中兴通讯与美国法院指派的监督员产生矛盾
10/16/2021
中国的中兴通讯在2017年承认了美国司法部对其非法向伊朗出口美国敏感技术和多次向调查人员撒谎的指控，同意接受一名独立监督员的监督。
《华尔街日报》引述知情人士称，现在，令司法部官员感到震惊的是，该监督员，一名达拉斯的律师，正在寻求将自己的任期延长到明年3月份到期之后，并对该中国电信设备公司若不同意此事而发出威胁。
这些人士表示，法院指派的监督员James Stanton的威胁包括，说他将利用他与监督此案的法官的友谊。他们补充说，在此前每年对总部位于深圳的中兴通讯遵守和解协议的情况进行认证后，Stanton在6月推动了延期事宜，称他有证据表明该公司违反了缓刑条款，但没有提供进一步的细节。
Stanton告诉参与监督的人，他与指派他的美国地区法官Ed Kinkeade是“亲密的私人朋友”，他们将一起做“必要的事情”，以确保中兴通讯遵守司法部的和解协议。据报道，熟悉此事的人士表示，公司律师和司法部官员认为这种言辞不合适，而且可能不道德。
Stanton也说，《华尔街日报》的报道有“大量的不准确之处”，并不予进一步评论，表示此事已经封存。法官Kinkeade称，“除了我，没有人可以代表我说话”，他不予进一步评论。
知情人士说，中兴通讯认为，将Stanton的监督权延长到目前的期限之后没有法律依据，检方已选择不质疑该公司的立场。这样的决定通常是由检察官作出的，而该公司则有权作出回应。
中国新兴仓库机器人企业 低价为卖点 挑战亚马逊
来源：日经中文网
10/20/2021
物流仓库的自动化机器人作为幕后英雄支撑了电子商务（EC）的发展。如今，全球的初创企业正展开激烈的物流机器人竞争。面对借助自主开发领跑的美国亚马逊，以低价格为卖点的中国北京极智嘉科技（Geek+）等厂商正在崛起。它们面向希望在不依赖亚马逊的情况下构建自主物流网的电商企业，积极争取订单。
电商仓库自动化的开创者是亚马逊。2012年，亚马逊斥资7.75亿美元收购了开发机器人的美国Kiva Systems。以该公司的技术为基础，开发了钻入货架之下、沿着仓库内的移动路线把货物运至工人身边、被称为“货架搬运型”的机器人。
在通常的仓库，工人在货架之间来回走动分拣货物。但如果分拣的商品数量庞大，行走的距离将延长，效率低下。亚马逊借助不让工人移动、而是让货架动起来的逆向思维，建立了工人能集中精力完成打包作业的机制。亚马逊正在全世界的自主仓库引进物流机器人，包括其他种类机器人在内运行着35万台。
重视配送速度
引进机器人等提升物流服务直接关系到电商企业的竞争力。普华永道集团（PwC group）以世界8000多名消费者为对象实施的调查显示，在电商领域最为重视的项目中，“配送速度和可靠性”被提及。
亚马逊2019年为了在美国国内加强次日送达服务，实施了3000亿日元规模的投资。随后，新冠疫情推动电商扩大，亚马逊加快了投资。进入2021年后，在美国新建了250多个物流基地。
不过，亚马逊并不对外销售机器人。在此背景下，面向其他电商企业和希望构建自主物流网的企业，自主提供与亚马逊同样的货架搬运型机器人的初创企业正在崛起。代表就是中国的极智嘉。
2015年创建的该公司向阿里巴巴等供货，在世界20个国家的200多家企业的仓库，有约2万台机器人正在运行。据称与依赖人力的仓库相比，能把作业效率提高至3倍以上。
极智嘉选择劳动力短缺严重的日本作为进军海外的第一站。耐克日本公司位于千叶县市川市的仓库引进了约200台，属于日本国内最大规模。
极智嘉的优势在于能配套提供廉价的通用机器人和仓库运营经验。耐克日本公司的仓库也充分利用极智嘉的经验，在引进机器人后，与进出货数量的波动配合，推进优化商品和工人配置等。在单纯引进机器人的提升效果之外，出货效率也提高了8成。
亚马逊作为巨大的平台提供商持续发展。另一方面，为加强品牌管理和避免价格竞争，企业停止在亚马逊上开店或开始构建自主物流网的案例也相继出现。
耐克建立自主物流网
耐克2019年宣布了撤出亚马逊的方针。建立自主物流网的趋势还扩大至耐克以外。极智嘉日本法人的社长佐藤智裕干劲十足地表示，“希望提供亚马逊以外的选项”。
同样涉足货架搬运型机器人的美国初创企业GreyOrange也瞄准了希望建立自主物流网的企业的需求。该公司2011年在印度创建，除了美国沃尔玛旗下、印度电商企业Flipkart之外，还向德国阿迪达斯和瑞典Hennes & Mauritz（H&M）等供货。
采用与亚马逊不同工作模式的机器人也不断普及。例如“立体自动仓库”，这种仓库把商品堆叠到天花板的高度，由机器人取出被卖出的商品。与平置的仓库利用的货架搬运型机器人相比，设备投资增加，但存储效率更高。
从这种方式来看，挪威企业AutoStore把装有商品的专用集装箱放入网格状支柱中，由马达驱动的专用机器人负责出入库。货物的堆叠高度已经接近天花板，仓库内不需要人员通道，存放密度提高至此前的4倍。
AutoStore在30个国家的700多个基地有超过3万台机器人运行，客户包括德国彪马和英国零售巨头Asda。AutoStore的首席执行官（CEO）Karl Johan Lier认为，亚马逊是潜在客户之一，但同时表示“通过引进我们的产品，亚马逊的竞争对手能提高物流效率”。
4月，AutoStore从日本软银集团获得28亿美元出资，今后将加强开拓亚洲市场。在日本，似鸟控股于2016年引进该公司的机器人。2021年3月，AutoStore的系统在软银集团控股的新一代基地投入运行。
关于立体自动仓库，除了AutoStore以外，美国初创企业Alert Innovation向沃尔玛的美国店铺供应产品。在日本，Alert Innovation携手村田机械，首家客户是体育用品企业爱蓬（Alpen），2021年11月在自身仓库正式开始运用。据称货物的存储密度提高至此前的1.6倍，分拣相同货物所需的人手减少6成。
