utilize China’s difficulties to push the domestic agenda, despite the US’s capacity to re-defend norms. His policy proposals include industrial strategies, government involvement, planning, and control. According to rumors, the Biden administration may employ further subsidies and oversight to ensure that jobs and manufacturing remain in the United States.
So, in effect, Biden’s policy proposals have followed a moderate kind of trade protectionism. If the Biden administration withdraws its friends from China, if the goal is to allow the US to leave more employment possibilities, the allies who have not benefitted will understandably wonder, “Why on earth should I join the US in doing this?”
The cover story of The Economist may be considered to have struck the high points of Bi’s China policy since taking office. The Biden administration appears to have clear stances and propositions on China policy, but both its logic and the actions of relevant officials send a strong signal that it serves only the internal affairs of the United States – as if the United States is unconcerned about the affairs of other countries.
Benefits and emotions For example, Southeast Asia was originally given significant weight in the United States’ Asia-Pacific policy, but when the ASEAN foreign ministers met at the end of May, Anthony Blinken, who had been invited, not only did not attend, but instead decided to travel from Ireland to Israel. Connected to join, however because to technical difficulties, other individuals waited on the scene for over an hour before connecting successfully. Despite the fact that it is only a technical problem, the impression provided to ASEAN nations is that the Biden administration does not value Southeast Asia.
A few weeks later, the same group of ASEAN foreign ministers traveled to Chongqing for the meeting. China not only laid out the red carpet for them, but Foreign Minister Wang Yi also had constructive face-to-face talks with them. When ASEAN nations compare their sentiments to those of China and the United States, they realize how frigid they are.
Aside from technical problems, Blinken opted to visit the Middle East rather than Southeast Asia, which rendered the Biden administration’s “return to Asia-Pacific” rhetoric unconvincing to many countries. The US Department of Defense relocated its lone aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific to facilitate military departure from Afghanistan, sending an incredible signal to US allies.
Similar events took place several times in the six months after Biden entered the stage. For example, when the Indonesian foreign minister visited New York last month for a UN meeting, he requested a foreign minister-level meeting with Blinken, but Blinken wasn’t sure if he couldn’t spare the time or didn’t want to see each other at all.
Other nations’ bewilderment, as well as the United States’ skepticism of the Biden administration, has inevitably been felt. Biden and his staff are now pushing for a solution. Blinken, for example, stated last Sunday that the Biden administration maintained the Trump administration’s policy of rejecting China’s South China Sea sovereignty claims, and that the US and the Philippines have signed a mutual defense treaty, and that any attacks on the Philippines will result in a response from the US.
Trying to win the approval of the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, studying Pompeo will not help the US diplomatic position. If Biden’s China policy proposal continues to follow the thinking and operations of the Trump era, it may face significant domestic and foreign problems.
US must outcompete China for a stable relationship: Daniel Russel
Beijing’s aggression comes from perception that America is declining, former official says
TSUYOSHI NAGASAWA, Nikkei staff writer
7/10/2021
WASHINGTON — The secret visit of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, kicked off an American policy of engagement with China. Fifty years later, with China on track to overtake the U.S. economy as early as 2028, bilateral relations are at a crossroad.
In an interview with Nikkei, Daniel Russel, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration, said the nature of the relationship is changing, and it would be wrong to assume that Washington would return to the “good old days,” supporting China’s growth while making an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
But Russel, now vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute, also stressed that aiming for regime change in Beijing is unrealistic and unwise, and would be in line with the “catastrophic” failures of attempted regime changes in the Middle East.
Edited excerpts from the interview follow:
Q: Since Kissinger began an engagement policy with China in the 1970s, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively stable. The U.S. has invited China into the international system. Looking back, how do you evaluate the pros and cons of this policy?
A: If we took a step back and looked broadly at the historical record, we see that the United States deliberately chose a policy of engaging China and supporting its development, first back in 1972 under President Richard Nixon, where this was part of the strategy for containment of the Soviet Union, but then again in the ’90s, when Bill Clinton was president, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a second policy of engaging China that led up to the entry of China into the WTO.
From the Clinton era on, America’s policy toward China was based on the view that a stable China, a prospering China, would serve the best interests of the United States, in part because a weak China, or an insecure China, would likely pose a lot of risks to U.S. interests and to our allies.
I’ve never heard a persuasive argument that it would have been better to do something different than engagement, at those junctures. The United States made a common-sense decision, to try to engage China and to shape its behavior, to integrate China and to give it a stake in the international system, that the United States had largely designed.
And, while people hoped for political liberalization, I don’t think that political liberalization was the reason that the U.S. government and other governments took this approach, because what was the alternative?
Who is going to argue that an effort to isolate China and to contain China, or to destabilize China would have been a better strategy? It would have been a recipe for disaster.
Today, there is a kind of new conventional wisdom that is based on the view that cooperation with China is impossible, that engagement with China is a failure.
If you look at the historical record, that’s just not defensible, that’s not true.
But that doesn’t mean that we can go back to the “good old days” where we tried to support China’s growth, where we made an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
There are two reasons for this.
In the past, as long as there was a large disparity, a gap, in military power and economic power between the two countries, the relationship was reasonably stable. But China has become much more economically successful and much more militarily and technologically capable. China is now close to being a peer power to the United States, which it never was.
Secondly, in the Xi Jinping era — which now is about almost nine years — China’s leadership has become more assertive, more ideological, and more brazen, more overt, in challenging global norms and challenging U.S. leadership. We’ve seen bullying behavior intensify by China.
Q: What were negotiations with China like in the years of President Barack Obama?
