约瑟夫·奈：“9·11”20年后，美国需要反思
来源：新京报
9/08/2021
未来的历史学家会将2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击和1941年12月7日的珍珠港事件相提并论。
今年9月11日，美国将迎来“9·11”恐怖袭击20周年纪念日。这场震惊世界的袭击是美国本土迄今为止遭遇的最严重的恐怖袭击，同时也被认为是美国历史上的一个重要转折点。
“9·11”恐袭后，美国于2001年10月7日发动了阿富汗战争，标志着美国“全球反恐战争”的开始。美国在几个月内迅速推翻了当时掌权的塔利班，但此后却深陷战争泥潭20年。
20年后，阿富汗塔利班于8月15日重返喀布尔，再次控制阿富汗。而在阿富汗停留20年都未能如愿以偿建立一个“民主国家”的美国，于8月30日彻底撤出阿富汗，留下一个满目疮痍、人心惶惶的阿富汗。
20年后，我们应如何看待当年那场震惊世界的恐怖袭击，以及美国由此发起的反恐战争？20年后，我们又应该如何应对再次涌动的恐怖主义？新京报对话美国政治学者约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye Jr.）。
约瑟夫·奈是著名国际政治学家、新自由主义代表人物、“软实力”提出者，此前曾出任卡特政府助理国务卿、克林顿政府助理国防部长。他还曾担任哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院院长，目前是哈佛大学杰出贡献教授。
“9·11”和珍珠港事件影响相当
新京报：20年后回看，“9·11”对美国意味着什么？
约瑟夫·奈：“9·11”恐怖袭击对我们来说是一次可怕的心理冲击。直至目前，遇难者从双子塔上跳下来的画面仍然难以磨灭。
但一些怀疑论者开始质疑“9·11”是美国历史的一个转折点这一说法。他们的说法是，这次恐袭的直接影响对美国来说远非致命性的——据估计，美国2001年的GDP增长下降了0.5%，最终的保险索赔总额超过400亿美元，但只是当时10万亿经济总量的一小部分；这次袭击造成近3000人死亡，但相比于美国当年的交通事故死亡人数也只占非常小的一部分。
但我认为，未来的历史学家会将2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击和1941年12月7日的珍珠港事件相提并论。二战期间日本政府对珍珠港的突然袭击造成大约2400名美军死亡，摧毁或损坏19艘海军舰艇，包括8艘战舰。
事实上，这两起事件最主要的都是对美国公众心理的影响。二战期间，美国时任总统罗斯福一直试图强调轴心国（二战中的法西斯国家联盟）的威胁，但仍无法克服孤立主义的盛行。直到珍珠港事件后，美国立即正式加入二战。
在2000年的总统选举中，小布什倡导的是谦逊的外交政策，同时警告要避免“建设国家”的诱惑。但在“9·11”恐袭之后，他立马发起了“全球反恐战争”，先后入侵了阿富汗和伊拉克。
美国无休止的战争成本甚至高于“9·11”
新京报：如何看待美国在“9·11”后发起的全球反恐战争？
约瑟夫·奈：“9·11”恐袭说明了一点，那就是恐怖主义核心在于心理冲击，而非造成的破坏。
恐怖主义就像戏剧。在恐怖分子看来，一起事件产生的“震惊和敬畏”，更多的是来自戏剧性效果，而非死亡人数。举例来说，毒药可以杀死更多的人，但爆炸可以带来强烈的视觉冲击。直至现在，全世界电视电脑中仍在不断播放的双子塔倒下的画面，就是本·拉登的一个“妙招”。
恐怖主义也可以和柔术相对比——在柔术中，一个弱小的人可以将对手强大的力量反作用于他本身。“9·11”让数千名美国人遇难，但美国随后发起的无休止的战争成本更高——相比于我们对自己造成的损害，基地组织造成的损害几乎不值一提。
据估计，“9·11”后美国战争的经济成本超过6万亿美元，近15000名美国军人和美国承包商被杀害。再加上其他国家在战争中死亡的平民、因战争产生的难民，这个代价是难以估量的。
它的机会成本也很大。当美国前总统奥巴马试图将战略重心转向亚洲——世界经济增长最快的地区时，因为全球反恐战争遗留的问题让美国深陷中东泥潭。
新京报：美国20年的全球反恐战争胜利了吗？
约瑟夫·奈：有人认为，美国的全球反恐战是胜利的。美国本土再未发生过类似“9·11”那样大规模的恐怖袭击。“基地组织”的本·拉登和他的很多高级副手都被击毙，伊拉克前总统萨达姆·侯赛因已被处决（尽管他和“9·11”的关联一直存在质疑）。
但也有人会认为，本·拉登是“胜利”的，尤其是将他的死亡视为为宗教、为信仰殉难的一些人。目前，全球圣战运动支离破碎，但不可否认的是它已经蔓延到了更多的国家。在美国待了20年的阿富汗，塔利班已经重新掌权——讽刺的是，拜登总统最初设定的美军撤离日期为9月11日。
美国撤出阿富汗后或专注于亚洲
新京报：美国入侵阿富汗20年后，近日终于撤离阿富汗。如何评价拜登撤离阿富汗的决定？
约瑟夫·奈：现在评估美军撤出阿富汗的长期影响可能为时过早，但从喀布尔机场的混乱局势、ISIS实施的恐怖袭击来看，短期影响已经很明显。
从长远来看，拜登终于放弃在一个被山脉和部落分割、主要通过反抗外国人团结起来的国家“建设民主国家”的努力，可能是正确的。
放弃阿富汗之后，他能够更专注于他的核心战略——平衡在最具活力的亚洲崛起的中国的影响。虽然美国从阿富汗撤军的混乱伤害了美国的软实力，但亚洲也有自己长期的力量平衡，日本、印度等国家欢迎美国在场，以遏制中国的影响。所以说，拜登的总体战略是有其道理的。
美国不应重蹈覆辙
新京报：20年后的今天，美国应该从“9·11”中吸取哪些教训？
约瑟夫·奈：必须关注的是，恐怖主义问题仍然存在，甚至恐怖分子可能会受“9·11”刺激而再次采取类似的行动。
因此，美国需要制定有效的反恐策略，而其核心是，不要重蹈覆辙，再次陷入会对自己造成巨大伤害的陷阱之中。
想象一下，2001年的“9·11”恐袭之后，如果布什总统没有发起全球反恐战争，而是通过精细化的军事打击、良好的情报和外交相结合来进行应对，世界会是什么样？如果美国进入阿富汗六个月后就离开了——即使这意味着需要和当时执政的塔利班谈判，现在阿富汗和全球局势是不是会不一样？我们都应该从过去20年中吸取教训，同时制定更加合理的应对计划。
What Difference Did 9/11 Make?
By JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.
9/08/2021
When the next terrorist attacks come, will US presidents be able to channel public demand for revenge by precise targeting, explaining the trap that terrorists set, and focusing on creating resilience in US responses? That is the question Americans should be asking, and that their leaders should be addressing.
CAMBRIDGE – The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a horrific shock. Images of trapped victims leaping from the Twin Towers are indelible, and the intrusive security measures introduced in the wake of the attacks have long since become a fact of life.
But skeptics doubt that it marked a turning point in history. They note that the immediate physical damage was far from fatal to American power. It is estimated that the United States’ GDP growth dropped by three percentage points in 2001, and insurance claims for damages eventually totaled over $40 billion – a small fraction of what was then a $10 trillion economy. And the nearly 3,000 people killed in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC, when the al-Qaeda hijackers turned four aircraft into cruise missiles was a small fraction of US travel fatalities that year.
While accepting these facts, my guess is that future historians will regard 9/11 as a date as important as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The surprise attack on the US naval base in Hawaii killed some 2,400 American military personnel and destroyed or damaged 19 naval craft, including eight battleships. In both cases, however, the main effect was on public psychology.
For years, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had tried to alert Americans to the Axis threat but had failed to overcome isolationism. All that changed with Pearl Harbor. In the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush advocated a humble foreign policy and warned against the temptations of nation-building. After the shock of 9/11, he declared a “global war on terror” and invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq. Given the proclivities of top members of his administration, some say a clash with Iraq’s then-dictator, Saddam Hussein, was predictable in any case, but not its manner or cost.
What 9/11 illustrates is that terrorism is about psychology, not damage. Terrorism is like theatre. With their powerful military, Americans believe that “shock and awe” comes from massive bombardment. For terrorists, shock and awe comes from the drama more than the number of deaths caused by their attacks. Poisons might kill more people, but explosions get the visuals. The constant replay of the falling Twin Towers on the world’s television sets was Osama bin Laden’s coup.
Terrorism can also be compared to jujitsu, in which a weak adversary turns the power of a larger player against itself. While the 9/11 attacks killed several thousand Americans, the “endless wars” that the US subsequently launched killed many more. Indeed, the damage done by al-Qaeda pales in comparison to the damage America did to itself.
By some estimates, nearly 15,000 US military personnel and contractors were killed in the wars that followed 9/11, and the economic cost exceeded $6 trillion. Add to this the number of foreign civilians killed and refugees created, and the costs grow even more enormous. The opportunity costs were also large. When President Barack Obama tried to pivot to Asia – the fastest-growing part of the world economy – the legacy of the global war on terror kept the US mired in the Middle East.
Despite these costs, some say that the US achieved its goal: There has not been another major terrorist attack on the US homeland on the scale of 9/11. Bin Laden and many of his top lieutenants were killed, and Saddam Hussein was removed (though his connection to 9/11 was always dubious). Alternatively, a case can be made that bin Laden succeeded, particularly if we consider that his beliefs included the value of religious martyrdom. The jihadist movement is fragmented, but it has spread to more countries, and the Taliban have returned to power in Afghanistan – ironically, just before the 9/11 anniversary that President Joe Biden originally set as the target date for withdrawing US troops.
It is too early to assess the long-term effects of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The short-term effects of the chaotic exit are costly, but in the long term, Biden may come to be seen as correct to forswear the effort at nation-building in a country divided by mountains and tribes and united mainly by opposition to foreigners.
Leaving Afghanistan will allow Biden to focus on his grand strategy of balancing the rise of China. For all the damage done to US soft power by the chaotic manner of the exit from Afghanistan, Asia has its own longstanding balance of power in which countries like Japan, India, and Vietnam do not wish to be dominated by China and welcome an American presence. When one considers that within 20 years of America’s traumatic exit from Vietnam, the US was welcome in that country as well as the region, Biden’s overall strategy makes sense.
At the same time, 20 years after 9/11, the problem of terrorism remains, and terrorists may feel emboldened to try again. If so, the task for US leaders is to develop an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Its core must be to avoid falling into terrorists’ trap by doing great damage to ourselves. Leaders must plan to manage the psychological shocks at home and abroad.
Imagine what the world would be like if Bush had avoided the tempting rallying cry of a global war on terror and responded to 9/11 by carefully selected military strikes combined with good intelligence and diplomacy. Or, if he had gone into Afghanistan, imagine that he had withdrawn after six months, even if that had involved negotiating with the despised Taliban.
Looking forward, when the next terrorist attacks come, will presidents be able to channel public demand for revenge by precise targeting, explaining the trap that terrorists set, and focusing on creating resilience in US responses? That is the question Americans should be asking, and that their leaders should be addressing.
** Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is Dean Emeritus of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and author of Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump.