亚马逊通过收购等方式积累技术，拥有大量无人搬运相关专利。德国咨询企业罗兰贝格的合伙人小野塚征志认为，“如果不具备亚马逊那样的规模，自主研发技术就没什么益处”。在构建不依赖亚马逊这样的平台提供商的物流网方面，与机器人初创企业的合作将成为关键。
市场规模将在5年内翻一番
美国调查公司LogisticsIQ的统计显示，仓库自动化系统的世界市场规模到2026年有望增至2021年的约2倍，达到300亿美元。预测称由于新冠疫情影响，食品的电商化也取得进展，将拉动仓库自动化系统市场增长。
在此背景下，不仅是电商专用仓库，在现有的依赖人力的仓库中追加引进机器人、提高作业效率的趋势也将扩大。能在仓库内与工人协同工作的“协作型”机器人是今后的增长领域之一。
协作型机器人能在仓库的货架之间自由走动，把工人分拣的货物运到指定位置。虽然无人化的程度低于货架搬运型机器人等，但不需要对专用货架投资，容易在现有的仓库引进。
中国企业炬星科技正在京东集团等的基地引进协作型自律移动机器人。搭载摄像头和高性能传感器的机器人在仓库内移动，掌握货架布局等情况后，由协作型机器人展开工作。在日本，物流中心代理公司“关通”运营的面向乐天集团的基地将引进炬星科技的机器人，力争到2022年引进1500台左右。
目前，亚马逊宣布新招聘12.5万名员工在美国的仓库等处工作。在一部分地区，签合同时支付3000美元签字费，自2022年1月起，还以在仓库工作的员工为对象，全额支付大学学费。面对新冠疫情后的需求激增和劳动力争夺激化，电商企业等不得不采取新措施。包括与人类协作的理想方式在内，有可能需要采用新模式的仓库机器人。
戴琪释放美国与世贸关系解冻信号
文 / 陈慧璋
10/15/2021
（早报讯）美国贸易代表戴琪表明美国希望缓和其与世界贸易组织（WTO）的关系，显示华府对世贸争端解决程序所采取的立场发生了转变。
法新社和路透社综合报道，戴琪周四（14日）在日内瓦研究所的日内瓦贸易平台致辞时说：“我们都认识到世贸组织的重要性，我们都希望它取得成功。”
许多观察人士将世贸组织最高争端解决机制停摆归咎于华盛顿方面。2019年12月，该机构新法官的任命受到美国特朗普政府的阻挠。基于此，世贸上诉机构一直无法对贸易争端做出裁决。
戴琪周四表示，拜登政府正在寻求加强与世贸组织的关系，并改善世贸组织解决贸易争端的方式。
戴琪说：“我们相信，如果我们创建一个更灵活的世贸组织，改变我们集体解决问题的方式，提高透明度和包容性并恢复世贸组织的审议功能，我们将有望成功改革我们的谈判支柱。
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开辟对华贸易新道路 戴琪强调美国无意加剧贸易紧张关系
来自 / 联合早报 | 文 / 黄小芳
10/05/2021
美国贸易代表戴琪昨天首次表明拜登政府将开辟新的对华贸易政策道路，包括就中国的产业政策和中国直接接触，并强调拜登政府的目的不是加剧中美贸易的紧张关系。
受访学者分析，戴琪就贸易问题向中国释放了安抚信号，有助缓解中美之间的关系；但戴琪未排除实施新关税的可能性，因此中美下来出现“贸易战2.0”的风险并未解除。
戴琪昨早10时（美东时间，新加坡时间昨晚10时）在位于华盛顿的战略与国际研究中心演讲时表明，第一阶段协议并未有意义地解决美国对中国贸易行为的担忧，以及其对美国经济带来的有害冲击，并且加剧了世界经济的零和贸易关系。因此拜登政府必须在中美关系中采取新的全面和务实的方式，推进美国短期和长期的战略和经济目标。
戴琪在演讲中首次阐明拜登政府的对华贸易政策，提出四大重点，包括和中国讨论其第一阶段协议的执行表现；展开“具针对性”的加征关税免除程序；向北京提出美国对中国以国家为中心以及非市场化的贸易行为的“深切关注”；以及继续和盟友合作塑造21世纪公平贸易的规则。
戴琪随后对前特朗普政府向中国“单边施压”的政策作出评估，并阐明拜登政府为中美贸易开辟新道路的重要性；暗示美国不会寻求和中国签署第二阶段贸易协议。
中美是在去年1月15日，美国前总统特朗普执政时期签署第一阶段贸易协议。根据协议，美国同意取消对手机、笔记本电脑等总值1600亿美元（约2170亿新元）中国进口商品的惩罚性关税；这项条款去年底已失效，美国政府已恢复针对中国大部分商品的加征税。中国则在协议中承诺加大采购美国农产品，两年内的采购目标为总额2000亿美元（2716亿新元），截止日期是今年12月31日。
戴琪强调，和以往不同，拜登政府将以自身实力出发和中国接触，包括加强对美国工人和基础设施的投资，和加倍创新科技发展方面的投入。
至于和中国的相处方式，戴琪计划在下来的日子里，和中国展开“坦诚的对话”。
全文未提及征收新关税总体展现友好姿态
美国媒体上周六（2日）传出戴琪可能在演讲中宣布中国未达成第一阶段协议中的采购目标，美国贸易代表办公室正考虑向中国征收额外关税的消息，令部分舆论担心中美可能引发第二次贸易战。
但戴琪全文未提及征收新关税的计划，也没有提及中国未达标，总体展现了友好姿态。她表明，美国的目标不是激起和中国的贸易紧张关系。她也提出“持久的共存（durable coexistence）需要责任感和对于自身行为所造成的后果的重视”。
她也指出，美国必须准备好使用所有工具并发展新的工具，包括和其他经济体和国家进行合作。她说：“我们必须开辟新的道路，以改变我们双边贸易和动能（dynamics）的发展轨迹。”