A: We had two very different experiences with the Chinese. On the South China Sea, Obama had very direct, very blunt, discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping repeatedly, from 2013 and the Sunnylands meeting on, each time more forcefully warned Xi that China’s island building, its reclamation, its activities, were creating risk, and that the United States had a responsibility to the defense of the Philippines and more broadly had a strong commitment to freedom of navigation, and could not accept efforts by China to claim the so-called nine-dashed line, or to develop outposts in international waters, and that this was damaging the U.S.-China relationship.
Finally, in the meeting in 2015, Xi made an assurance, and he made a public assurance as well, that China would not militarize the outposts that it built.
But, in that case, China did not ultimately honor that commitment, and the problematic behavior continued. And it had a very damaging effect on U.S. relations with China.
The issue of cyber theft, and particularly the Chinese government’s sponsorship of cyber-enabled theft of American intellectual property from companies, that was a different experience, because for years Obama raised this issue with Xi and warned of consequences, and told Xi that, although China was denying it, the United States knew that China was conducting these attacks, and that they couldn’t hide from us.
And finally, the Chinese saw evidence that the United States was preparing to take very severe action in retaliation for this, and the Chinese leadership recognized that they were reaching a dangerous, critical point, and so they sent to Washington the top security official in China, Meng Jianzhu, who came with instructions: don’t come home without an agreement.
And he stayed in Washington for several days. He met with the U.S. government team. And you may remember that the U.S. and China issued a four-point agreement. In that agreement, China essentially acknowledged that this cyber theft had occurred, committed to end it, and made some public commitments that they did implement, they did honor.
For several years after that, the U.S. agencies that were monitoring cyberattacks formed a judgment that China had, in fact, scaled back significantly the attacks that at least the government, the state, was supporting.
Q: Based on those lessons, how should the U.S. approach China?
A: My judgment is that Chinese behavior has become much more troubling and dangerous as Chinese leaders have begun to believe that they are as strong as the United States, that they are getting stronger and the U.S. is getting weaker.
I don’t think that it is wise or feasible to pursue a strategy of weakening China. Instead, it is necessary and wise to pursue a strategy of strengthening the United States and its allies because, as I pointed out before, when the power differential between the United States and China was wider, the relationship was very stable.
As long as the Chinese perception is that the United States is weak, is on the decline, is withdrawing from its traditional role in shaping and often leading international affairs, in rules-setting and so on, and has abandoned the sort of moral high ground that gave the United States so much soft power over the decades, China is incentivized to challenge more directly.
If and when the Chinese leaders see more evidence that the United States is demonstrating resilience, is renewing and reinventing itself, that the overall strength of the democratic communities is growing, not shrinking, the Chinese leaders will be much more open to compromise. They will be much more flexible, much more careful, in their behavior.
Chinese leaders are Leninists and Leninists respect strength and have contempt for weakness.
If the United States, over the course of this year, shows, for example, extraordinary ability to stop the spread of COVID-19, an extraordinary ability to develop vaccines that have 96% to 97% effective rates, demonstrates the ability to manufacture billions of doses and make them available to countries around the world, whereas China, despite its very strict and draconian controls, now continues to battle emerging cases of the delta variant, and the Chinese vaccine, Sinovac, which they have distributed around the world, is now revealed to be far less effective in preventing COVID than advertised, that’s a way in which the United States is already demonstrating its strength.
It is already outcompeting. We’re not hurting China. We’re not blocking China. But we are outperforming China.
Q: You talked about the leadership of Xi Jinping himself. How is he different from former presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin before him?
A: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not democrats; they had no interest in sharing power. But they were also pragmatists, and they were continuing the tradition of Deng Xiaoping, the tradition of “hiding and biding,” the tradition of opening and reform.
Xi Jinping represents a more nationalist and a more ideological strain of Leninism. In the Chinese communist system, he is clearly representing those who believe that more control is the right answer, and that political liberalization is a recipe for disaster that China cannot afford.
Q: China hawks in the U.S. have argued that the biggest problem is the Chinese Communist Party and thus the U.S. should seek regime change.
A: Number one, the people who are advocating regime change are the very people that have experimented with regime change in Iraq, in Libya, and other parts of the world. And, in every case, it has been a catastrophic failure. It’s not only that it didn’t succeed; it’s that it created immense problems in the country and immense problems in the United States.
The United States does not have the power to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party, and we know from experience that, even if we were successful, the consequences are unpredictable and immensely dangerous.
We can certainly hope for a change and an improvement. There’s much that we can do to bolster civil society within China, and much we can do to help strengthen institutions other than the Chinese Communist Party, in China.
There is a lot of pressure that can be applied externally on the Chinese leadership to limit their behavior. But the notion of the United States reaching in and changing the government in China is unrealistic and unwise.
Q: Is there a similarity between the current situation and the 1970s, in the sense that the Biden administration is now seeking a stable and predictable relationship with Russia so as to focus more on China and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia?
A: The big difference in the 1970s was that Moscow and Beijing were in an intense rivalry and were virtual enemies. Another difference was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in a very significant Cold War, in which we had very little economic or other mutual dependencies and were largely separated into independent blocs, and we were competing around the world for influence, in a very direct way.
Today, Russia is a relatively weak power that is largely focused on making problems, making mischief for the U.S. and for the West.
And the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is very cooperative, very collaborative. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is well integrated into the global system, the multilateral system, and the degree of economic and technological integration between China, the United States, and the rest of the West, is unimaginably large.
So, I think, in those respects, we’re in a very, very different world. And, while it is problematic for the United States when China and Russia cooperate in causing problems for us and our friends, and while there would be some virtue and value in trying to provide incentives for Moscow to moderate its behavior and to refrain from that kind of mischief-making, I don’t think there is any prospect for a kind of fundamental alteration of the triangular relationship, the way that Kissinger and Nixon changed it in 1972.
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020