新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院东亚国际关系助理教授柳庸煜（Ryu Yongwook）接受《联合早报》访问时分析，戴琪在演讲中释放安抚信号，并不意味美国将放软总体的对华政策。尽管拜登政府再次加剧贸易摩擦的可能性不高，但若美国的经济迅速复苏，还是可能向中国实施新关税，掀起新一轮贸易战。
美若对华征收额外关税 将出现“贸易战2.0”
By 黄小芳
10/03/2021
中美第一阶段贸易协议的执行进入最后三个月，美国贸易代表戴琪明天将宣布拜登政府对华贸易政策的检讨结果；美媒引述消息人士称，戴琪将宣布中国未遵守协议，并可能对中国征收额外关税。
受访学者预计，若美国向中国征收额外关税，中美很可能会硬碰硬，出现比特朗普执政时期更激烈的“贸易战2.0”。
美国贸易代表办公室周四（9月30日）发声明，宣布戴琪将在10月4日就拜登政府的中美贸易关系政策发表演讲。美国全国广播公司商业频道（CNBC）昨天引述消息人士报道，拜登政府届时将针对中美贸易关系作出上任以来“最强烈”的表态，包括宣布中国未遵守第一阶段贸易协议。
消息人士透露，美国贸易代表办公室正在评估可能针对中国不遵守协议的行为采取哪些行动，包括考虑征收额外关税。
中美是在去年1月15日，美国前总统特朗普执政时期签署第一阶段贸易协议。根据协议，美国将取消和减少部分中国进口商品的加征关税；中国则承诺加大采购大豆和猪肉等美国农产品，两年内的采购目标为总额2000亿美元（2716亿新元），截止日期是今年12月31日。
彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员鲍恩（Chad Bown）接受路透社访问时指出，截至今年8月，中国预计只完成了约62%的第一阶段采购目标。
戴琪今年3月上任后，提出将“全面审视”美国的对华贸易政策；拜登政府在检讨工作进行期间延续了特朗普时期的政策，未阐明本届政府对此的立场。
分析：中美贸易战 很可能进入新回合
随着第一阶段贸易协议的执行进入倒数计时，敦促拜登政府尽快说明政策的呼声两个月来持续高涨。包括美国商会、全美零售业协会在内的30余个商界组织8月5日曾公开致信戴琪和美国财政部长耶伦，呼吁拜登政府重启美中贸易谈判。
《华尔街日报》9月11日报道，拜登政府正在考虑根据美国贸易法第301条款对中国政府给企业的补贴展开调查。前特朗普政府曾在2017年对中国展开301条款调查，并在隔年以调查结果为由展开了对华贸易战；有分析认为，这预示中美贸易战很可能进入新回合，美国未来可能会对接受中国政府补贴的中国产品再加征关税。
华中科技大学教授陈波接受《联合早报》访问时解读，在中美关系紧张的背景下，美国以采购额不达标为由继续敲打中国是意料中事；但他原本预计，采取理性政策的拜登政府不会让贸易战升级，可能会用展延采购期限的方式向中国施压。
他提醒，若拜登政府选择征收额外关税，中国也不会示弱，双方很可能出现新一轮的贸易战，对两国而言将是双输的局面。
中国国家创新与发展战略研究会资深研究员谢茂松则认为，美国的高压姿态很可能只是与中国求和前“拉高调门”的策略。
他解释，美国目前面对通货膨胀、国债等经济挑战，急需与中国展开经贸合作。在圣诞将至的时间点上，美国企业也需要中国的廉价商品，加上美国商界的敦促，预计都对拜登政府形成一定的压力。
谢茂松指出，上月的中美元首通话，以及孟晚舟案的解决都显示，美国正在积极向中国释放有意推进经贸合作的信号，但在科技战上不会松手；因此中美贸易战只会降温，不太可能升级。
美商务部长打算加强与中国的商业联系
9/25/2021
美国商务部长雷蒙多（Gina Raimondo）称，她将寻求改善美国与中国的商业联系；在中美两国在国家安全和人权问题上紧张关系日益加剧之际，她认为两国可以互利互惠。
雷蒙多在接受《华尔街日报》采访时说，她计划率领美国首席执行官代表团前往海外，包括中国，寻找商机并讨论长期存在的贸易问题，不过目前还没有任何安排。
她说：“我工作的很大一部分是维护美国的企业。”
雷蒙多称，中国的经济政策以低于市场的价格补贴出口产品，对窃取知识产权的做法视而不见，使美国公司处于不利地位。她说，尽管如此，鉴于中国市场的规模，美国必须与中国展开贸易。
“这只是一个经济事实”，雷蒙多说。“我实际上认为，紧密的商业往来将有助于缓解任何潜在的紧张关系。”
美众议院拟立法禁中企购买美国农地
来自 / 联合早报
8/01/2021
华盛顿州共和党籍众议员纽豪斯是禁止中企购买美国农业用地条款的发起人。他说，禁止中国人购买农田以及获得农业补助，是“确保美国食品供应链安全和独立的一个步骤”。
（华盛顿讯）根据美国农业部的数据，过去10年，中国企业通过对美国农场和大型农业企业的收购，扩大了他们在美国农业中的存在。美国众议院拨款委员会日前在审议对农业等相关机构的拨款法案草案时，特别纳入了禁止由中国政府部分或全部控制的公司购买美国农业用地的条款。此外，已经拥有美国农业用地的中企将没有资格申请农业补助。该法案仍有待国会参众两院表决通过。
《美国之音》报道，仅在2013年，中国双汇集团收购美国猪肉加工巨头史密斯菲尔德（Smithfield Foods）的并购案中，中国企业就购得14.6万英亩（约6万公顷）的美国耕地。到2020年初，中国业主在美国控制的农业用地约19.2万英亩，价值18.58亿美元（约25.3亿新元）。这些土地可用于耕作、放牧和林业。
尽管中国拥有的美国农业用地远低于其他国家，在美国全部8.97亿英亩农业用地中所占比率也微不足道，但中国对海外农业领域的投资增速迅猛，引起了美国国会议员的警惕。美国农业部2018年一份调查报告显示，自2009年以来，中国在海外的农业投资增长了10倍以上。
华盛顿州共和党籍众议员纽豪斯是禁止中企购买美国农业用地条款的发起人。他说，禁止中国人购买农田以及获得农业补助，是“确保美国食品供应链安全和独立的一个步骤”。
艾奥瓦州共和党籍参议员格拉斯利表示，农业和粮食生产涉及国家安全，“我们必须确保我们没有大量农田受外国利益集团控制”。
目前美国只有六个州立法禁止外国人拥有耕地。这六个州包括艾奥瓦、夏威夷、明尼苏达、密西西比、北达科他、俄克拉荷马。
长期呼吁禁止外国人购买美国耕地的农户利益倡导团体“家庭农场行动”（Family Farm Action）总裁、前密苏里州副州长马克斯韦尔说，外国人或外国实体往往以高于市场价值的价格购买农场，从而推高了土地价格，使得下一代美国农民难以购得土地。
不过，美国农业部经济学家盖尔指出，考虑到中国企业拥有的美国农业用地面积不大，而且主要集中在史密斯菲尔德和2017年中国化工集团收购农业科技企业先正达（Syngenta）这两笔交易上，因此他不认为中国目前在美国的农业存在构成立即的国家安全威胁。
他说：“大多数中国投资集中在收购农田或资源非常易得和便宜的地方，而在美国收购土地往往更昂贵和更复杂，所以大多数中国人的投资集中在美国以外的其他国家。”
美贸易代表办公室首席中国顾问辞职
7/31/2021
美国贸易代表办公室的首席中国顾问伍人英（Mark Wu）表示，由于家庭原因已经辞职。
《华尔街日报》报道，伍人英在接受采访时说，他已经在7月中旬离开了美国贸易代表办公室，将于8月回到哈佛大学法学院，在那里他将专注研究知识产权问题和中国贸易政策。
伍人英表示，“我们的计划一直是帮助贸易代表戴琪适应她的角色”，“团队已经就位，节奏也已经形成”。
伍人英说，家庭问题是他离开的另一个原因。他说，这与美国贸易代表办公室继续对中国政策进行审查无关。
据报道，美国贸易代表办公室正在对其对华政策进行全面审查，预计将于今年秋季完成。该政策的细节鲜少公开，这导致大型投资者和对华的出口商日益失望。
中国首次以《反外国制裁法》制裁美国人员与实体
文 / 杨丹旭
7/23/2021
美国副国务卿谢尔曼访华前夕，中国首次援引《反外国制裁法》，对美国前商务部长罗斯等七个美国人员与实体实施制裁。
中国外交部23日晚在其官网以发言人回答记者问形式做出该宣布。
除了罗斯，其他被制裁的人员和实体包括：美国国会美中经济与安全评估委员会主席卡罗琳·巴塞洛缪；国会—行政部门中国委员会前办公室主任乔纳森·斯迪沃斯；美国国际事务民主协会金度允、美国国际共和研究所在港授权代表亚当·金、人权观察中国部主任索菲·理查森，以及香港民主委员会。
这是中国首次依据《反外国制裁法》，对美国采取反制措施。中国全国人大常委会上月10日通过《反外国制裁法》，为反制外国对中国的单边制裁提供法律依据。
根据该法律，反制措施包括不予签发签证、不准入境、注销签证或驱逐出境等；查封、扣押、冻结在中国境内的动产、不动产和其他各类财产；禁止或限制中国境内组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作等。
中国外交部发言人称：“对美国炮制所谓‘香港商业警告’，无端抹黑香港营商环境，非法制裁多名中国中央政府驻港机构官员，有关行径严重违反国际法和国际关系基本准则，严重干涉中国内政，中方对此坚决反对，予以强烈谴责。”
美国财政部本月16日宣布，对香港中联办七名副主任实施制裁，他们在美资产将被冻结，也被禁与美国实体交易。美国国务院、商务部和国土安全部同日也向企业发出公告，指随着北京加强对港控制，在港美企将面对信誉、监管、财务乃至法律风险。
中国做出的制裁宣布，也被视为给谢尔曼的下马威。按照计划，谢尔曼将于25日至26日到访天津。她将与中国外交部主管中美关系的副部长谢锋会谈，之后会见中国国务委员兼外长王毅。（联合早报北京特派员杨丹旭报道）
Biden’s China Doctrine?
By Raihan Ronodipuro
7/19/2021
The current issue of “The Economist,” published recently, features a cover story on Biden’s China Doctrine. According to the report, “Bidenism” has converted the rhetoric of the “Trumpism” era into a policy prescription of Sino-US clashes (particularly institutional confrontation), with only one winner.
Biden and his team think that China is not interested in coexisting with the US, and they anticipate an early domination. Because of this, the goal of US policy toward China is to undermine China’s objectives. The US can collaborate with China on topics of mutual interest, such as climate change, but on problems such as the economics, technology, diplomacy, military, and values, the US focuses opposing China’s aspirations by strengthening itself and expanding cooperation with allies.
The report calls Biden’s China Doctrine into doubt. Internally, although Biden wishes to utilize China to unify the two parties and push his own agenda, the Republican Party is clearly not foolish enough to readily embrace Biden’s proposals as long as Biden includes a “China” chapter on the bill’s cover.
Diplomatically, Biden not only misjudged the United States’ present global power, but also miscalculated the losses that American allies would suffer if they faced China. In reality, instead of promoting cohabitation, the US administration has turned the relationship between major powers into a “zero sum” game.
The article provides an illustration of how China is on the verge of dominating the economic sphere. Aside from becoming the world’s largest economy, the number of nations with China as their primary trade partner has nearly doubled that of countries with the United States as their primary trading partner.
When it comes to the Sino-US competition, Germany’s perspective is clearly influenced by economic reasons. Southeast Asian countries turn to the United States only for security, and they look to China for economic growth. As a result, if forced to choose between China and the United States, many countries will go with China.
Biden has continued to utilize China’s difficulties to push the domestic agenda, despite the US’s capacity to re-defend norms. His policy proposals include industrial strategies, government involvement, planning, and control. According to rumors, the Biden administration may employ further subsidies and oversight to ensure that jobs and manufacturing remain in the United States.
So, in effect, Biden’s policy proposals have followed a moderate kind of trade protectionism. If the Biden administration withdraws its friends from China, if the goal is to allow the US to leave more employment possibilities, the allies who have not benefitted will understandably wonder, “Why on earth should I join the US in doing this?”
The cover story of The Economist may be considered to have struck the high points of Bi’s China policy since taking office. The Biden administration appears to have clear stances and propositions on China policy, but both its logic and the actions of relevant officials send a strong signal that it serves only the internal affairs of the United States – as if the United States is unconcerned about the affairs of other countries.
Benefits and emotions For example, Southeast Asia was originally given significant weight in the United States’ Asia-Pacific policy, but when the ASEAN foreign ministers met at the end of May, Anthony Blinken, who had been invited, not only did not attend, but instead decided to travel from Ireland to Israel. Connected to join, however because to technical difficulties, other individuals waited on the scene for over an hour before connecting successfully. Despite the fact that it is only a technical problem, the impression provided to ASEAN nations is that the Biden administration does not value Southeast Asia.
A few weeks later, the same group of ASEAN foreign ministers traveled to Chongqing for the meeting. China not only laid out the red carpet for them, but Foreign Minister Wang Yi also had constructive face-to-face talks with them. When ASEAN nations compare their sentiments to those of China and the United States, they realize how frigid they are.
Aside from technical problems, Blinken opted to visit the Middle East rather than Southeast Asia, which rendered the Biden administration’s “return to Asia-Pacific” rhetoric unconvincing to many countries. The US Department of Defense relocated its lone aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific to facilitate military departure from Afghanistan, sending an incredible signal to US allies.
Similar events took place several times in the six months after Biden entered the stage. For example, when the Indonesian foreign minister visited New York last month for a UN meeting, he requested a foreign minister-level meeting with Blinken, but Blinken wasn’t sure if he couldn’t spare the time or didn’t want to see each other at all.
Other nations’ bewilderment, as well as the United States’ skepticism of the Biden administration, has inevitably been felt. Biden and his staff are now pushing for a solution. Blinken, for example, stated last Sunday that the Biden administration maintained the Trump administration’s policy of rejecting China’s South China Sea sovereignty claims, and that the US and the Philippines have signed a mutual defense treaty, and that any attacks on the Philippines will result in a response from the US.
Trying to win the approval of the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, studying Pompeo will not help the US diplomatic position. If Biden’s China policy proposal continues to follow the thinking and operations of the Trump era, it may face significant domestic and foreign problems.
US must outcompete China for a stable relationship: Daniel Russel
Beijing’s aggression comes from perception that America is declining, former official says
TSUYOSHI NAGASAWA, Nikkei staff writer
7/10/2021
WASHINGTON — The secret visit of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, kicked off an American policy of engagement with China. Fifty years later, with China on track to overtake the U.S. economy as early as 2028, bilateral relations are at a crossroad.
In an interview with Nikkei, Daniel Russel, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs during the Obama administration, said the nature of the relationship is changing, and it would be wrong to assume that Washington would return to the “good old days,” supporting China’s growth while making an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
But Russel, now vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute, also stressed that aiming for regime change in Beijing is unrealistic and unwise, and would be in line with the “catastrophic” failures of attempted regime changes in the Middle East.
Edited excerpts from the interview follow:
Q: Since Kissinger began an engagement policy with China in the 1970s, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively stable. The U.S. has invited China into the international system. Looking back, how do you evaluate the pros and cons of this policy?
A: If we took a step back and looked broadly at the historical record, we see that the United States deliberately chose a policy of engaging China and supporting its development, first back in 1972 under President Richard Nixon, where this was part of the strategy for containment of the Soviet Union, but then again in the ’90s, when Bill Clinton was president, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a second policy of engaging China that led up to the entry of China into the WTO.
From the Clinton era on, America’s policy toward China was based on the view that a stable China, a prospering China, would serve the best interests of the United States, in part because a weak China, or an insecure China, would likely pose a lot of risks to U.S. interests and to our allies.
I’ve never heard a persuasive argument that it would have been better to do something different than engagement, at those junctures. The United States made a common-sense decision, to try to engage China and to shape its behavior, to integrate China and to give it a stake in the international system, that the United States had largely designed.
And, while people hoped for political liberalization, I don’t think that political liberalization was the reason that the U.S. government and other governments took this approach, because what was the alternative?
Who is going to argue that an effort to isolate China and to contain China, or to destabilize China would have been a better strategy? It would have been a recipe for disaster.
Today, there is a kind of new conventional wisdom that is based on the view that cooperation with China is impossible, that engagement with China is a failure.
If you look at the historical record, that’s just not defensible, that’s not true.
But that doesn’t mean that we can go back to the “good old days” where we tried to support China’s growth, where we made an effort to avoid friction and confrontation.
There are two reasons for this.
In the past, as long as there was a large disparity, a gap, in military power and economic power between the two countries, the relationship was reasonably stable. But China has become much more economically successful and much more militarily and technologically capable. China is now close to being a peer power to the United States, which it never was.
Secondly, in the Xi Jinping era — which now is about almost nine years — China’s leadership has become more assertive, more ideological, and more brazen, more overt, in challenging global norms and challenging U.S. leadership. We’ve seen bullying behavior intensify by China.
Q: What were negotiations with China like in the years of President Barack Obama?
A: We had two very different experiences with the Chinese. On the South China Sea, Obama had very direct, very blunt, discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping repeatedly, from 2013 and the Sunnylands meeting on, each time more forcefully warned Xi that China’s island building, its reclamation, its activities, were creating risk, and that the United States had a responsibility to the defense of the Philippines and more broadly had a strong commitment to freedom of navigation, and could not accept efforts by China to claim the so-called nine-dashed line, or to develop outposts in international waters, and that this was damaging the U.S.-China relationship.
Finally, in the meeting in 2015, Xi made an assurance, and he made a public assurance as well, that China would not militarize the outposts that it built.
But, in that case, China did not ultimately honor that commitment, and the problematic behavior continued. And it had a very damaging effect on U.S. relations with China.
The issue of cyber theft, and particularly the Chinese government’s sponsorship of cyber-enabled theft of American intellectual property from companies, that was a different experience, because for years Obama raised this issue with Xi and warned of consequences, and told Xi that, although China was denying it, the United States knew that China was conducting these attacks, and that they couldn’t hide from us.
And finally, the Chinese saw evidence that the United States was preparing to take very severe action in retaliation for this, and the Chinese leadership recognized that they were reaching a dangerous, critical point, and so they sent to Washington the top security official in China, Meng Jianzhu, who came with instructions: don’t come home without an agreement.
And he stayed in Washington for several days. He met with the U.S. government team. And you may remember that the U.S. and China issued a four-point agreement. In that agreement, China essentially acknowledged that this cyber theft had occurred, committed to end it, and made some public commitments that they did implement, they did honor.
For several years after that, the U.S. agencies that were monitoring cyberattacks formed a judgment that China had, in fact, scaled back significantly the attacks that at least the government, the state, was supporting.
Q: Based on those lessons, how should the U.S. approach China?
A: My judgment is that Chinese behavior has become much more troubling and dangerous as Chinese leaders have begun to believe that they are as strong as the United States, that they are getting stronger and the U.S. is getting weaker.
I don’t think that it is wise or feasible to pursue a strategy of weakening China. Instead, it is necessary and wise to pursue a strategy of strengthening the United States and its allies because, as I pointed out before, when the power differential between the United States and China was wider, the relationship was very stable.
As long as the Chinese perception is that the United States is weak, is on the decline, is withdrawing from its traditional role in shaping and often leading international affairs, in rules-setting and so on, and has abandoned the sort of moral high ground that gave the United States so much soft power over the decades, China is incentivized to challenge more directly.
If and when the Chinese leaders see more evidence that the United States is demonstrating resilience, is renewing and reinventing itself, that the overall strength of the democratic communities is growing, not shrinking, the Chinese leaders will be much more open to compromise. They will be much more flexible, much more careful, in their behavior.
Chinese leaders are Leninists and Leninists respect strength and have contempt for weakness.
If the United States, over the course of this year, shows, for example, extraordinary ability to stop the spread of COVID-19, an extraordinary ability to develop vaccines that have 96% to 97% effective rates, demonstrates the ability to manufacture billions of doses and make them available to countries around the world, whereas China, despite its very strict and draconian controls, now continues to battle emerging cases of the delta variant, and the Chinese vaccine, Sinovac, which they have distributed around the world, is now revealed to be far less effective in preventing COVID than advertised, that’s a way in which the United States is already demonstrating its strength.
It is already outcompeting. We’re not hurting China. We’re not blocking China. But we are outperforming China.
Q: You talked about the leadership of Xi Jinping himself. How is he different from former presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin before him?
A: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not democrats; they had no interest in sharing power. But they were also pragmatists, and they were continuing the tradition of Deng Xiaoping, the tradition of “hiding and biding,” the tradition of opening and reform.
Xi Jinping represents a more nationalist and a more ideological strain of Leninism. In the Chinese communist system, he is clearly representing those who believe that more control is the right answer, and that political liberalization is a recipe for disaster that China cannot afford.
Q: China hawks in the U.S. have argued that the biggest problem is the Chinese Communist Party and thus the U.S. should seek regime change.
A: Number one, the people who are advocating regime change are the very people that have experimented with regime change in Iraq, in Libya, and other parts of the world. And, in every case, it has been a catastrophic failure. It’s not only that it didn’t succeed; it’s that it created immense problems in the country and immense problems in the United States.
The United States does not have the power to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party, and we know from experience that, even if we were successful, the consequences are unpredictable and immensely dangerous.
We can certainly hope for a change and an improvement. There’s much that we can do to bolster civil society within China, and much we can do to help strengthen institutions other than the Chinese Communist Party, in China.
There is a lot of pressure that can be applied externally on the Chinese leadership to limit their behavior. But the notion of the United States reaching in and changing the government in China is unrealistic and unwise.
Q: Is there a similarity between the current situation and the 1970s, in the sense that the Biden administration is now seeking a stable and predictable relationship with Russia so as to focus more on China and try to drive a wedge between China and Russia?
A: The big difference in the 1970s was that Moscow and Beijing were in an intense rivalry and were virtual enemies. Another difference was that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in a very significant Cold War, in which we had very little economic or other mutual dependencies and were largely separated into independent blocs, and we were competing around the world for influence, in a very direct way.
Today, Russia is a relatively weak power that is largely focused on making problems, making mischief for the U.S. and for the West.
And the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is very cooperative, very collaborative. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is well integrated into the global system, the multilateral system, and the degree of economic and technological integration between China, the United States, and the rest of the West, is unimaginably large.
So, I think, in those respects, we’re in a very, very different world. And, while it is problematic for the United States when China and Russia cooperate in causing problems for us and our friends, and while there would be some virtue and value in trying to provide incentives for Moscow to moderate its behavior and to refrain from that kind of mischief-making, I don’t think there is any prospect for a kind of fundamental alteration of the triangular relationship, the way that Kissinger and Nixon changed it in 1972.
China beating US by being more like America
Cultivating human capital will be essential if the US rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution
By BRANDON J WEICHERT
4/25/2021
The United States transitioned from an agrarian backwater into an industrialized superstate in a rapid timeframe. One of the most decisive men in America’s industrialization was Samuel Slater.
As a young man, Slater worked in Britain’s advanced textile mills. He chafed under Britain’s rigid class system, believing he was being held back. So he moved to Rhode Island.
Once in America, Slater built the country’s first factory based entirely on that which he had learned from working in England’s textile mills – violating a British law that forbade its citizens from proliferating advanced British textile production to other countries.
Samuel Slater is still revered in the United States as the “Father of the American Factory System.” In Britain, if he is remembered at all, he is known by the epithet of “Slater the Traitor.”
After all, Samuel Slater engaged in what might today be referred to as “industrial espionage.” Without Slater, the United States would likely not have risen to become the industrial challenger to British imperial might that it did in the 19th century. Even if America had evolved to challenge British power without Slater’s help, it is likely the process would have taken longer than it actually did.
Many British leaders at the time likely dismissed Slater’s actions as little more than a nuisance. The Americans had not achieved anything unique. They were merely imitating their far more innovative cousins in Britain.
As the works of Oded Shenkar have proved, however, if given enough time, annoying imitators can become dynamic innovators. The British learned this lesson the hard way. America today appears intent on learning a similar hard truth … this time from China.
By the mid-20th century, the latent industrial power of the United States had been unleashed as the European empires, and eventually the British-led world order, collapsed under their own weight. America had built out its own industrial base and was waiting in the geopolitical wings to replace British power – which, of course, it did.
Few today think of Britain as anything more than a middle power in the US-dominated world order. This came about only because of the careful industrial and manipulative trade practices of American statesmen throughout the 19th and first half of the 20th century employed against British power.
The People’s Republic of China, like the United States of yesteryear with the British Empire, enjoys a strong trading relationship with the dominant power of the day. China has also free-ridden on the security guarantees of the dominant power, the United States.
The Americans are exhausting themselves while China grows stronger. Like the US in the previous century, inevitably, China will displace the dominant power through simple attrition in the non-military realm.
Many Americans reading this might be shocked to learn that China is not just the land of sweatshops and cheap knockoffs – any more than the United States of previous centuries was only the home of chattel slavery and King Cotton. China, like America, is a dynamic nation of economic activity and technological progress.
While the Chinese do imitate their innovative American competitors, China does this not because the country is incapable of innovating on its own. It’s just easier to imitate effective ideas produced by America, lowering China’s research and development costs. Plus, China’s industrial capacity allows the country to produce more goods than America – just as America had done to Britain
Once China quickly acquires advanced technology, capabilities, and capital from the West, Chinese firms then spin off those imitations and begin innovating. This is why China is challenging the West in quantum computing technology, biotech, space technologies, nanotechnology, 5G, artificial intelligence, and an assortment of other advanced technologies that constitute the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Why reinvent the wheel when you can focus on making cheaper cars and better roads?
Since China opened itself up to the United States in the 1970s, American versions of Samuel Slater have flocked to China, taking with them the innovations, industries, and job offerings that would have gone to Americans had Washington never embraced Beijing.
America must simply make itself more attractive than China is to talent and capital. It must create a regulatory and tax system that is more competitive than China’s. Then Washington must seriously invest in federal R&D programs as well as dynamic infrastructure to support those programs.
As one chief executive of a Fortune 500 company told me in 2018, “If we don’t do business in China, our competitors will.”
Meanwhile, Americans must look at effective education as a national-security imperative. If we are living in a global, knowledge-based economy, then it stands to reason Americans will need greater knowledge to thrive. Therefore, cultivating human capital will be essential if America rather than China is to be the base of the next industrial revolution.
Besides, smart bombs are useless without smart people.
These are all things that the United States understood in centuries past. America bested the British Empire and replaced it as the world hegemon using these strategies. When the Soviet Union challenged America’s dominance, the US replicated the successful strategies it had used against Britain’s empire.
Self-reliance and individual innovativeness coupled with public- and private-sector cooperation catapulted the Americans ahead of their rivals. It’s why Samuel Slater fled to the nascent United States rather than staying in England.
America is losing the great competition for the 21st century because it has suffered historical amnesia. Its leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as its corporate tycoons and its people must recover the lost memory – before China cements its position as the world’s hegemon.
The greatest tragedy of all is that America has all of the tools it needs to succeed. All it needs to do is be more like it used to be in the past. To do that, competent and inspiring leadership is required. And that may prove to be the most destructive thing for America in the competition to win the 21st century.
Source: https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-beating-us-by-being-more-like-america/
Feb 18, 2021
Aug 4, 2020
